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Abstract
We study a dual channel structure in which a manufacturer sells its product
through an independent traditional retailer channel as well as a direct online channel
(i.e., the Internet). The model conceptualizes service-based competition between the
channels by considering consumer channel choice. The service level of the retailer
channel is evaluated with its product availability level while the service level of the
direct channel is evaluated with its delivery lead time. The consumers choose between
channels by considering the channels’ service levels and a number of other factors such
as the relative convenience of channels. We base our studies on Chen et al. (2008).
We extend their study by considering a buyback contract between the manufacturer
and the retailer. We compare results under dual channel, direct-channel-only and
retail-channel-only structures under wholesale price and buyback contracts.
iii
GERI˙ ALIM KONTRATLARI I˙LE I˙KI˙LI˙ SATIS¸ KANALLARININ
YO¨NETI˙LMESI˙
Sevilay GO¨KDUMAN
EM, Master Tezi, 2009
Tez Danıs¸manı: Yar. Doc¸. Dr. Murat Kaya
Anahtar Kelimeler: I˙kili kanallar, dog˜rudan kanal, hizmet tabanlı rekabet, u¨ru¨n
bulunabilirlig˜i, tedarik zinciri kontratları
O¨zet
Bu tezde u¨reticilerin hem bag˜ımsız geleneksel perakendeci kanalları hem de kendi
dog˜rudan internet kanalları aracılıg˜ı ile satıs¸ yapabildikleri ikili satıs¸ kanalı sistem-
leri u¨zerinde c¸alıs¸ılmaktadır. Model, kanallar arasındaki hizmet tabanlı rekabeti
kavramsallas¸tırmaktadır. Perakendecilerin hizmet seviyesi u¨ru¨n bulunabilirlig˜i ile,
u¨reticilerin hizmet seviyesi ise tedarik su¨resi ile deg˜erlendirilmektedir. Tu¨keticiler
kanallar arasındaki tercihlerini, kanallar tarafından sag˜lanan hizmet seviyelerini ve
perakendeci kanalını kullanmanın neden oldug˜u go¨reli rahatsızlık maliyeti gibi bir-
takım dig˜er fakto¨rleri de deg˜erlendirerek yapmaktadırlar. C¸alıs¸malarımızda Chen
vd. (2008) modelini taban aldık. U¨retici ve perakendeci arasında geri alım kontratı
uygulayarak modeli genis¸lettik. Sonuc¸ları ikili kanal sistemleri, yalnız perakendeci
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As the number of alternatives to reach end consumers increases, it is getting more
important for companies to design and coordinate their processes in a way that
they can satisfy the needs of consumers. Dual channel structure is of increasing
interest to manufacturers in order to survive in today’s competitive markets. This
thesis investigates the changes in the channel performance; i.e., total sales and total
profit when a new channel is added to the existing channel structure under different
contracting mechanisms.
We develop a dual channel model in which the manufacturer (he) sells directly
through his website and also through an independent retail (she) channel. By doing
so, the manufacturer increases his consumer base including the online channel con-
sumers. Although the manufacturer’s profit margin is higher in the direct channel,
he shares the inventory risk with the retailer when he sells through the retailer. We
determine the terms of the trade between the manufacturer and the retailer by a
using buyback contract.
We also develop a consumers’ channel choice model. The consumers choose be-
tween these two channels depending on the service level and the relative inconvenience
of the channels. The service level of the direct channel is evaluated with its delivery
lead time while the service level of the retailer channel is evaluated with its product
availability level. We capture the relative inconvenience of the retailer with a param-
eter called relative inconvenience cost. This parameter reflects the time and effort
2
costs that consumers incur due to visiting the retailer.
By solving the model, we determine three types of dual channel strategies for
the manufacturer. First, the manufacturer eliminates the retailer by setting a short
delivery lead time when the direct channel cost is low. In this case, all consumers are
served through the direct channel. Second, the manufacturer captures the retailer’s
profit when the direct channel cost is above a threshold and the relative inconvenience
cost of the retailer is high. In this case, the consumer market is segmented into two.
The first segment buys only from the direct channel. The second segment buys only
from the retailer if the product is available otherwise the consumers leave the system
without purchasing. Third, the manufacturer shares the profit with the retailer when
the direct channel cost is high and the relative inconvenience cost of the retailer is
low. In this case, the consumer market is segmented into three. The first segment
only buys from the direct channel. The second segment first attempt to buy from
the retailer channel. If the product is available then they buy the product from the
retailer. If there is a stock-out, then those consumers buy from the direct channel.
The third segment only buys from the retailer channel if the product is available
otherwise they leave the system without purchasing.
In addition to observing the channel performance under the dual channel - buy-
back contract structure (DB), we also analyze dual channel - wholesale price contract
(DW), retailer-only - buyback contract (RB), retailer-only - wholesale price contract
(RW) and direct-only channel structures. By comparing the results of these cases, we
determine under which parameter combinations switching to a dual channel structure
or switching to the buyback contract is better for a manufacturer, assuming that the
status quo is the retailer-only structure with wholesale price contract.
3
1.2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we aim to explore the main issues that we cover in the thesis. First
we discuss a number of existing channel structures. Then we explain the effects of
consumer behavior on channel structures. We continue with a discussion on channel
management, and finally we outline the concept of coordination with contracts.
1.2.1 Channel Structures and the Internet as a New Sales
Channel
A distribution channel is a set of interdependent organizations that ensures a product
arrives to the market. There are varieties of channel structures which are built on
the idea of satisfying the needs of market segments in a precise way (Coughlan et al.
1992). Changes in technology and consumer preferences lead to the introduction of
new channel structures. Personal computer industry is a good example to illustrate
the noteworthy changes in channel structures. As computers first started to be sold
in the market, direct sales forces were the only way of selling them. In 1970s retail-
ers were also included in the channel as intermediaries. In mid of 1980s, customer
awareness about PCs grew as the number of competitors increase. This change led
to three important long term adjustments in the distribution channels. First, mass
resellers entered to the market. Second, consumers started to order via the Internet
in 1990s and finally, specialized computer stores opened (Winer 2007).
Channel structures can be classified under two main categories: direct channel
structures and indirect channel structures. In a direct channel structure, all activi-
ties from the manufacturing of a product to reaching the end consumers are under
the responsibility of a single firm, the manufacturer. Sales directly via the Internet
and telephone, door-to-door selling, or retail outlets which are owned by manufactur-
ers are different applications of direct channels. Indirect channel structure includes
different levels of intermediaries depending on the type of business. In this case,
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the manufacturer uses other companies to reach the end consumers. Direct channel
structure entails the usage of direct sales force providing the opportunity of applying
new strategies directly. By the help of the direct channel, the manufacturers can ex-
tend their contact with their consumers and obtain better information about market
demand (Lee et al. 1997). A direct channel also allows the manufacturers to gain
more profit by controlling pricing and distribution directly (Stern et al. 1996). How-
ever, the access of the direct sales force to consumers might be limited and managing
a direct sales force is expensive. On the other hand, an indirect channel allows a
company to reach more consumers by the help of intermediaries. In addition, the
intermediaries perform some key functions such as gathering information, providing
transportation and storage and financing (Winer 2007).
Both channel structures can be observed in different formats. Physical (bricks
and mortar) format and online (the Internet) format are two of the most commonly
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Figure 1.1: Different Channel Structures
Both the manufacturers and the retailers might use one or more channel formats
at the same time. For example, Apple, as a manufacturer, sells its products through
both its direct online channel apple.com and through Apple retail stores. Similarly,
BestBuy, a retailer, sells the products of different manufacturers through its physical
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stores and website. Some consumer-goods manufacturers sell their products through
both direct and indirect channels simultaneously. For example, a manufacturer might
provide direct sales through company outlets meanwhile its products are also available
at independent retailers. This new channel structure is referred to as a dual channel
structure.
Dual channel structure may allow a firm to increase its market coverage, obtain
lower channel cost and provide customized service to its customers (Keller, 2006).
Beyond its advantages, a dual channel structure may also result in conflicts between
the channel members as it introduces the manufacturer as a direct competitor to his
retailers (See Section 1.2.3). With the widespread usage of the Internet, dual channel
applications evolved into a new phase.
As a flexible, interactive distribution channel the Internet offers improvement on
channel management. A large number of manufacturers including Compaq, Hewlett
& Packard, IBM, and Nike apply a dual distribution channel strategy by selling on-
line in addition to their traditional retailer channel. There are various advantages of
including the Internet as a distribution channel. Beyond conventional direct channel
applications, the Internet provides a higher accessibility for the consumers as it is not
limited to a physical store. Moreover, the manufacturers can observe the changes in
market and respond quickly (Kiang et al. 1999). However, Peterson et al. (1997)
raise two questions regarding the interaction between the Internet and the traditional
channels. The authors question if the Internet is a suitable substitute for the tradi-
tional channels and whether the Internet can dominate the current channel structures
or not.
The characteristics of the product which is marketed through the Internet is an
important factor for the success of the Internet sales. Peterson et al. (1997) classify
products as search goods and experience goods. Search goods are defined as the prod-
ucts that can be evaluated by external information while experience goods require
personal interaction with the product. The Internet might be an effective distribu-
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tion channel for search goods whereas traditional channels might be better suited
for experience goods. The Internet might also be suitable for high cost, infrequently
purchased goods.
In this research, we focus on a dual channel structure which includes a direct
channel in online format and a retailer channel in physical format. However, note
that other channel combinations are also observed in practice. For example both
the manufacturer and the retailer can manage an online channel. Alternatively the
manufacturer can sell his product directly through both the online format and the
physical format.
1.2.2 The Effect of Consumer Purchasing Behavior on
Channel Structure
With the evolution of new channel structures, insight into the changing consumer
behaviors becomes crucially important for channel management. In order to set the
right channel strategies, companies should analyze how different consumers choose
between competing channel structures.
Neslin et al. (2006) define six factors that determine the consumers’ channel se-
lection as marketing efforts, channel attributes, channel integration, social influence,
situational factors and individual differences. By considering these factors, it is pos-
sible to differentiate online consumers from traditional channel consumers. Online
consumers tend to give more importance to informativeness, convenience, time and
effort savings whereas the traditional channel consumers tend to give more impor-
tance to enjoyment and service quality (Broekhunizen et al. 2003). Price is also one
of the most important cues affecting the consumers’ purchasing behavior. However,
Bellman et al. (1999) report that online consumers’ valuations regarding cost savings
is lower than their valuations on time savings. On the other hand, Clay et al. (2001)
claim that consumers’ price sensitivity is dependent on their previous shopping be-
haviors. If a consumer is already price sensitive, then she can be more sensitive in
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the online channel as a result of high flexibility. However if a consumer is price in-
sensitive, then due to time considerations or high income she might tend to be less
sensitive in the online channel.
Consumers’ decision sequence is another important aspect of the their purchas-
ing behavior. Peterson et al. (1997) suggest that the consumers’ decision process is
shaped around brand or product category preferences and channel preferences. At the
information acquisition process, they either focus on a brand or a product category.
The consumers also make a choice between the traditional channel and the online
channel for information acquisition. Finally they choose a channel for final transac-
tion and brand acquisition. The authors also state that brand-loyal consumers tend
to moderate the competition between the online channel and the traditional channel
because in such a case the consumers only focus on price information and product
availability in the search process. In addition, Steinfield et al. (2002) point to the
possible switches of the consumers from one channel to another during the purchas-
ing process. Regarding the brand or product category preferences, Jupiter research
results indicate that 77% of the online shoppers determine the specific product they
want to purchase before the purchasing process (Gilly et al. 2000). In addition, HP
research results show that 73% of the consumers who shop for printers are brand-sure;
i.e., they know which brand they will buy from (Chen et al. 2008).
Considering the aforementioned information about consumers’ purchasing behav-
ior, the companies segment their consumer population. Market segmentation is a
consumer analysis method which groups the consumers under different categories in
order to investigate the common shopping habits (Winer 2007). In a dual channel
structure, as Broekhuizen et al. (2003) state, channel loyalty is a more effective factor
for channel segmentation than brand loyalty.
In our study we consider brand-sure consumers who have determined the product
that they want to purchase. Therefore we segment the consumer population depend-
ing on their channel preferences, which in turn depend on the service levels that the
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channels offer. We also allow the consumers to switch between channels in case of a
stock-out.
1.2.3 Potential Issues in Channel Management
Retaining a dual channel structure provides greater market penetration than a single-
channel structure by allowing the channel members to serve consumers from different
segments. However dual channel structure also leads to a tension between the manu-
facturer and the retailer as it establishes the manufacturer as a direct competitor to
his retailer. In literature, this tension is referred to as channel conflict (Tsay et al.
2004). Channel conflict originates from one channel members’ behavior that prevents
the other member(s) from obtaining its (their) goals. Channel conflict issue gained
importance with the opening of factory outlets in 1980s and today it has reached a
new phase with the inclusion of the Internet to channel structures. Manufacturer’s
attempt to open a direct channel is considered to be a threat by the retailer. Home
Depot case is a well known example of channel conflict resulting from the dual chan-
nel structure. Home Depot is a large retailer of home improvement and construction
products and services. After some of the suppliers of Home Depot opened their online
direct channel, Home Depot send letters to her suppliers stating that she is hesitant
about doing business with her competitors (Brooker 1999).
Double marginalization is another common problem encountered in channel man-
agement. Double marginalization reflects the inefficiencies in a channel (or, in a sup-
ply chain) due to decentralized decision making by a number of independent firms
(Spengler 1950). We discuss double marginalization in detail in Section 1.2.4.
1.2.4 Coordination with Contracts
In order to eliminate the aforementioned channel problems and increase channel per-
formance, firms should design and manage their channels carefully. The effectiveness
of a channel depends on the degree that the companies synchronize and coordinate
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their decentralized operations. On the other hand, synchronization of decentralized
operations can lead to loss of competitive advantage. Hence it is important to align
the incentives of the relevant parties (O¨zer 2006).
We illustrate these concepts with an example. Consider a vertically integrated
firm (i.e., the manufacturer) that undertakes both production and distribution op-
erations. The firm operates in a single selling season. Because of the nature of the
business, neither carrying inventory from one period to the next nor placing a sec-
ond production run is possible. Hence the firm needs to determine the production
quantity prior to the selling season. However demand during the selling season is
probabilistic.
Since demand is uncertain, upon deciding the production quantity, the firm faces
a trade off between excess inventory and insufficient inventory. Holding excessive
inventory cause inefficient investment because of the opportunity costs, inventory
holding costs and costs of devaluation of inventory; whereas, insufficient inventory
cause loss of goodwill cost and leads to decrease in profit because of lost sales. These
two cases reflect an inventory management problem which is known as inventory risk
(Kaya and O¨zer 2009). Let c be the unit production cost and p be the unit selling
price of the product in the market. Assume that units unsold during the single period
have no salvage value (as in the case of newspapers). Then, the cost of each unit of
excess inventory to the firm is c and is referred to as the overage cost co whereas the
cost of each unit of insufficient inventory is p− c and referred to as the underage cost
cu.
Let Q be the quantity that the firm decides to produce. Let F (.) denote the
cumulative distribution function of the random demand for the product during the
selling season. Then F (Q) represents the probability that realized demand during
the selling season will be smaller than Q. Thus the probability of having at least one
unsold item at the end of the selling season is F (Q) and the probability of stocking
out is 1−F (Q). The corresponding costs are coF (Q) and cu(1−F (Q)). A balancing
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quantity between the marginal cost of an additional item and the marginal benefit of
a stocked-out item is the optimal quantity that should be produced by the firm; i.e.,






Equation (1.1) is called as the critical ratio. The substitution of cu and co values





where F−1 is the inverse function of cumulative distribution function.
The same result can be obtained by analyzing the profit function of the firm. The
expected sales of the firm is E[min(Q,D)]; the minimum of its production quantity
Q and demand D. The resulting expected profit is:
ΠI(Q) = pE[min(Q,D)]− cQ. (1.3)






which is the same result as Equation (1.2).
Instead of managing both production and distribution simultaneously, the firm
might alternatively choose to disintegrate the production and the distribution opera-
tions. In such a case, production of the product is provided by the manufacturer (he)
and the distribution of the product is provided through a retailer (she). In this case,
formal contracts can be used to align incentives between the members of the channel
(i.e., between the manufacturer and the retailer). Contracts are used for defining the
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rules of the trade between the channel members. An extended review of the academic
literature on contracts can be found in Cachon (2003). For the purpose of this study
we only analyze the wholesale price contract and the buyback contract in detail and
briefly mention a number of other contract types.
The Wholesale Price Contract
The wholesale price contract is the most commonly used contract type in disinte-
grated channels because of its ease of application. In the wholesale price contract,
the retailer pays a wholesale price w per unit ordered to the manufacturer. The re-
tailer decides her order quantity Q by considering the wholesale price offered by the
manufacturer. The manufacturer satisfies the retailer’s order by producing Q units
at a unit production cost of c, and delivers these units to the retailer. The retailer
cannot return unsold units to the manufacturer. This contract yields a profit margin
of w−c to the manufacturer and a profit margin of p−w to the retailer. The expected
profit functions of the manufacturer, the retailer and the total channel are as follows:
Πwm(Q) = (w − c)Q, (1.4a)








In a disintegrated channel, the profit of the manufacturer is determined by the
order quantity of the retailer. Once the retailer decides on Q, the manufacturer’s
profit is certain. However the retailer’s demand quantity is unknown and she decides
her order quantity in a way that maximizes her own profit in (1.4b). The resulting
12





Channel Coordination and Double Marginalization
As we mentioned earlier, one purpose of contracts is to achieve channel coordination
by preventing double marginalization. In this section, we analyze the efficiency of
the wholesale price contract for channel coordination by emphasizing the differences
between the results of the vertically integrated channel and the disintegrated channel.
Note that the expression for the total profit of the disintegrated channel in (1.4c) is
same as the expression for the total profit of the vertically integrated channel in (1.3),
and it is independent of the wholesale price value. Hence in a coordinated channel,
the order (or, production) quantity should be equal to the order quantity of the the
vertically integrated channel. When we compare the results of the integrated channel
to the disintegrated channel under a wholesale price contract, we first observe that the
retailer orders a lower number of products than what the integrated channel orders
(i.e., Qw ≤ QI). The underlying reason behind the retailer’s decision is the change
in the balance of underage and overage costs. The overage cost of the retailer with a
wholesale price contract contract (w) is higher than the overage cost of the integrated
channel (c). At the same time, the underage cost of the retailer with a wholesale price
contract (p − w) is lower than the underage cost of the integrated channel (p − c).
Therefore the retailer’s optimal solution is to order a lower quantity compared to the
integrated channel. While determining her order quantity, the retailer maximizes her
expected profit and ignores the total profit of the channel. In literature, this situation
is referred to as double marginalization.
With proper contracting mechanisms, the manufacturer can induce the retailer
to order the channel-optimal quantity, leading to maximum total channel profit.
The extra profit can be shared by the channel member(s). A contract is classified
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as Pareto improving if it leads to a profit increase for at least one of the channel
members without decreasing the profit of the other channel members. The efficiency
of a contract is measured by proportioning the total channel profit under the contract
to the total profit of the vertically integrated channel. If the ratio is 1 then the channel
is said to be coordinated. In this case, the channel achieves the maximum possible
total profit.
Our analysis regarding the wholesale price contract shows that the wholesale price
contract cannot achieve channel coordination. Next we study the buyback contract
which is proven to be coordinating in the setting we consider (Cachon 2003).
The Buyback Contract
With a buyback contract, the manufacturer shares some of the retailer’s inventory risk
due to demand uncertainty. In a buyback contract (w, b), the manufacturer charges
a wholesale price w per product and offers to buy the unsold products of the retailer
at the end of the season at a buyback price b each. Therefore, the corresponding
expected profits of the channel members and the total channel profit are as follows:
Πbm(Q) = (w − c)Q− bE[Q−min(Q,D)], (1.5a)
Πbr(Q) = pE[min(Q,D)] + bE[Q−min(Q,D)]− wQ,
= (p− b)E[min(Q,D)]− (w − b)Q,
(1.5b)
Πbtot = pE[min(Q,D)]− cQ. (1.5c)
Buyback contracts provide incentive to the retailer to increase her order quantity,
and hence the level of product availability by decreasing her cost of overage. The
overage cost of the retailer decreases to w− b. Considering the costs of underage and





Thus the retailer orders more than what she orders with a wholesale price contract.
With appropriate choices of w and b, the retailer can be persuaded to order a quantity
equal to the integrated channel’s production quantity and hence coordination can be
achieved. Coordination requires the equality of the critical ratio of the integrated





. From this equality, the relation between bb and w of a coordinating
buyback contract determined as:
bb =
p(w − c)
p− c . (1.6)
Buyback contract can also be used as a profit sharing mechanism between the
manufacturer and the retailer. Comparing (1.5c) and (1.5b), we observe that the
profit of the retailer under buyback contract can be written in terms of the total
channel profit. If the contract parameters satisfy
(p− b) = θp and (w − b) = θc
then θ represents the retailer’s share in total channel profit i.e. Πbr(Q) = θΠ
b
tot(Q).
Any (w, b) pair that satisfies (1.6) is a coordinating contract for the channel.
Different values of (w,bb) lead to different profit and risk sharing strategies. See Kaya
and O¨zer (2009) for detailed analysis.
Other Contract Types
We use the wholesale price contract and the buyback contract in detail in our sub-
sequent analysis. Here we mention some other contracts which are commonly used
in literature and in practice. Under a revenue sharing contract the retailer shares
her sales revenue with the manufacturer in exchange for a reduction in the wholesale
price. Under a sales rebate contract the manufacturer provides a rebate (a monetary
payment) to the retailer for each sold item above a threshold value. Under a quan-
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tity flexibility contract, the retailer is permitted to change her order quantity after
demand is realized. After the retailer determines her order quantity, the manufac-
turer commits to provide up to a threshold quantity and the retailer commits to buy
more than a certain quantity. With a quantity discount contract, the wholesale price
becomes a decreasing function of the retailer’s order quantity. All of these contracts
are found to be coordinating in the setting we consider by reallocating the inventory
risk and profit between the channel members (Cachon 2003, Kaya and O¨zer 2009).
The Road Map for the Thesis
As above discussions point out, the manufacturers should manage their channels in
a way that they satisfy the needs of consumers while they eliminate the potential
conflicts with their retailers. In this research, we study a dual channel setting which
consists of an online direct channel and a traditional retailer channel. We focus on
the performance of the firms under three channel structures: dual channel, retailer-
only channel and direct-only channel and two contracting practices: wholesale price
contract and buyback contract. Figure 1.2 illustrates the different channel struc-
ture/contract combinations that we consider. As the arrows indicate, beginning with
a traditional retailer channel under a wholesale price contract (which is the default
setting in most of the traditional academic studies), the manufacturer might prefer
to switch to other channel structures such as retailer-only channel under a buyback
contract or dual channel under a wholesale price contract. By considering these
alternatives, we figure out in which circumstances the manufacturer should prefer
opening a direct channel over changing the contract type and vice versa. In addition,
we study the efficiency of the buyback contract, which is known to be coordinating
in a retailer-only channel structure, in a dual channel structure.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 3 summarizes the
related literature. Section 4 describes the dual channel buyback contract model. In





Channel Section 5Section 4
Channel
Structure Retailer-Only Section 6.1 Section 6.2
Direct-Only Section 7
Figure 1.2: Possible Channel Structure/Contract Combinations
Section 6 we analyze the retailer-only channel model and in Section 7 we analyze
the direct-only model. Section 8 presents a discussion on our results and Section 9




We summarize the related literature in three related areas: dual channel management,
supply chain contracting and consumer behavior.
Tsay et al. (2004a) review several channel structures by focusing on the conflict
and coordination issues. The authors classify the existing channel structures under
four categories regarding channel control and channel type. A channel can include
single or multiple channel types and it can be controlled by the manufacturer or
there can be independent intermediaries. Our main interest is on multiple-channel
type systems with independent intermediaries.
Most of the papers that study dual channel management focus on price compe-
tition between the manufacturer and the retailer. Chiang et al. (2003) examine a
dual channel structure under the assumption that customers obtain less value from
the direct channel. Their study shows that the dual channel structure is effective in
reducing double marginalization by creating a threat for the retailer. Therefore, even
in the cases in which the expected sales of the direct channel is zero, it is optimal for
the manufacturer to open a direct channel. Yan (2008) improves the work of Chiang
et al. (2003) by including the profit sharing approach. Their study shows that a dual
channel structure increases the total channel profit but depending on the perceived
value of consumers, it may also cause a price war between the manufacturer and the
retailer. Yet, the authors indicate that the profit sharing strategy increases the profit
of both the manufacturer and the retailer. Avery et al. (2008) study the cannibaliza-
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tion and complementarity effects of retailer store openings on catalogue and online
channels of the manufacturer. The authors show that in the short term retailer stores
cannibalize the sales through catalogues, but in the long term, complementary effects
of the retailer stores are observed on both channels.
Rhee et al. (1999) segment the consumers into two as price-sensitive consumers
and service-sensitive consumers. Their study show that when the consumers’ val-
uations of retail service is similar in both segments, dual channel is the optimum
strategy as a result of higher market coverage and lower wholesale price. But as
the valuation of retailer service gets higher, the selling price at the retailer increases
which also leads to an increase in the wholesale price. In this case, the manufacturer
shuts down the direct channel and focuses only on the retailer channel. Dumrongsiri
et al. (2006) change the utility definition of consumer which Chiang et al. (2003)
and Yan et al. (2008) use in their models by adding a service quality term. Ku-
mar et al. (2006) segment the consumer population into two: brand-loyal consumers
and store-loyal consumers. Their model also allows the retailer to carry a compet-
ing product with the manufacturer’s product. Therefore the authors introduce the
merchandising support concept which influences the shopping behavior of the store-
loyal consumers. Similar to previous studies, they also show that the existence of a
competing direct channel improves the retailer performance hence improves the total
channel performance.
Cattani et al. (2006) examine the pricing strategies of a retailer and a manufac-
turer under different strategies. They assume that the manufacturer commits to set
the price of the direct channel same with the retailer channel in order to avoid chan-
nel conflict. Hendershott et al. (2006) analyze a system where a single manufacturer
sells to more than one retailer. Consumers have different valuations for the product,
and they search the retailers until they find a sufficiently low price. However, as
consumers visit more retailers, their gain from the product decreases. In this setting,
he authors show that adding a direct channel decreases the number of retailers in the
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market. The retailers that enter the market have a reduced demand and they lower
the market price. Bell et al. (2002) examine a model where a physical direct store
and an independent retailer’s store are located in the same mall. They compare the
performance of the retailer in the case of competition with independent retailers with
the performance in the case of competition with the manufacturer.
The models we mentioned so far ignore inventory-related issues. Boyaci (2004)
studies a dual channel model in which both the retailer channel and the direct channel
hold inventories. The manufacturer is assumed to have an infinite supply capacity
such that he can instantly supply the demand of both channels. The model allows con-
sumers to search the other channel if there is a stock-out in their first-choice channel.
Hence, the manufacturer and the retailer compete both vertically and horizontally.
Vertical competition reflects the double marginalization issue whereas horizontal com-
petition reflects the competition due to demand substitution. The substitutability of
the product is modeled with a parameter (substitution rate) which shows the fraction
of the consumers in a channel who will search for the product in the other channel.
Boyaci shows that increasing the double marginalization, i.e., increasing the whole-
sale price, leads to overstocking in the direct channel whereas it induces the retailer
to understock. On the other hand, increasing horizontal competition, i.e., increasing
one of the channels’ substitution rate leads to overstocking in the other channel. The
author also shows that simple contracting mechanisms such as buyback or revenue
sharing cannot coordinate the dual channel described in the model.
Chiang et al. (2003) examine a two-echelon dual channel inventory model. The
product is available both at the traditional retailer store and an online direct channel.
The demand of the retailer channel consumers are satisfied by the on hand inventory
of the retailer whereas the demand of online consumer are satisfied by the on-hand
inventory of the manufacturer’s warehouse. The consumers are allowed to search the
other channel in case of a stock-out. The fraction of the consumers who will search the
other channel is modeled with a parameter, the search rate. The consumers who will
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not search the other channel and who cannot find the product at both channels will
be lost. The authors focus on the optimal base-stock levels, inventory holding cost
and lost sales cost. They show that inventory holding cost does not affect the base-
stock levels of both the direct channel and the retailer channel. On the other hand,
an increase in the lost sales cost increases the base-stock levels at both channels. The
authors also show that the dual channel strategy performs better than retailer-only
and direct-only strategies in most cases.
The second related literature in on supply chain (or, channel) contracts. This
literature aims to determine coordinating contracts in different conditions. Cachon
(2003) and Kaya and O¨zer (2009) provide an extensive summary on different con-
tracting mechanisms. Lariviere et al. (2001) examine the efficiency of the wholesale
price contract in response to the changes in the properties of demand distribution.
Regarding buyback contract applications, Pasternack (1985) first studied the opti-
mal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities. He showed that unlimited
return of retailer’s unsold items at partial credit is system-optimal for appropriately
chosen wholesale price and buyback price values. Donohue (2000) shows that the
buyback contract is also coordinating in a two-mode production environment which
allows the retailer to update her forecast and order accordingly. Emmons et al. (1998)
study a classical buyback contract model with the difference of the retailer’s price-
dependent market demand. Lee et al. (2000) examine return policies on products
which face price reduction during the selling season. The manufacturer can offer a
full protection of the wholesale price reduction regardless of the time that the retailer
purchases the product. Alternatively the manufacturer can set a time limit for the
return of unsold items or he can offer a limited price protection. The authors show
that price protection is coordinating if there is a single order opportunity, whereas it
is not coordinating if there are two ordering opportunities.
Other contracting mechanisms are also covered in literature. Cachon et al. (2005)
study revenue sharing contracts. The authors show that revenue sharing contracts
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coordinate a channel with a single retailer who determines the optimal price and
quantity. The study indicates that revenue sharing contracts are equivalent to buy-
back contracts in a fixed-price newsvendor setting. Revenue sharing contracts are
also found to be coordinating in channels with retailers competing in quantities.
Tsay et al. (1999) extend the studies on quantity flexibility contracts by considering
an agent which contracts with both a supplier and a retailer, i.e., a manufacturer.
Taylor (2002) studies sales rebates contracts. He compares the linear rebate case in
which the manufacturer provides a rebate for each sold item with target rebate case
in which the manufacturer provides a rebate for the items above a threshold. He
observes that in linear rebate case coordination is not achieved. Taylor also stud-
ies sales effort effects on rebate contracts. He shows that channel coordination is
achieved in quantity and sales effort when rebate and buyback contracts are applied
simultaneously. Jeuland et al. (2008) provide a discussion on the quantity discount
contracts.
The third related literature stream is the papers that study consumer behavior
under different channel structures (Neslin et al. 2006). Kumar et al. (2005) study
the consumer characteristics and supplier factors that affect multi-channel purchas-
ing behaviors. Kohli et al. (2004) study the effect of online channel decision support
capabilities on consumer decision process. Bhatnagar et al. (2000) determine the
factors that differentiate the online channel consumers than traditional channel con-






In this section, we present the most general form of our model: The dual channel -
buyback contract case. The other cases are obtained through simplifications of this
case. There is a single manufacturer (he) and a single retailer (she) in the system.
The manufacturer sells his product through both the traditional retailer channel and
an online direct channel. We model the relation between the firms in three stages:
contracting stage, operational decisions stage and consumer channel choice stage.
Figure 3.1 illustrates these stages.
At the contracting stage (Stage-1), the manufacturer determines the terms of the
contract. At this stage our model differs from Chen et al.’s (2008) model. Unlike
that study which uses a wholesale price contract, we use a buyback contract (w, b)
with a wholesale price w and buyback price b. The manufacturer offers this buyback
contract to the retailer. The retailer accepts the contract as long as his expected
profit is nonnegative.
At the operational decisions stage (Stage-2), the firms play a simultaneous move
operational decisions game: The retailer decides on her service level α without ob-
serving the manufacturer’s decision and the manufacturer decides on the delivery
lead time t in the direct channel without observing the retailer’s decision. The ser-

































Figure 3.1: Sequence of Events
selling season. This probability corresponds to the Type-1 service level in inventory
management (Nahmias 2001). The delivery lead time t represents the time between
the placement and delivery of an order. The cost of the direct channel to the man-
ufacturer is m/t2. Hence, the manufacturer needs to incur a higher cost to offer fast
delivery time in the direct channel. Both the manufacturer and the retailer aim to
maximize their respective expected profits when making their decisions. Upon decid-
ing on the α value, the retailer places the corresponding order with quantity Q from
the manufacturer.
At the third stage (Stage-3), consumers decide which channel to buy from by
considering the delivery lead time t offered by the manufacturer, the service level
α offered by the retailer and inconvenience cost of the retailer channel, k. The
inconvenience cost represents the decrease in consumer utility due to visiting the
retailer. The sales price, p is the same in both channels. That is, we do not consider
price competition between the channels.
In a dual channel setting with no price competition, consumers differ from each
other by their time sensitivity index d which describes the consumers’ willingness to
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wait. Time sensitivity index is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
A low sensitivity index shows more toleration to longer delivery lead times, therefore
the consumers with lower indexes are more likely to prefer the direct channel. The
total number of consumers in the market is represented by a random variable X
and it is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and a which denotes the
maximum size of the market.
We assume that the direct channel can satisfy the demand within the delivery
lead time even if there is no on-hand inventory. Therefore there is no lost demand
in the direct channel. On the other hand, the demand of the retailer channel is
satisfied with the on-hand inventory of the retailer. In case of a stock-out at the
retailer channel, the consumers are allowed to search for the product at the direct
channel depending on the utility they derive from the direct channel. If they obtain
a positive utility from the direct channel, then they purchase the product from the
direct channel; otherwise they leave the system without purchasing. If the retailer
has unsold stock at the end of the selling season, according the terms of the buyback
contract, the manufacturer buys them back at b per unit.
Next we solve this three-stage model using backwards induction. First we ana-
lyze the consumer channel choice process at Stage-3. We determine the demand in
each channel by using the information we obtained from consumers’ channel choice
model. Then we determine the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move service
game between the manufacturer and the retailer at Stage-2. Finally, at Stage-1, we
determine the manufacturer’s optimal buyback contract (w, b).
3.1.1 Consumers’ Channel Choice
Our main interest when analyzing the consumers’ channel choice is to determine how
the consumer population will be segmented given the manufacturer and the retailer’s
decisions from stage 2. To do this, we introduce the utility functions of the consumers
from both channels. Then we figure out the expected demands in each channel.
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A consumer with time sensitivity index d derives utility ud from direct channel.
The utility obtained from the direct channel is affected by the price of the product
p, the consumer’s valuation of the product v, and the delivery lead time t decision of
the manufacturer. Recall that p and v are exogenously given constants. The utility
function of a consumer with time sensitivity index d is:
ud(d) = v − p− dt.
In this expression the term dt reflects the decrease in consumer’s utility due to waiting
the delivery lead time.
The consumers obtain an expected utility from the retailer channel because of the
probability of stocking out. The expected utility obtained from the retailer channel
does not depend on the consumers’ time sensitivity index d, and it is given by
E[ur] = φ(α) (v − p)− k.
In this formulation, the retailer’s availability level φ(α) shows the probability that
a consumer can find the product in the store. In our setting, this probability corre-
sponds to the Type-2 service level, or the fill rate (Nahmias 2001). Availability level
φ(α) is a direct result of retailer’s service level decision α. In order to be operative,
the retailer should provide a positive utility to the consumers (i.e., E[ur] ≥ 0). Hence,
we define the minimum service level of the retailer as:
αmin ≡
{




Comparing the utilities obtained from the channels, we determine three market
segments as illustrated in Figure 3.2. First, we determine the index of the consumer
who is indifferent between buying from the two channels (d1) and the index of the
consumer who is indifferent between buying from the direct channel or not buying
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(d2). These two consumers act as the boundaries between the three market segments.
d1 ≡ min {{d | ud(d) = E[ur]} , 1} (3.2)
= min{[(v − p)(1− φ(α)) + k]/t , 1},
d2 ≡ min {{d | ud(d) = 0} , 1}
= min{(v − p)/t , 1}.
Buy from the 
direct channel
Buy from the retailer if 
available; else, buy from 
the direct channel
Buy from the retailer if 
available, else do not buy (lost)
d=0
The most patient 
consumer
d=1
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Figure 3.2: Consumer Segmentation
Each consumer prefers the channel which provides higher utility or prefers not
to buy the product if both channels provide negative utility. Since the consumers
are heterogenous in their channel preferences, we observe three consumer segments.
The first segment includes the consumers whose direct channel utility is higher than
their retailer channel utility (i.e., ud(d) ≥ E[ur]). Therefore the consumers with time
sensitivity index lower than d1 prefer to buy from the direct channel. These type of
consumers constitute the primary demand D1d of the direct channel.
The second segment includes the consumers who derive positive utility from both
channels while obtaining higher utility from the retailer channel (i.e., E[ur] ≥ ud(d) ≥
0). These are the consumers with time sensitivity index values between d1 and d2.
Such consumers constitute part of the retail channel demand Dr. These consumers
buy the product if it is available in the retailer’s store. If the product is not available
in the store, the consumers purchase from the direct channel. These type of consumers
constitutes the secondary demand D2d of the direct channel.
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The third segment includes the consumers who derive positive utility from the
retailer channel but negative utility from the direct channel (i.e., ud ≤ 0). These con-
sumers have a time sensitivity index d > d2. They purchase from the retailer channel
if the product is available. Otherwise, they leave the system without purchasing, and
constitute the lost demand Dl.
Recall that the utility from the retail channel does not depend on the d index of
the consumers. That is, either all consumers derive positive utility from the retail
channel, or none. Hence, if the retailer channel will be operative, all consumers should
be deriving positive utility from that channel. This is different from the situation
with the direct channel because consumers with d > d2 do not derive positive utility
from the direct channel.
The three-segment case we described above (and Figure 3.2) is the most general
case with 0 < d1 < d2 < 1. The number of the segments in the market takes its final
form depending on the manufacturer’s delivery lead time decision and the retailer’s
service level decision. The following lemma summarizes the demand allocation and
the operational status of the channels depending on the delivery lead time:
Lemma 1 Random demand in the direct channel and in the retailer are as follows.
Delivery lead time range t ≤ te † t ∈ (te , v − p ] t ∈ (v − p , ∞ ) t→∞
Retailer’s status inoperative operative operative operative
Direct channel coverage full full partial zero
Retailer demand (Dr) 0 (1− d1)X (1− d1)X X
Primary demand (D1d) X d1X d1X n/a
†
Secondary demand (D2d) n/a [Dr − q]+ d2−d11−d1 [Dr − q]
+
n/a
Lost demand (Dl) n/a 0
1−d2
1−d1
[Dr − q]+ [Dr − q]+
† te ≡ (v − p)(1− φ(α)) + k and n/a: not applicable.
Lemma 1 shows the four possibilities that can be observed in the dual channel
structure. By setting t shorter than a threshold value te ≡ (v − p)(1 − φ(α)) + k,
the manufacturer may choose to eliminate the retailer. In this case, the delivery lead
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time is so short that all consumers prefer to buy from the direct channel. There is
no segmentation in the market.
Note that for t <= v − p, we have d2 = 1. Hence, all consumers derive positive
utility from the direct channel. For these cases, no consumer is lost in the market
because they can buy from the direct channel, if not from the retailer. Hence, for
t ∈ (te, v − p), we have two segments in the market. Since the time sensitivity index
of the consumers is uniformly distributed, the primary demand of the direct channel
is equal to d1X. The retailer’s demand consists of the remaining of the market, which
is equal to (1−d1)X. In this case, the consumers who face a stock-out in the retailer
channel will meet their need from the direct channel. These consumers constitute
the secondary demand of the direct channel and this quantity would be equal to the
demand that the retailer cannot satisfy: [Dr − q]+.
The manufacturer can segment the market into three by setting t > (v − p). In
this case, d2 < 1 and hence, some consumers derive negative utility from the direct
channel. These consumers would be lost if they cannot find the product in the retailer
channel. This leads to the three-segment outcome we illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Alternatively, the manufacturer can set the delivery lead time so long that the
direct channel becomes inoperative and market remains unsegmented. In this case,
all consumers would visit the retailer and the consumers who cannot find the product
in the retailer channel would be lost.
Market segmentation is also affected by the service level decision of the retailer.
When t > (v − p), if φ(α) = k/(v − p), there are two segments in the market. The
consumers with time sensitivity index d < d1 buy only from the direct channel. The
consumers with time sensitivity index d > d1 buy only from the retailer channel
as they do not derive positive utility from the direct channel. Hence there is no
secondary demand of the direct channel.
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3.1.2 Operational Decisions
At Stage-2, first we determine the objective functions of the retailer and the manufac-
turer. Then, we determine the best response functions of the manufacturer and the
retailer to each others’ actions and we find the Nash equilibrium of the operational
decisions game.
Retailer’s Problem
First we determine the expected profit function of the retailer, and then we analyze
this function to obtain the retailer’s best response function α∗(t) to the manufac-
turer’s delivery lead time decision.
For given buyback contract parameters (w, b) the retailer’s expected profit func-
tion is:
Πr(α) = pE[min{Dr, q}]− wq + b(q − E[min{Dr, q}]).
Here the term E[min{Dr, q}] denotes the expected sales of the retailer and the term
(q − E[min{Dr, q}]) denotes the expected quantity of unsold items at the end of
the selling season. Recall that the manufacturer buys back the retailer’s unsold
inventory at b per unit. Hence the retailer’s expected profit consists of her gain from
sales, her gain from the manufacturer’s buyback payment minus her payment to the
manufacturer.
We first determine the order quantity q(α), the availability level φ(α) and the
expected sales of the retailer E[min{Dr, q}] for a given service level α that she de-
termines. From Lemma 1, the retailer’s demand Dr is equal to (1− d1)X and hence
it is uniformly distributed between 0 and a(1 − d1). The service level decision of
the retailer determines the probability that she does not stock out during the selling
season; i.e.,
Pr(Dr ≤ q) = α = q
a(1− d1) .
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Therefore we determine the retailer’s optimal order quantity q as
q(α) = aα(1− d1(α)). (3.3)
We define the availability level φ(α) of the retailer as the probability that a con-
sumer finds the product when she visits the retailer. We have


















By substituting q(α) from (3.3), we obtain
φ(α) = α(1− ln(α)). (3.4)














Substituting q(α) = aα(1− d1(α)), we have
E[min{Dr, q}] = q (1− α/2) . (3.5)
We rewrite the expected utility of retailer by substituting values from (3.3), (3.4)
and (3.5):
Πr(α) = aα(1− d1(α))
(












(t− k − (v − p)(1− α(1 − ln(α))))
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subject to α ∈ {0, [αmin, 1]}.
Note that for α = 0, the term ln(α) is undefined. Therefore consider α = 0 as
α = 0 + ǫ.
Recall that αmin is the minimum service level that the retailer should provide
(as defined in (3.1)). Solving the retailer’s problem, we determine the retailer’s best
response as presented in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 The retailer’s expected profit function has a unique local maximizer
in the domain (0,∞). Let αi(t) represent this local maximizer which is decreasing in




αmin, for αi(t) ≤ αmin,
αi(t), for αi(t) ∈ (αmin, 1),
1, for αi(t) ≥ 1,
if Πr(α
∗) ≥ 0 holds. Otherwise, the retailer sets α∗(t) = 0.
Given a buyback contract (w, b), if the retailer’s expected profit is nonnegative,
the retailer’s best response is either setting her service level equal to the minimum
service level αmin or equal to local maximizer of the retailer’s expected profit αi(t)
or equal to 1. The best response service level is found to be a decreasing function
of the wholesale price w. Hence, by setting a high wholesale price the manufacturer
might enforce the retailer to set her service level equal to the minimum service level
αmin. The manufacturer might also offer a very high wholesale price which leads to
a negative expected profit for the retailer. In such a case, the retailer does not enter
the market by setting her service level equal to zero.
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Manufacturer’s Problem
Here, we first determine the manufacturer’s expected profit function. Then we deter-
mine the best response delivery lead time t(α) function of the manufacturer to the
retailer’s α decision.
The profit function of the manufacturer is:




In this expression, the term (w − c) represents the profit margin of the manu-
facturer for each item that he sells to the retailer. The term (p − c) is his profit
margin from the direct channel sales. The term m/t2 represents the direct channel
cost where m is the direct channel cost parameter. Direct channel cost is used to
capture the inventory and shipping costs of the direct channel to the manufacturer
(which we do not explicitly model) 1. The manufacturer needs to incur a higher cost
if he wants to offer shorter delivery lead time to consumers.
Substituting the expected sales of the retailer from (3.5), we have
max
t
Πm(t) = (w − c− bα
2




In order to analyze the manufacturer’s problem, we first determine the demand
of the direct channel which is a sum of the primary and the secondary demand in
that channel. Then, we determine the expressions for the manufacturer’s expected
profit function in the three t domains discussed in Lemma 1 (except the t→∞ case).
Recall from Lemma 1 that we have differing d1 and d2 expressions on these three t
domains. The following lemma summarizes the results.
Lemma 2 The expected sales in the direct channel is E[D1d + D
2
d] = (a/2)[α(α −
2)(d2(α)−d1(α))+d2(α)]. The manufacturer’s expected profit is a continuous function
1We use the specific functionm/t2 to denote the cost of the direct channel. However, our structural






Πem(t) ≡ a2(p− c)− mt2 , for t ≤ te,









, for t ∈ (te, v − p],







, for t > v − p,
where Ga(α) ≡ (aα/2) [(v − p)(1− α(1 − ln(α))) + k] [bα+ (p− c)(2− α) − 2(w − c)] and
Gu(α) ≡ [a(p− c)(1− α)2(v − p)]/2 + (aα/2) [(v − p)(1− α(1− ln(α))) + k]×
[bα+ (p− c)(2− α) − 2(w − c)].
The first profit function represents the case in which the manufacturer eliminates
the retailer by setting a very short delivery lead time. The second function represents
the aggressive case in which the manufacturer ensures that all market is covered by
the direct channel (in addition to the retailer) and allows no lost demand. The
final function represents the unaggressive case in which the direct channel does not
cover the whole consumer population (i.e., d2 < 1). Lost demand is possible in this
case. Superscript a is used for representing the aggressive case whereas superscript
u is used for the unaggressive case. The following lemma further analyzes the profit
functions of the manufacturer.
Lemma 3 (i) The function Πam(t) is increasing in t when G
a(α) ≤ 0. It is uni-
modal with a maximum at taf =
2m
Ga(α)
when Ga(α) > 0.
(ii) The function Πum(t) is increasing in t when G
u(α) ≤ 0. It is unimodal with a
maximum at tuf =
2m
Gu(α)
when Gu(α) > 0.
(iii) For α = 1, we have Πum(t) = Π
a
m(t).
(iv) For α < 1, Πam(t) = Π
u
m(t) only for t = v − p. We have Πum(t) > Πam(t) for
t < v − p, and Πam(t) > Πum(t) for t > v − p.
Lemmas 2 and 3 lead us to determine the best response delivery lead time decision
of the manufacturer in response to a given service level α decision of retailer.
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Proposition 2 Given the wholesale price w and the buyback price b, the manufac-








, if Ga(α) > 0 and taf ∈ (te, v − p],




, if Gu(α) > 0 and tuf > v − p,
∞, if Gu(α) ≤ 0.
There are five types of delivery lead time decisions in the manufacturer’s best
response. At one extreme, the manufacturer eliminates the retailer by setting a very
short delivery lead time; i.e., t = te. In this case, the manufacturer serves to all
consumers which in turn leads to a high direct channel cost m/t2. At the other
extreme, the manufacturer sets a very long delivery lead time; i.e., t → ∞. In this
case, the direct channel becomes inoperative and part of the consumer demand is
satisfied through the retailer channel depending on the service level decision of the
retailer. Alternatively, the manufacturer might set his delivery lead time to one of
the two interior solutions: taf for the aggressive case, and t
u
f for the unaggressive
case. Finally, there is the boundary solution t = v − p between the aggressive and
unaggressive cases.
The Nash Equilibrium
Next, we determine the Nash equilibrium of the operational decisions game between
the manufacturer and the retailer for a given buyback contract (w, b). To do so, we
simultaneously solve the best response functions that we characterized in Proposi-
tions 1 and 2. We could not obtain a closed form solution due to the complexities of
the best response functions. Instead, we used the following algorithm to determine
the equilibrium numerically.
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The algorithm to determine the Nash equilibrium
Set δ = 0.01, ǫ = 10−6, Π∗m = (small number)
(Find the Nash equilibrium of the operational decisions game for a given w and b)
For i = 1 to i = number of initial seeds Do




j = (large number)
While (α∗j+1 − α∗j > ǫ and t∗j+1 − t∗j > ǫ) Do
t∗j+1(α
∗
j )← (find the manufacturer’s best response to α∗j ),
α∗j+1(t
∗
j+1)← (find the retailer’s best response to t∗j+1)
j ← j + 1 (increment j by one)
End While
Report the Nash equilibrium as the pair (α∗j (i),t
∗
j(i))
End For i loop
Check whether there are multiple equilibria
t∗ ← t∗j (1) and α∗ ← α∗j (1)
If Π∗m ≤ Π∗m(t∗) (where Πm(t∗) is defined in (3.8))
then Π∗m ← Πm(t∗) and w∗ ← w
w ← w + δ
Report Π∗m and the corresponding (t
∗, α∗).
The algorithm is an application of the best response dynamics methodology (Mat-
sui 1992). At each iteration, the algorithm finds the retailer’s best response α value
and the manufacturer’s best response t value to the the latest action of the other
party. The algorithm runs until the (t, α) couple converges to (t∗, α∗). By definition,
this (t∗, α∗) is a Nash equilibrium because neither the manufacturer nor the retailer
has an incentive to deviate from their actions in this couple as long as the other party
does not deviate.
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3.1.3 The Contracting Stage
To find the manufacturer’s optimal buyback contract parameters (w, b), we perform
a grid-search over the wholesale price values w ∈ [c, p] and the buyback price values
b ∈ [0, w]. For a given (w, b) pair, the algorithm which is described in Section 3.1.2
finds the Nash equilibrium. The (w, b) pair for which the Nash equilibrium provides
the highest expected profit for the manufacturer is determined as the optimal (w, b)
pair contract for the manufacturer.
3.2. DUAL CHANNEL-WHOLESALE PRICE
CONTRACT ANALYSIS (DW)
So far, we have analyzed the most general case of all: The dual channel-buyback
contract case (DB). Here, we outline the analysis for the dual channel-wholesale price
contract case (DW). The only difference from the DB case is the type of contract
that the manufacturer offers at Stage-1. At this stage, the manufacturer offers a
wholesale price contract with only a wholesale price parameter w, rather than a
buyback contract (w, b). Hence, the DW case is simply a special case of the DB case
with b = 0 forced at Stage-1.
The analysis of this case follows parallel steps with the DB analysis. Lemma 1
characterizes the demand allocations in channels at Stage-3. At Stage-2, for a given






(t− k − (v − p)(1− α(1 − ln(α))))
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subject to α ∈ {0, [αmin, 1]}.
The manufacturer’s problem is
max
t





Similar to the DB analysis, we find the best response functions of the firms and
use these functions to determine the Nash equilibrium at Stage-2 using the algorithm
in Section 3.1.2. At Stage-1, we determine the optimal wholesale price w for the
manufacturer through a grid search over the wholesale price values w ∈ [c, p]. The
wholesale price for which the Nash equilibrium provides the highest manufacturer
profit is determined as the optimum wholesale price.
3.3. RETAILER-ONLY ANALYSIS
Most traditional supply chains consist of a manufacturer selling products through
a bricks-and-mortar retailer channel. This case is a special case with delivery lead
time t → ∞. We study both buyback and wholesale price contract cases in this
retailer-only model next.
3.3.1 Retailer-Only Analysis under Buyback Contract (RB)




Πr(α) = (aα)(1− d1(α))(p− α(p− b)
2
− w),
subject to α ∈ [αmin, 1].
When we set t→∞ the problem reduces to
max
α
Πr(α) = (aα)(p− α(p− b)
2
− w),
subject to α ∈ [αmin, 1].







absence of the manufacturer, the retailer simply solves the newsvendor problem we
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described in Section 1.2.4. In this case, we observe a minimum service level constraint
differently from the classic newsvendor problem. Recall that in order to be operative
the retailer has to provide at least the minimum service level.
Anticipating the retailer’s service level decision, the manufacturer chooses between
two strategies. We refer to the first strategy as the share profit strategy. With this
strategy, the manufacturer sets a low wholesale price, and the retailer responds by
setting her optimal service level α = (p − w)/(p − b). In this case, the retailer’s
expected profit is positive. We refer to the second strategy as the capture profit
strategy. With this strategy, the manufacturer sets a high wholesale price, and the
retailer responds by setting the minimum service level α = αmin. In this case, the
manufacturer captures all profit from the retailer.
In the retailer-only model, the expected profit of the manufacturer is
Πm = q(w − c)− b[q −E[sales]] = (w − c)q − bqα/2.
We solve the manufacturer’s problem using both strategies separately. For the
share profit strategy, we assume α = (p − w)/p and for the capture profit strategy,
we assume α = αmin. For each strategy, we conduct a grip search over w ∈ [c, p]
and b ∈ [0, w] to determine the optimal contract parameters (this is because the
manufacturer’s profit function fails to be jointly concave in w and b). In the end, we
choose the strategy which provides the higher expected profit for the manufacturer.
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3.3.2 Retailer-Only Analysis under Wholesale Price
Contract (RW)
This case is a special case of the RB case with b = 0. Under the wholesale price
contract the retailer’s problem becomes
max
α
Πr(α) = Πr(α) = aα(p− pα
2
− w),
subject to α ∈ [αmin, 1].
The minimum service level constraint that we observe in RB model also holds for the







Again, the manufacturer chooses between two strategies, share profit strategy with
α = p−w/p and capture profit strategy with α = αmin. This time, different from the
RB case, the manufacturer’s profit function is concave in w. Hence, we can determine
the manufacturer’s optimal w in closed form. The following proposition illustrates
the manufacturer’s strategy and corresponding results.




Condition (p− c) ≥ (2 +√2)pαmin (p− c) < (2 +
√
2)pαmin
Manufacturer’s strategy Share profit Capture all profit
Wholesale price w p+c2 p(1− αmin)
Retailer’s service level α p−c2p αmin
Exp. profit of Manuf. Πm(w)
a(p−c)2
4p aαmin(p− c− pαmin2 )
Exp. profit of Retailer Πr(α)
a(p−c)2
8p 0
The manufacturer anticipates the service level decision of the retailer and deter-
mines his optimal wholesale price value w∗ such that he maximizes his own profit.
By setting the wholesale price w above a threshold value (i.e., w = p(1− αmin), the
manufacturer may enforce the retailer to set α = αmin and captures all the profit.
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By setting a wholesale price below the threshold value (i.e, w = p+c
2
), the the manu-
facturer may induce the retailer to set α = p−c
2p
and share the profit with the retailer.
3.4. DIRECT-ONLY ANALYSIS (DO)
In addition to the dual channel and the retailer-only channel structures the manu-








When we substitute the manufacturer’s expected sales E[D1d +D
2
d] from Lemma
2 and set α = 0 to reflect the elimination of the retailer, we obtain Πm(t) = (p −
c)a
2




Πfm(t) ≡ (p− c)a2 − mt2 , for t ≤ v − p (Full Coverage),
Πpm(t) ≡ (p− c)a2 v−pt − mt2 , for t ≥ v − p (Partial Coverage).
The manufacturer chooses either full coverage or partial coverage to maximize
his expected profit. Following proposition summarizes the manufacturer’s strategy
in the direct-only channel structure.










4 Full cov. v − p (p−c)a2 − m(v−p)2
High cost m
a
≥ (p−c)(v−p)24 Partial cov. 4m(p−c)((v−p))a a
2(p−c)2(v−p)2
16m
The results show that in the direct-only channel structure, the manufacturer de-
cides on his delivery lead time by considering the relation between the direct channel
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cost m and the size of the market a. If the ratio m/a is below the threshold value
(p−c)(v−p)2
4
, the manufacturer sets a low delivery lead time considering that the direct
channel cost is low relative to the market size. If the ratiom/a is above the threshold,




In this section, first we explain the solution methodology and the Mathematica code
we developed to automate the solution. Second, we provide some of the numerical
results and our observations. Third, we discuss the performance of the dual chan-
nel buyback contract structure under different parameter combinations. Finally, we
compare the total channel performance under different channel structures.
4.1.1 The Mathematica Code
We developed a Mathematica code that solves the model for given values of the five
parameters (v, p, k, c, m). The core of the code is the algorithm that we described
in Section 3.1.2. The code uses this algorithm to determine the Nash equilibrium of
the second stage game for given contact parameters w,b. The code determines the
best contract parameters for the manufacturer through a nested grid search over the
possible w and b values. Once the optimal contract parameters and the corresponding
Nash equilibrium is determined, the code stores the solution of the game including the
contract parameters, service levels, sales values in channels and the firms’ expected




To determine how the five parameters effect the outcome of the game, we solve the
model for a number of parameter combinations. As illustrated in Table 4.1, we solved
the model for low, medium and high values for each of the five parameters. Note from
(7) that the parameters k,v and p need to satisfy k ≤ v − p because φ(α) < 1. Also
recall the relation c < p. Due to these two constraints, the values that c, p and k
can take are restricted; hence, the low, medium and high values for these parameters
are determined as relative values. We solved the model for 35 = 243 parameter
combinations. The results for these runs are provided in Appendix C.
Table 4.1: Low, Medium, High Values of Parameters
m v p/v k/(v-p) c/p
1000 4 0.25 0.125 0
5000 8 0.5 0.5 0.25
10000 12 0.75 0.75 0.5
We observed that the 5-parameter space is partitioned into three equilibrium
regions, corresponding to three dual channel strategies for the manufacturer:
Eliminate retailer (ER): In ER, the manufacturer eliminates the retailer and sells
only through the direct channel. To do so, the manufacturer sets a high wholesale
price w and a low buyback price b, and also a very competitive (i.e., low) delivery
lead time t. Hence, the retailer does not enter to the market (or, eliminated). In this
case, d1 = d2 = 1 and we observe only one segment.
Capture-all-profit (CP): In CP, the manufacturer uses both channels but captures
all profit from the retailer. The retailer’s minimum availability constraint is binding,
i.e., she sets the minimum availability level. The manufacturer captures all profit
from the retailer by choosing appropriate contract terms w and b. In this case,
d1 = d2 < 1, and hence the market is segmented into two.
Share-profit (SP): In this case, the manufacturer sells through both channels and
shares the profit with the retailer. He offers a high w and a high b to the retailer. By
doing so, the manufacturer leaves a small profit margin for the retailer and shares
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the inventory risk of the retailer. We have d1 < d2 < 1 and hence, we observe three
consumer segments as discussed in Section 3.1.1.
Table 4.2 presents sample results from the 243 runs. Note that each equilibrium
type points to three aspects of the solution: market segmentation, profit sharing
and channel configuration. For each parameter set, the manufacturer determines the
equilibrium type with his wholesale price and buyback price decisions at the con-
tracting stage providing the optimal dual channel strategy for him. Hence, the three
equilibrium types correspond to three dual channel strategies for the manufacturer.
Table 4.2: Sample Results from the 243 Run
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v p k c w∗ b∗ t∗ α∗ Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
1000 12 3 4.50 0.75 2.75 0.00 9 0.19 1113 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 6 3.00 3.00 5.45 0.00 6 0.19 1361 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 3 1.13 1.50 3.00 0.00 9 0.03 627 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 4 2 1.50 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.79 0.38 306 0 264 146 90 CP
5000 8 4 3.00 2.00 3.55 1.65 4.74 0.38 695 0 422 48 30 CP
10000 8 2 4.50 1.00 2.00 2.00 12.63 0.38 299 0 237 162 101 CP
1000 4 2 1.00 1.00 1.95 1.85 3.94 0.38 291 5 216 189 95 SP
5000 4 3 0.75 1.50 2.95 2.90 27.21 0.50 369 12 17 364 119 SP
10000 8 6 1.50 1.50 5.90 5.85 18.52 0.68 1667 30 45 409 47 SP
4.1.3 Two-Parameter Analysis
Studying the outcome from the 243 runs gave us some insights into how the model
parameters affect the outcome of the game. Next, to obtain better insights, we focus
on two parameters at a time, and study the results in greater detail in two-dimensional
parameter spaces. Although 10 combinations of the parameters are possible, we study
only the pairs m− c, p− k and m− v as examples.
M-C Analysis
Table 4.3 illustrates the optimal strategy as functions of the direct channel cost m
and the unit production cost c for given values of the other three model parameters v,
p, k. We observe that for high values of c, the optimal strategy of the manufacturer
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turns out to be capture profit. As c value increases, the profit margin gets too low
to be shared between the firms. Hence, the manufacturer enforces the retailer to set
the minimum service level αmin. In cases with small m, if the c value is small as
well, then the manufacturer chooses to share the profits with the retailer because for
such cases, the profit margin is large enough to share. The manufacturer chooses to
operate with two channels to reach the maximum number of consumers. If m value
is not low (i.e., for m > 5000), operating the direct channel is not cheap and hence
the manufacturer chooses to use both channels and shares profits with the retailer.
Table 4.3: Manufacturer’s Optimal Channel Strategy under Buyback Contract,
when v = 8, p = 4, k = 1
m \ c 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00 3.25 3.50 3.75
25000 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP
22500 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP
20000 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP
17500 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP
15000 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP
12500 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP
10000 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP
7500 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP
5000 SP SP SP ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER SR SP SP SP CP
2500 SP SP ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER SP CP
0 ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the m/c plane is partitioned into three strategy regions.
The figure also illustrates how the other model parameters affect the boundaries
between these regions. For example, increasing the retailer inconvenience cost k
causes the CP region to grow leftward.
Table 4.4 illustrates the details of a number of sample equilibrium results.
Table 4.4: Equilibrium Outcome in the m/c Plane, when v = 8, p = 4, c = 1
Parameters Contract Terms Operational Decisions Sales Profits Eql.
c m w b t α Direct Retailer Πm Πr Type
0.25 2500 4 4 40 1 12 488 1752 0 SP
0.25 5000 3.95 3.95 66.66 1 7 493 1726 25 SP
0.25 10000 4 4 160 1 3 497 1750 0 SP
2.25 2500 3.9 0 4 0.07 500 0 719 0 ER
2.25 5000 3.9 0 4 0.07 500 0 562 0 ER
2.25 10000 3.95 3.85 11.35 0.36 127 240 440 7 SP
3.75 2500 3.9 1.05 10.66 0.07 188 41 30 0 CP
3.75 5000 3.9 1.05 21.32 0.07 94 53 19 0 CP











Figure 4.1: Manufacturer’s Strategy on the m/c Plane
For a small c value such as c = 0.25, the manufacturer aims to reach all consumers
because the profit margin is high. He wants the retailer to have very high availability
levels such that she will not miss many consumers. To achieve this, the manufacturer
sets the wholesale price equal to the buyback price, thus she undertakes all inventory
risk of the retailer. The retailer responds by setting service level equal to 1. The
manufacturer decides not to use the direct channel as indicated by the high t value
and the sales values. While the retailer is responsible for almost all sales, her expected
profit is very low or even zero because the wholesale price is close to or equal to the
sales price. Hence, this is a special type of the share profit equilibrium. Note that
this is not a capture profit type equilibrium because the retailer’s service level is not
the minimum service level.
As the c value increases to 2.25, the manufacturer changes his strategy depending
on his direct channel cost m. For small values of m, the manufacturer incurs a
relatively low cost from the direct channel. Hence, he chooses to sell only through
the direct channel by setting a short delivery lead time and eliminates the retailer.
However, as m increases the manufacturer uses the retailer channel more.
For sufficiently high values of c, the manufacturer captures the profit of the retailer
independent of the direct channel cost m. In this case, there is a small profit margin
to be shared between the firms. Hence, the manufacturer enforces the retailer to set
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the minimum service level α = 0.07 for this parameter combination. As indicated by
the low buyback price b, the manufacturer does not share the retailer’s inventory risk
and the retailer’s expected profit is zero.
P-K Analysis
Table 4.5 illustrates the manufacturer’s optimal strategy as functions of the unit sales
price of the product p and the retailer inconvenience cost k for given values of the
other three model parameters v, m, c. In the table, we indicated the parameter
combinations that do not satisfy the condition k ≤ (v − p) from (3.1) as N/A.
Table 4.5: Manufacturer’s Optimal Channel Strategy under Buyback Contract,
when v = 8, m = 7500, c = 1
p \ k 0.75 1.25 1.75 2.25 2.75 3.25 3.75 4.25 4.75 5.25
4.00 SP SP SP SP SP SP CP N/A N/A N/A
3.75 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP N/A N/A
3.50 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP N/A N/A
3.25 ER SP SP SP SP SP SP CP CP N/A
3.00 ER ER ER SP SP SP SP SP CP N/A
2.75 ER ER ER ER SP SP SP SP CP CP
2.5 ER ER ER ER SP SP SP CP CP CP
2.25 ER ER ER SP SP SP SP SP CP CP
2.00 ER SP SP SP SP SP SP CP CP CP
We observe that for high k values, the retailer’s minimum service level constraint
αmin ≡
{
α ∈ [0, 1] | φ(α) = k
v−p
}
becomes binding, leading to the capture-profit
strategy for the manufacturer. The eliminate retailer (ER) strategy is observed for
moderate values of p, when k is low.
Figure 4.2 illustrates how the other model parameters affect the boundaries be-
tween the equilibrium regions.
We observe that the ER region grows if the direct channel cost m decreases. In
this case, the manufacturer prefers to use only the direct channel. Similarly, for
smaller values of c CP region gets smaller and ER region grows. Increasing v value
causes the CP region to grow, due to the minimum availability constraint.
Table 4.6 provides greater detail on a sample result set. For small k values such


















Figure 4.2: Manufacturer’s Strategy on the p/k Plane
is a competitor for the manufacturer. In this case, when profit margin is low, i.e.,
p = 2.5 instead of sharing the profit with the retailer, the manufacturer decides to
eliminate the retailer. As p increases to 3.5, the manufacturer changes his strategy
as share profit. When k increases within the SP region (for example, from 1.25 to
2.75, when p = 3.5), the retailer increases her service level to attract consumers (0.54
to 0.56). As a response, the manufacturer decreases the delivery lead time (10.18 to
9.06). Increasing k reduces the quantity sold in the retail channel (324 to 256). If
k increases further, then the retailer’s minimum service constraint becomes binding
and the manufacturer switches to the CP strategy. Observe that for p = 3.5, the
manufacturer cuts both the wholesale price and the buyback price (significantly)
when he switches to the CP strategy.
Table 4.6: Equilibrium Outcome in the p/k Plane, when v = 8, m = 7500, c = 1
Parameters Contract Terms Operational Decisions Sales Profits Eql.
p k w b t α Direct Retailer Πm Πr Type
2.50 1.25 2.45 0 5.50 0.06 500 0 502 0 ER
2.50 2.75 2.45 2.35 8.14 0.40 281 161 505 4 SP
2.50 4.25 2 0.05 7.85 0.41 350 97 524 0 CP
3.00 1.25 2.9 0 5.00 0.07 500 0 700 0 ER
3.00 2.75 2.95 2.9 9.73 0.56 188 264 715 8 SP
3.00 4.25 2.95 2.9 8.65 0.58 278 186 745 5 SP
3.50 1.25 3.45 3.4 10.18 0.54 117 324 900 10 SP
3.50 2.75 3.45 3.4 9.06 0.56 194 256 928 8 SP
3.50 4.25 2.35 0.15 9.27 0.69 243 232 978 0 CP
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M-V Analysis
Table 4.7 illustrates the optimal strategy of the manufacturer as functions of the
direct channel cost m and the customer valuation v for given values of the other
three model parameters p, k, c. For small values of v, the retailer’s minimum service
level constraint becomes binding. Hence the optimal channel strategy turns out to
be capture-profit. For small values of m, the manufacturer eliminates the retailer
because serving all customers through the direct channel is not expensive. The ER
strategy is also observed for the higher values of m when v is high as well. This
is because higher v values correspond to higher possible direct channel sales prices,
which might offset higher possible direct channel costs.
Table 4.7: Manufacturer’s Optimal Channel Strategy under Buyback Contract,
when p = 4, k = 1, c = 1
m \ v 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0
25000 CP SP SP SP SP SP SP
22500 CP SP SP SP SP SP SP
20000 CP SP SP SP SP SP SP
17500 CP SP SP SP SP SP SP
15000 CP SP SP SP SP SP SP
12500 CP SP SP SP SP SP SP
10000 CP SP SP SP SP SP SP
7500 CP SP SP SP SP SP SP
5000 CP SP SP SP SP SP ER
2500 CP SP SP SP ER ER ER
0 ER ER ER ER ER ER ER






ER Equilibrium Consumers’ 
valuation v,
Figure 4.3: Manufacturer’s Strategy on the m/v Plane
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Table 4.8 provides the details of some of the equilibrium results.
Table 4.8: Equilibrium Outcome in the m/v Plane, when p = 4, k = 1, c = 1
Parameters Contract Terms Operational Decisions Sales Profits Eql.
m v w b t α Direct Retailer Πm Πr Type
2500 5 3.95 3.9 10 1 50 450 1025 0 CP
2500 6 3.9 3.85 8.47 0.68 71 393 1119 29 SP
2500 7 3.8 0 3 0.1 500 0 1222 0 ER
2500 8 3.9 0 4 0.06 500 0 1344 0 ER
5000 5 3.95 3.9 20 1 25 475 1012 0 CP
5000 6 3.9 3.85 16.52 0.67 37 418 1099 31 SP
5000 7 3.9 3.85 13.26 0.68 51 411 1112 30 SP
5000 8 3.9 0 4 0.06 500 0 1187 0 ER
For the parameter set k = 1, p = 4, c = 1, when v = 5 the availability level φ(α)
turns out to be 1 which in turn makes the minimum service level equal to 1. Hence,
for v = 5 the optimal channel strategy is CP independent of the m value. With
this strategy, the retailer satisfies most of the demand. Given p = 4, w = 3.95 and
b = 3.9, the retailer’s underage and overage costs both are equal to 0.05. Yet, she
has to order quite a large number of products and hence, her expected profit is zero.
As the v value increases to 6, the utilities of consumers increase. This causes an
increase in the potential demand of the channels for given α or t values. Therefore,
the manufacturer switches from CP to SP strategy. When v increases, the minimum
service level decreases as well. This allows the retailer to offer a lower service level
(0.67), which is still greater than the min service level. On the other hand, the
manufacturer offers lower delivery lead time (i.e., better service to consumers). As
a result, the quantity sold in the direct channel increases whereas the quantity sold
in the retailer channel decreases. However, most of the sales are still through the
retailer. When m = 5000, for example, with p = 4, w = 3.9 and b = 3.85, the
cost of overage for the retailer is 0.05 per unit, whereas the cost of underage is 0.10
per unit. Yet, the retailer is ordering a lower number of units than in the CP case
(418 versus 475). This reduces the inventory risk of the retailer and allows her to
expect a positive profit of 31. If v increases further to 7, the manufacturer decreases
the delivery lead time more (from 16.52 to 13.26), which causes an increase in the
expected direct channel sales (from 37 to 51).
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If v increases further to 8, potential demand from consumers increase, hence, the
business becomes very profitable compared to the direct channel cost. The man-
ufacturer decides to offer a very short delivery lead time of 4, and eliminates the
retailer.
4.1.4 Comparison of Different Channel Structures
Upon completing our analysis on dual channel buyback contract structure, we focus







Structure Retailer-Only RB RW
Direct-Only DO
Figure 4.4: Possible Channel Structure/Contract Combinations
We compare the outcome from five structures (channel/contract combinations):
• DO : Direct channel only (hence, no contract)
• RW : Retailer channel only, wholesale price contract
• RB : Retailer channel only, buyback contract
• DW : Dual channel, wholesale price contract
• DB : Dual channel, buyback contract (our main model)
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We assume that the default structure is a manufacturer-retailer supply chain with
a wholesale contract (i.e, the RW structure). It is known in literature that the man-
ufacturer can improve his profit by switching to a buyback contract (i.e., to RB),
because doing so reduces double marginalization. An alternative is to switch to a
dual-channel structure under a wholesale price contract (DW). Chen et al. (2008)
consider such a model. Switching to the dual channel structure increases the manufac-
turer’s profit because he can now serve different consumers through different channels.
In this thesis, in addition to these two structures, we also consider the possibility of
manufacturer doing both changes: Switching to the dual channel strategy and to the
buyback contract (i.e., to DB strategy). In addition to the manufacturer’s profit,
we discuss the changes in the retailer’s profit, total channel profit and other model
results including the operational decisions, contract parameters and sales quantities.
The details of these comparisons can be found in Appendices C and D.
Next we analyze the manufacturer’s optimal channel structure in m−c plane and
m− v plane.
M-C Analysis
Table 4.9 illustrates the total channel profit under different channel structures. We
observe that the DB structure provides the highest total channel profit for all pa-
rameter combinations in this table. The second best structure is either DW or RB.
The RB structure performs quite well for low unit cost c values. For low c values, the
total profit margin is high, leading to high losses due to double marginalization. This
is why the RB structure, in which the buyback contract mitigates double marginal-
ization, performs well with low c values. With high c values, the loss due to double
marginalization is low, and hence, the improvement of RB over RW is not significant.
For high c values, switching to a dual channel strategy (to DW) is the better choice.
The performance of DO structure depends critically on the direct channel cost m.
This structure performs very poor for high m values. The performance of DW struc-
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ture also deteriorates when m increases, but not as much as the DO structure because
there are now two channels.
Table 4.9: Expected Total Channel Profit under Different Channel Structures for
v = 8, p = 4, k = 1
Parameters Total Channel Profit
m c DO RW DW RB DB
5000 0 1687.50 1500.00 1687.50 2000.00 2000.00
5000 1.25 1062.50 717.50 1062.50 944.44 1062.50
5000 3.25 112.50 50.78 130.53 69.44 139.62
12500 0 1218.75 1500.00 1401.56 2000.00 2000.00
12500 1.25 405.00 481.56 570.20 625.00 668.71
12500 3.25 45.00 50.78 77.18 69.44 97.56
22500 0 711.11 1500.00 1451.32 2000.00 2000.00
22500 1.25 225.00 481.56 527.23 625.00 650.51
22500 3.25 25.00 50.78 61.37 69.44 85.14
Next, we analyze the expected profits of the manufacturer and the retailer as
presented in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11.
Table 4.10: Manufacturer’s Expected Profit under Different Channel Structures for
v = 8, p = 4, k = 1
Parameters Manufacturer Profit
m c RW DW RB DB
5000 0 1000.00 1687.50 2000.00 2000.00
5000 1.25 472.50 1062.50 911.11 1062.50
5000 3.25 50.78 130.07 65.28 137.81
12500 0 1000.00 1255.87 2000.00 2000.00
12500 1.25 472.50 704.80 911.11 930.28
12500 3.25 50.78 76.40 65.28 94.01
22500 0 1000.00 1134.73 2000.00 2000.00
22500 1.25 472.50 599.24 911.11 922.24
22500 3.25 50.78 60.50 65.28 81.32
Not surprisingly, the manufacturer’s highest profit is in the DB structure, which
is the most general structure of all. We compare the manufacturer’s performance
between the DW and RB structures. From Table 4.10, we observe that manufacturer’s
profit with RB is generally higher than his profit with DW. DW performs better than
RB only when c is high and m is low. Hence, for a manufacturer currently operating
in RW, most of the benefits would come from changing the contract to buyback rather
than switching to a dual channel strategy. The reverse happens only when m is low
and c is high.
From Table 4.11, we observe that the retailer’s expected profit under the buyback
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Table 4.11: Retailer’s Expected Profit under Different Channel Structures for v = 8,
p = 4, k = 1
Parameters Retailer Profit
m c RW DW RB DB
5000 0 500.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5000 1.25 245.00 0.00 33.33 0.00
5000 3.25 0.00 0.46 4.17 1.82
12500 0 500.00 145.68 0.00 0.00
12500 1.25 245.00 73.58 33.33 31.75
12500 3.25 0.00 0.78 4.17 3.55
22500 0 500.00 316.59 0.00 0.00
22500 1.25 245.00 151.14 33.33 32.43
22500 3.25 0.00 0.87 4.17 3.82
contract structures is generally lower than her expected profit under in the wholesale
price structures. This is because the buyback contract gives too much power to the
manufacturer. With the buyback contract, the manufacturer has two parameters to
obtain profits from the retailer while keeping her in business. With wholesale price
contract, he only has one parameter to do so.
Table 4.12: Model Results Under Different Structures in the m/c Plane for v = 8,
p = 4, k = 1
Parameters Contract Terms Operational Decisions Sales Eql.
Structure m c w b t α Direct Retailer Type
DO 5000 0 - - 4 - 500 - -
DO 5000 1.25 - - 4 - 500 - -
DO 12500 0 - - 4 - 500 - -
DO 12500 1.25 - - 4.5 - 440 - -
RW 5000 0 2 - - 0.5 - 375 -
RW 5000 1.25 2.6 - - 0.35 - 289 -
RW 12500 0 2 - - 0.5 - 375 -
RW 12500 1.25 2.6 - - 0.35 - 289 -
DW 5000 0 3.9 - 4 0.068 500 0 ER
DW 5000 1.25 3.9 - 4 0.068 500 0 ER
DW 12500 0 2.8 - 6.9 0.37 205 211 SP
DW 12500 1.25 3.05 - 7.5 0.26 222 153 SP
RB 5000 0 4 4 - 1 - 500 -
RB 5000 1.25 3.9 3.85 - 0.66 - 444 -
RB 12500 0 4 4 - 1 - 500 -
RB 12500 1.25 3.9 3.85 - 0.66 - 444 -
DB 5000 0 4 4 450 1 0 500 SP
DB 5000 1.25 3.9 0 4 0.068 500 0 ER
DB 12500 0 4 4 450 1 0 500 SP
DB 12500 1.25 3.9 3.85 26 0.68 29 428 SP
So far we have compared profit values between structures. Table 4.12 compares
other model results between the five structures for m = 5000, 12500 and c = 0, 1.25.
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M-V Analysis
Table 4.13 illustrates the total channel profits under different channel structures in
m/v plane. We observe that similar to the m − c analysis, DB provides the highest
total channel profit. The second most profitable channel structure depends on the m
value. For small values of m, DW structure performs better than RW structure. On
the other hand, for high values of m total channel profit is higher in RB structure.
Table 4.13: Expected Total Channel Profit under Different Structures for k = 1,
p = 4, c = 1
Parameters Total Channel Profit
m v DO RW DW RB DB
2500 6.5 1100 844 1100 1111 1157
2500 7.5 1296 844 1296 1111 1296
5000 6.5 703 843 911 1111 1136
5000 7.5 1091 843 1091 1111 1148
12500 6.5 281 843 861 1111 1121
12500 7.5 551 843 887 1111 1128
22500 6.5 156 843 863 1111 1117
22500 7.5 306 843 866 1111 1120
Table 4.14 and 4.15 illustrates the respective profits of the manufacturer and the
retailer.
Table 4.14: Manufacturer’s Expected Profit under Different Channel Structures for
k = 1, p = 4, c = 1
Parameters Manufacturer’s Profit
m v RW DW RB DB
2500 6.5 563 1100 1077 1129
2500 7.5 563 1296 1077 1296
5000 6.5 562 820 1077 1105
5000 7.5 562 1091 1077 1118
12500 6.5 562 666 1077 1089
12500 7.5 562 751 1077 1096
22500 6.5 562 620 1077 1084
22500 7.5 562 666 1077 1088
The manufacturer’s profit is also highest under DB structure. As expected, for
small values of m DW structure performs better than RW and RB structures. How-
ever as m increases, RB becomes more profitable for the manufacturer. Hence for
a manufacturer who operates under RW structure, the policy should be opening a
direct channel for small m values. For higher m values, the manufacturer should
switch to buyback contract under retailer-only structure.
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Table 4.15: Retailer’s Expected Profit under Different Channel Structures for k = 1,
p = 4, c = 1
Parameters Retailer’s Profit
m v RW DW RB DB
2500 6.5 281 0 33 28
2500 7.5 281 0 33 0
5000 6.5 281 91 33 30
5000 7.5 281 0 33 30
12500 6.5 281 195 33 32
12500 7.5 281 136 33 31
22500 6.5 281 243 33 32
22500 7.5 281 199 33 32
Table 4.16: Model Results Under Different Structures in the m/v Plane for k = 1,
p = 4, c = 1
Parameters Contract Terms Operational Decisions Sales Eql.
Structure m v w b t α Direct Retailer Type
DO 2500 6.5 - - 2.5 - 500 - -
DO 2500 7.5 - - 3.5 - 500 - -
DO 12500 6.5 - - 6.6 - 188 - -
DO 12500 7.5 - - 4.7 - 468 - -
RW 2500 6.5 2.5 - - 0.37 - 305 -
RW 2500 7.5 2.5 - - 0.37 - 305 -
RW 12500 6.5 2.5 - - 0.37 - 305 -
RW 12500 7.5 2.5 - - 0.37 - 305 -
DW 2500 6.5 3.75 - 2.5 0.13 500 0 ER
DW 2500 7.5 3.86 - 3.5 0.08 500 0 ER
DW 12500 6.5 2.65 - 12 0.35 84 249 SP
DW 12500 7.5 2.8 - 8.7 0.32 156 208 SP
RB 2500 6.5 3.9 3.85 - 0.66 - 444 -
RB 2500 7.5 3.9 3.85 - 0.66 - 444 -
RB 12500 6.5 3.9 3.85 - 0.66 - 444 -
RB 12500 7.5 3.9 3.85 - 0.66 - 444 -
DB 2500 6.5 3.9 3.85 7.6 0.69 82 387 SP
DB 2500 7.5 3.85 0 3.5 0.08 500 0 ER
DB 12500 6.5 3.9 3.85 36 0.67 18 432 SP
DB 12500 7.5 3.9 3.85 29 0.67 25 429 SP




In this thesis, we developed a game theoretical model of the dual channel relation
between a manufacturer and a retailer. The relation between the firms is governed by
a buyback contract. Different from the majority of the literature, the direct channel
of the manufacturer and the retailer channel compete not in prices, but in service to
consumers. We developed a detailed consumer choice model in which we consider a
random number of consumers that are heterogeneous in their channel preference to
choose between channels.
We solved the model using analytical and numerical (Mathematica) techniques.
We determined three dual channel strategies for the manufacturer. Each strategy
outlines how many products will be sold in each channel (in expectation), how the
profits will be shared and how the consumer population will be segmented. We
illustrated how the manufacturer’s optimal strategy changes with respect to changes
in the model parameters such as the cost of the direct channel, retailer’s inconvenience
cost and the sales price of the product.
In addition to studying the manufacturer’s dual channel strategy under a buyback
contract, we studied four other structures: dual channel with wholesale price con-
tract, direct channel only, retail channel only with buyback contract, retail channel
only with wholesale price contract. We compared the results of these structures. As
expected, the dual channel buyback contract structure resulted in the highest man-
ufacturer profit. With this structure, the manufacturer has two contract parameters
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w,b and his direct channel to modify the retailer’s actions. Because of this power,
the manufacturer obtains the majority of the profits, leaving the retailer with zero or
small profit. The retailer generally prefers the retailer-only channel with wholesale
price contract.
We compared the performance of the two options that a manufacturer who oper-
ates only through a retail channel with a wholesale price contract has: (1) Switching
to a buyback contract, which reduces double marginalization; (2) Switching to a dual
channel strategy, which might provide greater market penetration. We determined
that the first strategy is generally better than the second. For example, considering
two of the model parameters, we find that switching to a dual channel strategy is
better only if the cost of the direct channel is low and the unit production cost is
high. If the unit production cost is high then for a fixed sales price, the total profit
margin is low. In this case, the adverse effect of double marginalization is low, and
as a result, the gain from a buyback contract is not high.
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Appendix A: Notation
Exogenous Constants Decision Variables
v : Product’s value to consumers α ∈ [0, 1] : Retailer’s service level.
p : Selling price at both channels Corresponds to:
a : Maximum market size for the product φ(α) ∈ [0, 1] : Availability level
k : Retailer inconvenience cost q(α) : Stocking level
c : Unit production cost t : Direct channel’s delivery lead time
m : Direct channel cost parameter w : Wholesale price
b : Buyback price
Others
d ∈ [0, 1] : Consumer time-sensitivity index Dr : Demand in the retail channel
D1d : Primary demand in the direct channel X : Market size ∼ UNIF [0, a]
D2d : Secondary demand in the direct channel
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Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: The demand of the channels is determined by considering
the consumers’ channel choice which model is discussed in Section 3.1.1. When one
of the channels is inoperative, the operative channel faces all demand, X. When
both channels are operative then the demand is allocated depending on the time
sensitivity indices of the consumers. Recall that the time sensitivity index is uniformly
distributed; i.e., d ∈ [0, 1]. Hence the primary demand of the direct channel is d1X
and the retailer demand is (1 − d1)X. In the aggressive case, since there is no lost
demand, the secondary demand of the direct channel is [Dr−q]+. In the unaggressive
case, part of the demand which is not satisfied through the retailer channel is satisfied
by the direct channel. In this case, the secondary demand of the direct channel is
d2−d1
1−d1
[Dr − q]+ and the lost demand is 1−d21−d1 [Dr − q]+.
Proof of Proposition 1: We determine the retailer’s best response in four steps.
First, we determine the α values which provide Πr(α) = 0. Second, we characterize
the local maximizer of Πr(α), αi. Third, we show that the retailer’s best response is
either to set αi or one of the boundary values αmin and 1. Fourth, we show that the
retailer’s best response value α∗ is decreasing in the wholesale price w.
• Step-1: Defining the α values at which Πr(α) = 0. Recall that Πr(α) =
aα[1− d1(α)][p− w − (p−b)α2 ] (3.6).




– Πr(α) crosses zero at α values such that (1− d1(α)) = 0. By substituting
the d1 from (3.2), we obtain the following equality: α(a−ln(α)) = v−p+k−tv−p .
Let α(a− ln(α) = Z(α) and v−p+k−t
v−p
= S.
∗ limα→0+ Z(α) = 0
∗ ∂Z(α)
∂α
> 0 for α ∈ (0, 1)
∗ ∂Z(α)
∂α




< 0 for α ∈ (1,∞)
∗ Z(α) = 0 when α = e
Hence
∗ For S < 0, the equation z(α) = S is satisfied by a unique α value
α2 > e ∼= 2.71
∗ For S ≥ 0 and S 6= 1, the equation z(α) = S is satisfied by two
distinct α values: α3 < 1 and α4 ∈ (1, e)
∗ For S = 1, the equation z(α) = S is satisfied only by α = 1
– This results implies that
∗ For v− p− t+ k < 0, the equation d1(α) = 1 is satisfied by α2 > e ∼=
2.71
∗ For v − p − t + k ≥ 0 and t 6= k, the equation d1(α) = 1 is satisfied
by α3 < 1 and α4 ∈ (1, e) We do not consider the case with t = k,
because the retailer is eliminated with t = k.
• Step-2: Defining the unique local maximizer of Πr(α), αi. Note that limα→∞Πr(α) =




[2(w + p(α − 1)− bα)(k − t + v + p(α −
1)−vα)− (p−v)α(4w−3bα+p(3α−4)ln(α))] which implies limα→0+ ∂Πr(α)∂α =
a
t
[(p− w)(t− k − v + p)].









] > 0. Therefore
∂2Πr(α)
∂α2
has a unique minimizer and ∂Πr(α)
∂α
crosses zero at most three times.
Next we characterize the αi values considering the two cases below.
– Case-1: v − p− t+ k < 0:
∗ limα→0+ ∂Πr(α)∂α > 0.
∗ Πr(α) crosses zero only at α1 = 2(p− w)/p, and α2 > e. Considering
these
· Πr(α) ≥ 0 for α ∈ (0, α1)
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· Πr(α) ≤ 0 for α ∈ (α1, α2)
· Πr(α) ≥ 0 for α ≥ α2.
Hence there is at least one local maximizer αi ∈ (0, α1) and one local
minimizer αj ∈ (α1, α2). In addition, both αi and αj are unique.
To have any other local maximum or minimum, the total number of
positive extremum should be 4 contradicting with the fact ∂Πr(α)
∂α
= 0
is satisfied at most at three positive α values. Hence, Πr(α) has a
unique local maximizer αi. This maximizer satisfies αi ∈ (0, α1).
– Case-2: v − p− t+ k > 0:
∗ limα→0+ ∂Πr(α)∂α < 0.
∗ Πr(α) crosses zero only at α1 = 2(p−w)/(p−b), α3 < 1 and α4 ∈ (1, e).
Depending on the value of α1, we analyze five possible cases:
∗ α1 < α3 < α4 < e
∗ α1 = α3 < α4 < e
∗ α3 < α1 < α4 < e
∗ α3 < α1 = α4 < e
∗ α3 < α4 < α1 < e
Πr(α) has a local maximizer αi and two local minimizers αj1 and αj2 that
satisfy αj1 < αi < αj2. Hence, αi is the unique local maximizer. This
maximizer satisfies αi ∈ (0,max{α1, α3}].
• Step-3: Showing that α∗ is equal to either αi, or one of the boundary values
αmin and 1.
– For Case-1, the maximum α value that satisfies Πr(α) = 0 is α2 > e.
– For Case-2, the maximum α value satisfying Πr(α) = 0 is max(α1, α4). For
both cases α > 1 contradicting the fact that α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the solution
of the retailer’s problem in (3.6) is either αi, or one of the boundary
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values αmin and 1 such that the retailer’s expected profit is nonnegative.
Otherwise, the retailer sets α∗ = 0.






[−t+ k + (v − p) (1− α (1− 2 ln(α)))] < 0 due to t ≥ te =
(v − p) (1− α (1− ln(α))) + k. This inequality holds because the manu-
facturer does not set t < te in the equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2: In Lemma 1, we characterize the demand allocation of the
direct channel and the retailer channel depending on the delivery lead time decision
of the manufacturer. We also determine the retailer’s order quantity as q = aα(1−
d1(α)). By substituting these values, we obtain the expected sales of the direct
channel. Recall that the expected sales of the direct channel is the sum of the primary
and the secondary demand; i.e., E[D1d+D
2










(d2 − d1)/(1− d1)(z − q)[1/a(1− d1)]dz.








2 , for t ≤ te,
a
2 (α(α− 2) + 1)− a2tα(α− 2) ((v − p)(1 − φ(α))+k) , for t ∈ (te, v − p],
a
2t (α(α− 2)((v − p)φ(α) − k) + (v − p)) , for t ∈ (v − p , ∞),
0, for t→∞.
Finally, we substitute E[D1d +D
2
d], q = aα(1− d1(α)) and φ(α) = α(1− ln(α)) into
(3.8) to find the manufacturer’s expected profit function. For example, when t ≤ te,
we have q = 0 because d1(α) = 0. Hence, Πm(t) = (p− c)a/2−m/t2.
Proof of Lemma 3: For part (i) and (ii), we have similar profit functions. We



















− G(α)). The first derivative
crosses zero at tf =
2m
G(α)
. For G(α) < 0, we have ∂Πm(t)
∂t
> 0 for all t ∈ (0,∞),
hence Πm(t) is strictly increasing in t. For G(α) > 0, we have
∂Πm(t)
∂t
|t∈(0,tf ) > 0 and
∂Πm(t)
∂t
|t>∈(tf ,∞) < 0. Hence Πm(t) is unimodal and the maximizer is tf .




Proof of Proposition 2: In Lemma 2, we define Πm(t) in three connected
regions. To characterize the best response of the manufacturer t∗, we examine Πm(t)
in each region. Note that Gu(α) ≥ Ga(α). Hence, considering the relation between
Gu(α) and Ga(α) we analyze three main cases.
• Case 1: When Gu(α) ≥ Ga(α) > 0, we have tuf ≤ taf . We analyze resulting six
sub-cases.
– When taf ∈ (0, te] and tuf ≤ v − p, Πem(t) is increasing and is maximized at
Πem(t
e). From Lemma 3(i), Πam(t) is decreasing in t ∈ (te, v − p] (because
taf < t
e) and from part (ii) Πum(t) is also decreasing in t ∈ (v − p,∞).
Hence, Πm(t) achieves its maximum at t
∗(α) = te.
– When taf ∈ (te, v − p ] and tuf ≤ v − p, Πem(t) is increasing; Πam(t) is
increasing in t ∈ (te, taf ] and decreasing thereafter; Πum(t) is decreasing in
t ∈ (v − p,∞). Hence, t∗ = taf .
– When taf ∈ (v − p,∞) and tuf ≤ v − p, Πem(t) is increasing; Πam(t) is
increasing in t ∈ (te, v − p] and achieves its maximum at t = v − p; Πum(t)
is decreasing in t ∈ (v − p,∞). Hence, t∗ = v − p.
– Note that sub-cases taf ∈ (0, te], tuf > v−p; and taf ∈ (te, v−p ], tuf > v−p
are not possible because tuf ≤ taf .
– When taf ∈ (v − p,∞) and tuf > v − p, Πem(t) is increasing; Πam(t) is
increasing in t ∈ (te, v − p] and achieves its maximum at v − p; Πum(t) is
increasing in t ∈ (v − p, tuf ] and decreasing thereafter. Hence, t∗ = tuf .
65
• Case 2: When Gu(α) > 0 ≥ Ga(α), we have Πem(t) and Πam(t) increasing in t.
Hence, Πm(t) achieves its maximum at t = v−p for t ≤ v−p. If tuf > v−p, then
t∗(α) = tuf . Otherwise, t
∗(α) = v−p because Πum(t) is decreasing in t ∈ (tuf ,∞).
• Case 3: When 0 ≥ Gu(α) ≥ Ga(α), we have Πem(t), Πam(t) and Πum(t) all
increasing in t. Hence, Πm(t) achieves its maximum at an arbitrarily large t.
We denote this maximizer as t∗(α) ≡ ∞.







wholesales price values over wb = p(1− αmin), the minimum service level is binding






, for w ≤ wb Case-U (Unconstrained),
αmin, for w > w
b Case-C (Constrained).
Considering the retailer’s service level decision, the manufacturer chooses either
Case-U; i.e., α = p−w
p











subject to Πr ≥ 0.
• Case-U: The manufacturer’s profit under this case is Πum = q(w− c) = aα(1−
d1)(w − c). Substituting α = p−wp and d1 = 0 we obtain Πum = ap (−w2 + w(p+
c) − cp). This function is maximized at w∗u = p+c
2






• Case-C: The manufacturer’s profit function under this case is Πum = q(w−c) =
aαmin(w−c). The manufacturer aims to capture the profit of the retailer, hence
he sets a wholesale price for which Πr = αmina(p−w− pαmin2 ) = 0 is provided.




The manufacturer chooses his strategy by comparing his expected profit under






). These two conditions reduce to (p − c) ≥ (2 + √2)pαmin. Hence for
(p − c) ≥ (2 + √2)pαmin, the manufacturer chooses Case-U, otherwise he chooses
Case-C.
Proof of Proposition 4: The full coverage profit Πfm(t) is maximized at t
f∗ =
v − p. The resulting profit is Πfm(tf∗) = a(p−c)2 − m(v−p2) .
The partial coverage profit Πpm(t) is maximized at t
p∗ = 4m
(p−c)(v−p)a
. In that case










this case t∗ = tp∗ because Πpm(t




becomes infeasible and tf∗ = v−p is the optimum solution. Hence optimum solution

















Appendix C: Results of the Buyback Contract
Table 5.1: The Numerical Experiments to Span the Parameter Space DB
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v p k c w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
1000 4 1 0.375 0 1 1 ∞ 1.00 500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 4 1 0.375 0.25 0.95 0.9 7.17 0.54 265 11 87 351 63 bco
1000 4 1 0.375 0.5 0.95 0.8 4.74 0.29 140 4 236 170 94 bco
1000 4 1 1.5 0 1 1 ∞ 1.00 500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 4 1 1.5 0.25 0.95 0.9 6.23 0.55 275 9 168 280 52 bco
1000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.95 0.85 5.20 0.39 147 5 243 177 80 bco
1000 4 1 2.25 0.00 1.00 1.00 ∞ 1.00 500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 4 1 2.25 0.25 0.95 0.9 5.76 0.57 282 7 231 224 45 bco
1000 4 1 2.25 0.5 1 1 5.05 0.38 157 0 297 126 78 sqz
1000 4 2 0.25 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 4 2 0.25 0.5 1.95 1.9 5.39 0.53 537 11 78 353 69 bco
1000 4 2 0.25 1 1.95 1.85 4.33 0.36 277 7 147 244 109 bco
1000 4 2 1 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 4 2 1 0.5 1.95 1.9 4.75 0.54 552 9 148 292 60 bco
1000 4 2 1 1 1.95 1.85 3.94 0.38 291 5 216 189 95 bco
1000 4 2 1.5 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.9 1.85 5.26 0.71 564 23 155 319 26 bco
1000 4 2 1.5 1 2 2 3.79 0.38 306 0 264 146 90 sqz
1000 4 3 0.125 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 4 3 0.125 0.75 2.9 2.85 12.70 0.67 808 33 11 440 49 bco
1000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.95 2.9 8.46 0.51 376 12 26 368 106 bco
1000 4 3 0.5 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 4 3 0.5 0.75 2.9 2.85 8.63 0.68 816 31 35 419 46 bco
1000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.95 2.9 6.40 0.51 387 11 57 344 99 bco
1000 4 3 0.75 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.9 2.85 7.09 0.68 823 30 58 398 44 bco
1000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.95 2.9 5.48 0.52 395 10 84 321 95 bco
1000 8 2 0.75 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 8 2 0.75 0.5 2 0 6.00 0.03 722 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 2 0.75 1 2 0 6.00 0.03 472 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 2 3 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 8 2 3 0.5 1.85 0 6.00 0.19 722 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 2 3 1 1.85 0 6.00 0.19 472 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 2 4.5 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.65 0 6.00 0.38 722 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 2 4.5 1 1.65 0 6.00 0.38 472 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 4 0.5 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 8 4 0.5 1 3.95 0 4.00 0.03 1437 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 4 0.5 2 3.95 0 4.00 0.03 937 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 4 2 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 8 4 2 1 3.65 0 4.00 0.19 1437 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 4 2 2 3.65 0 4.00 0.19 937 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 4 3 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 8 4 3 1 3.25 0 4.00 0.38 1438 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 4 3 2 3.25 0 4.00 0.38 938 0 500 0 0 elm
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v p k c w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
1000 8 6 0.25 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 8 6 0.25 1.5 5.95 0 2.00 0.03 2000 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 6 0.25 3 5.95 0 2.00 0.03 1250 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 6 1 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 8 6 1 1.5 5.45 0 2.00 0.19 2000 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 6 1 3 5.45 0 2.00 0.19 1250 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 6 1.5 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 8 6 1.5 1.5 4.9 0 2.00 0.38 2000 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 8 6 1.5 3 4.9 0 2.00 0.38 1250 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 3 1.125 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 12 3 1.125 0.75 3 0 9.00 0.03 1113 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 3 1.125 1.5 3 0 9.00 0.03 738 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 3 4.5 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 12 3 4.5 0.75 2.75 0 9.00 0.19 1113 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.75 0 9.00 0.19 738 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 3 6.75 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.45 0 9.00 0.38 1113 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.45 0 9.00 0.38 738 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 6 0.75 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 12 6 0.75 1.5 5.95 0 6.00 0.03 2222 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 6 0.75 3 5.95 0 6.00 0.03 1472 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 6 3 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 12 6 3 1.5 5.45 0 6.00 0.19 2222 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 6 3 3 5.45 0 6.00 0.19 1472 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 6 4.5 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 12 6 4.5 1.5 4.9 0 6.00 0.38 2222 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 6 4.5 3 4.9 0 6.00 0.38 1472 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 9 0.375 0 9 9 ∞ 1.00 4500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 12 9 0.375 2.25 8.9 0 3.00 0.03 3264 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 9 0.375 4.5 8.9 0 3.00 0.03 2139 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 9 1.5 0 9 9 ∞ 1.00 4500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 12 9 1.5 2.25 8.2 0 3.00 0.19 3264 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.2 0 3.00 0.19 2139 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 9 2.25 0 9 9 ∞ 1.00 4500 0 0 500 0 bco
1000 12 9 2.25 2.25 7.3 0 3.00 0.38 3264 0 500 0 0 elm
1000 12 9 2.25 4.5 7.3 0 3.00 0.38 2139 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 4 1 0.375 0 1 1 ∞ 1.00 500 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 4 1 0.375 0.25 0.9 0.85 58.26 0.67 246 33 7 442 51 bco
5000 4 1 0.375 0.5 0.95 0.9 40.70 0.51 116 12 17 371 113 bco
5000 4 1 1.5 0 1 1 ∞ 1.00 500 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 4 1 1.5 0.25 0.9 0.85 36.91 0.67 249 32 25 427 49 bco
5000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.95 0.9 30.22 0.51 118 12 36 355 109 bco
5000 4 1 2.25 0 1 1 ∞ 1.00 500 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 4 1 2.25 0.25 0.9 0.85 29.62 0.68 251 31 42 411 47 bco
5000 4 1 2.25 0.5 1 1 25.27 0.38 126 0 59 273 168 sqz
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v p k c w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
5000 4 2 0.25 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 4 2 0.25 0.5 1.9 1.85 46.05 0.67 525 33 6 442 52 bco
5000 4 2 0.25 1 1.95 1.9 31.10 0.51 243 12 15 371 114 bco
5000 4 2 1 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 4 2 1 0.5 1.9 1.85 30.77 0.67 528 32 20 430 50 bco
5000 4 2 1 1 1.95 1.9 23.49 0.51 247 12 31 358 111 bco
5000 4 2 1.5 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.9 1.85 25.17 0.67 531 31 33 418 49 bco
5000 4 2 1.5 1 2 2 18.95 0.38 250 0 53 277 171 sqz
5000 4 3 0.125 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 4 3 0.125 0.75 2.9 2.85 61.91 0.67 802 33 2 444 54 bco
5000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.95 2.9 41.36 0.50 365 12 6 374 121 bco
5000 4 3 0.5 0 2.95 2.95 800.00 1.00 1475 25 0 500 0 bco
5000 4 3 0.5 0.75 2.9 2.85 42.30 0.67 803 33 7 439 54 bco
5000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.95 2.9 31.54 0.50 368 12 12 369 120 bco
5000 4 3 0.75 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.9 2.85 34.90 0.67 805 33 12 435 53 bco
5000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.95 2.9 27.21 0.50 369 12 17 364 119 bco
5000 8 2 0.75 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 8 2 0.75 0.5 2 0 6.00 0.03 611 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 8 2 0.75 1 2 0 6.00 0.03 361 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 8 2 3 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 8 2 3 0.5 1.85 0 6.00 0.19 611 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 8 2 3 1 1.85 0 6.00 0.19 361 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 8 2 4.5 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.65 0 6.00 0.38 611 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 8 2 4.5 1 2 2 6.32 0.38 361 0 475 16 10 sqz
5000 8 4 0.5 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 8 4 0.5 1 3.95 0 4.00 0.03 1187 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 8 4 0.5 2 3.95 0 4.00 0.03 687 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 8 4 2 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 8 4 2 1 3.65 0 4.00 0.19 1187 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 8 4 2 2 3.65 0 4.00 0.19 687 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 8 4 3 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 8 4 3 1 3.95 3.9 6.13 0.59 1197 5 285 186 29 bco
5000 8 4 3 2 3.55 1.65 4.74 0.38 695 0 422 48 30 sqz
5000 8 6 0.25 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 8 6 0.25 1.5 5.9 5.85 16.47 0.68 1657 33 16 438 46 bco
5000 8 6 0.25 3 5.9 5.75 8.28 0.42 783 18 68 303 128 bco
5000 8 6 1 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 8 6 1 1.5 5.9 5.85 11.38 0.68 1679 30 53 406 41 bco
5000 8 6 1 3 5.9 5.75 7.10 0.42 812 16 114 267 119 bco
5000 8 6 1.5 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 8 6 1.5 1.5 5.9 5.85 9.41 0.69 1699 28 88 374 38 bco
5000 8 6 1.5 3 5.95 5.9 7.00 0.53 837 9 130 291 79 bco
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v p k c w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
5000 12 3 1.125 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 12 3 1.125 0.75 3 0 9.00 0.03 1063 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 3 1.125 1.5 3 0 9.00 0.03 688 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 3 4.5 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 12 3 4.5 0.75 2.75 0 9.00 0.19 1063 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.75 0 9.00 0.19 688 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 3 6.75 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.45 0 9.00 0.38 1063 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.45 0 9.00 0.38 688 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 6 0.75 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 12 6 0.75 1.5 5.95 0 6.00 0.03 2111 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 6 0.75 3 5.95 0 6.00 0.03 1361 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 6 3 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 12 6 3 1.5 5.45 0 6.00 0.19 2111 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 6 3 3 5.45 0 6.00 0.19 1361 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 6 4.5 0 5.95 5.95 88.89 1.00 2976 24 25 475 0 bco
5000 12 6 4.5 1.5 4.9 0 6.00 0.38 2111 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 6 4.5 3 4.9 0 6.00 0.38 1361 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 9 0.375 0 9 9 ∞ 1.00 4500 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 12 9 0.375 2.25 8.9 0 3.00 0.03 2819 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 9 0.375 4.5 8.9 0 3.00 0.03 1694 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 9 1.5 0 9 9 ∞ 1.00 4500 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 12 9 1.5 2.25 8.2 0 3.00 0.19 2819 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.2 0 3.00 0.19 1694 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 9 2.25 0 9 9 ∞ 1.00 4500 0 0 500 0 bco
5000 12 9 2.25 2.25 7.3 0 3.00 0.38 2819 0 500 0 0 elm
5000 12 9 2.25 4.5 7.3 0 3.00 0.38 1694 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 4 1 0.375 0 1 1 ∞ 1.00 500 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 4 1 0.375 0.25 0.9 0.85 115.37 0.67 245 33 4 443 53 bco
10000 4 1 0.375 0.5 0.95 0.9 80.68 0.50 114 12 8 373 119 bco
10000 4 1 1.5 0 1 1 ∞ 1.00 500 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 4 1 1.5 0.25 0.9 0.85 73.26 0.67 247 33 12 435 52 bco
10000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.95 0.9 60.11 0.50 115 12 18 365 117 bco
10000 4 1 2.25 0 0.95 0.95 355.56 1.00 475 25 3 497 0 bco
10000 4 1 2.25 0.25 0.9 0.85 58.87 0.67 248 32 21 428 51 bco
10000 4 1 2.25 0.5 1 1 50.54 0.38 122 0 30 291 179 sqz
10000 4 2 0.25 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 4 2 0.25 0.5 1.9 1.85 91.31 0.67 524 33 3 443 54 bco
10000 4 2 0.25 1 1.95 1.9 61.73 0.50 240 12 7 373 120 bco
10000 4 2 1 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 4 2 1 0.5 1.9 1.85 61.14 0.67 525 33 10 437 53 bco
10000 4 2 1 1 1.95 1.9 46.76 0.50 242 12 16 366 118 bco
10000 4 2 1.5 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.9 1.85 50.07 0.67 527 32 17 431 52 bco
10000 4 2 1.5 1 1.95 1.9 40.23 0.50 244 12 23 360 117 bco
71
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v p k c w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
10000 4 3 0.125 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 4 3 0.125 0.75 2.9 2.85 123.41 0.67 801 33 1 444 55 bco
10000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.95 2.9 82.48 0.50 364 12 3 374 123 bco
10000 4 3 0.5 0 2.95 2.95 1600.00 1.00 1475 25 0 500 0 bco
10000 4 3 0.5 0.75 2.9 2.85 84.38 0.67 802 33 4 442 55 bco
10000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.95 2.9 62.97 0.50 365 12 6 372 122 bco
10000 4 3 0.75 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.9 2.85 69.67 0.67 802 33 6 440 54 bco
10000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.95 2.9 54.37 0.50 366 12 9 370 122 bco
10000 8 2 0.75 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 8 2 0.75 0.5 1.9 1.85 32.47 0.68 534 32 24 435 41 bco
10000 8 2 0.75 1 1.95 1.85 14.31 0.36 271 7 135 247 118 bco
10000 8 2 3 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 8 2 3 0.5 1.9 1.85 21.46 0.69 548 28 83 383 34 bco
10000 8 2 3 1 1.95 1.85 13.02 0.37 284 5 197 197 106 bco
10000 8 2 4.5 0 2 2 ∞ 1.00 1000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.9 1.85 17.42 0.70 560 24 141 331 29 bco
10000 8 2 4.5 1 2 2 12.63 0.38 299 0 237 162 100 sqz
10000 8 4 0.5 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 8 4 0.5 1 3.9 3.85 24.85 0.68 1098 32 21 436 43 bco
10000 8 4 0.5 2 3.95 3.85 10.72 0.36 539 7 121 250 129 bco
10000 8 4 2 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 8 4 2 1 3.9 3.85 16.95 0.69 1119 29 71 393 37 bco
10000 8 4 2 2 3.95 3.85 9.79 0.37 560 6 176 206 119 bco
10000 8 4 3 0 3.95 3.95 266.67 1.00 1975 25 6 494 0 bco
10000 8 4 3 1 3.9 3.85 13.92 0.70 1138 26 118 349 33 bco
10000 8 4 3 2 3.55 1.65 9.47 0.38 584 0 211 179 110 sqz
10000 8 6 0.25 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 8 6 0.25 1.5 5.9 5.85 32.16 0.67 1646 33 8 441 50 bco
10000 8 6 0.25 3 5.95 5.9 21.19 0.51 760 12 21 369 110 bco
10000 8 6 1 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 8 6 1 1.5 5.9 5.85 22.34 0.67 1657 32 27 425 48 bco
10000 8 6 1 3 5.95 5.9 16.14 0.51 776 11 45 350 105 bco
10000 8 6 1.5 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 8 6 1.5 1.5 5.9 5.85 18.52 0.68 1667 30 45 409 47 bco
10000 8 6 1.5 3 5.95 5.9 13.89 0.51 789 11 66 333 101 bco
10000 12 3 1.125 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 12 3 1.125 0.75 3 0 9.00 0.03 1002 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 12 3 1.125 1.5 3 0 9.00 0.03 627 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 12 3 4.5 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 12 3 4.5 0.75 2.75 0 9.00 0.19 1002 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.75 0 9.00 0.19 627 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 12 3 6.75 0 3 3 ∞ 1.00 1500 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.45 0 9.00 0.38 1002 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.45 0 9.00 0.38 627 0 500 0 0 elm
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m v p k c w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
10000 12 6 0.75 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 12 6 0.75 1.5 5.95 0 6.00 0.03 1972 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 12 6 0.75 3 5.95 0 6.00 0.03 1222 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 12 6 3 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 12 6 3 1.5 5.45 0 6.00 0.19 1972 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 12 6 3 3 5.45 0 6.00 0.19 1222 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 12 6 4.5 0 6 6 ∞ 1.00 3000 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 12 6 4.5 1.5 4.9 0 6.00 0.38 1972 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 12 6 4.5 3 4.9 0 6.00 0.38 1222 0 500 0 0 elm
10000 12 9 0.375 0 9 9 ∞ 1.00 4500 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 12 9 0.375 2.25 8.9 8.85 15.20 0.68 2522 32 26 434 40 bco
10000 12 9 0.375 4.5 8.95 8.85 6.48 0.36 1273 7 148 244 108 bco
10000 12 9 1.5 0 9 9 ∞ 1.00 4500 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 12 9 1.5 2.25 8.9 8.85 10.52 0.69 2574 28 85 382 33 bco
10000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.95 8.85 5.95 0.38 1331 5 215 189 96 bco
10000 12 9 2.25 0 9 9 ∞ 1.00 4500 0 0 500 0 bco
10000 12 9 2.25 2.25 8.9 8.85 8.68 0.70 2621 24 141 330 29 bco
10000 12 9 2.25 4.5 9 9 5.62 0.38 1380 0 267 144 89 sqz
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Table 5.2: The Numerical Experiments to Span the Parameter Space RB/DO
RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m v p k c w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
1000 4 1 0.375 0 1 1 1.00 500 0 500 3.00 389 500
1000 4 1 0.375 0.25 1 1 1.00 250 0 500 3.00 264 500
1000 4 1 0.375 0.5 0.95 0.9 0.50 113 12 375 3.00 139 500
1000 4 1 1.5 0 1 1 1.00 500 0 500 3.00 389 500
1000 4 1 1.5 0.25 1 1 1.00 250 0 500 3.00 264 500
1000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.95 0.9 0.50 113 12 375 3.00 139 500
1000 4 1 2.25 0 1 1 1.00 500 0 500 3.00 389 500
1000 4 1 2.25 0.25 1 1 1.00 250 0 500 3.00 264 500
1000 4 1 2.25 0.5 0.95 0.75 0.38 117 1 309 3.00 139 500
1000 4 2 0.25 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 2.00 750 500
1000 4 2 0.25 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 2.00 500 500
1000 4 2 0.25 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 2.00 250 500
1000 4 2 1 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 2.00 750 500
1000 4 2 1 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 2.00 500 500
1000 4 2 1 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 2.00 250 500
1000 4 2 1.5 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 2.00 750 500
1000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 2.00 500 500
1000 4 2 1.5 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 2.00 250 500
1000 4 3 0.125 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 1.33 563 375
1000 4 3 0.125 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 1.78 316 281
1000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 2.67 141 188
1000 4 3 0.5 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 1.33 563 375
1000 4 3 0.5 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 1.78 316 281
1000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 2.67 141 188
1000 4 3 0.75 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 1.33 563 375
1000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 1.78 316 281
1000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 2.67 141 188
1000 8 2 0.75 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 6.00 972 500
1000 8 2 0.75 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.00 722 500
1000 8 2 0.75 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6.00 472 500
1000 8 2 3 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 6.00 972 500
1000 8 2 3 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.00 722 500
1000 8 2 3 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6.00 472 500
1000 8 2 4.5 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 6.00 972 500
1000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.00 722 500
1000 8 2 4.5 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6.00 472 500
1000 8 4 0.5 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1938 500
1000 8 4 0.5 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1438 500
1000 8 4 0.5 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 4.00 938 500
1000 8 4 2 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1938 500
1000 8 4 2 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1438 500
1000 8 4 2 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 4.00 938 500
1000 8 4 3 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1938 500
1000 8 4 3 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1438 500
1000 8 4 3 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 4.00 938 500
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RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m v p k c w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
1000 8 6 0.25 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 2.00 2750 500
1000 8 6 0.25 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 2.00 2000 500
1000 8 6 0.25 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 2.00 1250 500
1000 8 6 1 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 2.00 2750 500
1000 8 6 1 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 2.00 2000 500
1000 8 6 1 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 2.00 1250 500
1000 8 6 1.5 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 2.00 2750 500
1000 8 6 1.5 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 2.00 2000 500
1000 8 6 1.5 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 2.00 1250 500
1000 12 3 1.125 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 9.00 1488 500
1000 12 3 1.125 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 9.00 1113 500
1000 12 3 1.125 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 9.00 738 500
1000 12 3 4.5 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 9.00 1488 500
1000 12 3 4.5 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 9.00 1113 500
1000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 9.00 738 500
1000 12 3 6.75 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 9.00 1488 500
1000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 9.00 1113 500
1000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 9.00 738 500
1000 12 6 0.75 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 6.00 2972 500
1000 12 6 0.75 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 6.00 2222 500
1000 12 6 0.75 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.00 1472 500
1000 12 6 3 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 6.00 2972 500
1000 12 6 3 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 6.00 2222 500
1000 12 6 3 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.00 1472 500
1000 12 6 4.5 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 6.00 2972 500
1000 12 6 4.5 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 6.00 2222 500
1000 12 6 4.5 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.00 1472 500
1000 12 9 0.375 0 9 9 1.00 4500 0 500 3.00 4389 500
1000 12 9 0.375 2.25 8.85 8.8 0.75 2475 56 469 3.00 3264 500
1000 12 9 0.375 4.5 8.95 8.9 0.50 1113 12 375 3.00 2139 500
1000 12 9 1.5 0 9 9 1.00 4500 0 500 3.00 4389 500
1000 12 9 1.5 2.25 8.85 8.8 0.75 2475 56 469 3.00 3264 500
1000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.95 8.9 0.50 1113 12 375 3.00 2139 500
1000 12 9 2.25 0 9 9 1.00 4500 0 500 3.00 4389 500
1000 12 9 2.25 2.25 8.85 8.8 0.75 2475 56 469 3.00 3264 500
1000 12 9 2.25 4.5 8.95 8.9 0.50 1113 12 375 3.00 2139 500
5000 4 1 0.375 0 1 1 1.00 500 0 500 6.67 113 225
5000 4 1 0.375 0.25 1 1 1.00 250 0 500 8.89 63 169
5000 4 1 0.375 0.5 0.95 0.9 0.50 113 12 375 13.33 28 113
5000 4 1 1.5 0 1 1 1.00 500 0 500 6.67 113 225
5000 4 1 1.5 0.25 1 1 1.00 250 0 500 8.89 63 169
5000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.95 0.9 0.50 113 12 375 13.33 28 113
5000 4 1 2.25 0 1 1 1.00 500 0 500 6.67 113 225
5000 4 1 2.25 0.25 1 1 1.00 250 0 500 8.89 63 169
5000 4 1 2.25 0.5 0.95 0.75 0.38 117 1 309 13.33 28 113
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RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m v p k c w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
5000 4 2 0.25 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 5.00 200 200
5000 4 2 0.25 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.67 113 150
5000 4 2 0.25 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 10.00 50 100
5000 4 2 1 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 5.00 200 200
5000 4 2 1 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.67 113 150
5000 4 2 1 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 10.00 50 100
5000 4 2 1.5 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 5.00 200 200
5000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.67 113 150
5000 4 2 1.5 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 10.00 50 100
5000 4 3 0.125 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 6.67 113 75
5000 4 3 0.125 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 8.89 63 56
5000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 13.33 28 38
5000 4 3 0.5 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 6.67 113 75
5000 4 3 0.5 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 8.89 63 56
5000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 13.33 28 38
5000 4 3 0.75 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 6.67 113 75
5000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 8.89 63 56
5000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 13.33 28 38
5000 8 2 0.75 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 6.00 861 500
5000 8 2 0.75 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.00 611 500
5000 8 2 0.75 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6.00 361 500
5000 8 2 3 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 6.00 861 500
5000 8 2 3 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.00 611 500
5000 8 2 3 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6.00 361 500
5000 8 2 4.5 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 6.00 861 500
5000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.00 611 500
5000 8 2 4.5 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6.00 361 500
5000 8 4 0.5 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1688 500
5000 8 4 0.5 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1188 500
5000 8 4 0.5 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 4.00 688 500
5000 8 4 2 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1688 500
5000 8 4 2 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1188 500
5000 8 4 2 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 4.00 688 500
5000 8 4 3 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1688 500
5000 8 4 3 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1188 500
5000 8 4 3 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 4.00 688 500
5000 8 6 0.25 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 2.00 1750 500
5000 8 6 0.25 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 2.22 1013 450
5000 8 6 0.25 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 3.33 450 300
5000 8 6 1 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 2.00 1750 500
5000 8 6 1 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 2.22 1013 450
5000 8 6 1 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 3.33 450 300
5000 8 6 1.5 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 2.00 1750 500
5000 8 6 1.5 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 2.22 1013 450
5000 8 6 1.5 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 3.33 450 300
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m v p k c w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
5000 12 3 1.125 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 9.00 1438 500
5000 12 3 1.125 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 9.00 1063 500
5000 12 3 1.125 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 9.00 688 500
5000 12 3 4.5 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 9.00 1438 500
5000 12 3 4.5 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 9.00 1063 500
5000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 9.00 688 500
5000 12 3 6.75 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 9.00 1438 500
5000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 9.00 1063 500
5000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 9.00 688 500
5000 12 6 0.75 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 6.00 2861 500
5000 12 6 0.75 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 6.00 2111 500
5000 12 6 0.75 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.00 1361 500
5000 12 6 3 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 6.00 2861 500
5000 12 6 3 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 6.00 2111 500
5000 12 6 3 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.00 1361 500
5000 12 6 4.5 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 6.00 2861 500
5000 12 6 4.5 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 6.00 2111 500
5000 12 6 4.5 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.00 1361 500
5000 12 9 0.375 0 9 9 1.00 4500 0 500 3.00 3944 500
5000 12 9 0.375 2.25 8.85 8.8 0.75 2475 56 469 3.00 2819 500
5000 12 9 0.375 4.5 8.95 8.9 0.50 1113 12 375 3.00 1694 500
5000 12 9 1.5 0 9 9 1.00 4500 0 500 3.00 3944 500
5000 12 9 1.5 2.25 8.85 8.8 0.75 2475 56 469 3.00 2819 500
5000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.95 8.9 0.50 1113 12 375 3.00 1694 500
5000 12 9 2.25 0 9 9 1.00 4500 0 500 3.00 3944 500
5000 12 9 2.25 2.25 8.85 8.8 0.75 2475 56 469 3.00 2819 500
5000 12 9 2.25 4.5 8.95 8.9 0.50 1113 12 375 3.00 1694 500
10000 4 1 0.375 0 1 1 1.00 500 0 500 13.33 56 113
10000 4 1 0.375 0.25 1 1 1.00 250 0 500 17.78 32 84
10000 4 1 0.375 0.5 0.95 0.9 0.50 113 12 375 26.67 14 56
10000 4 1 1.5 0 1 1 1.00 500 0 500 13.33 56 113
10000 4 1 1.5 0.25 1 1 1.00 250 0 500 17.78 32 84
10000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.95 0.9 0.50 113 12 375 26.67 14 56
10000 4 1 2.25 0 1 1 1.00 500 0 500 13.33 56 113
10000 4 1 2.25 0.25 1 1 1.00 250 0 500 17.78 32 84
10000 4 1 2.25 0.5 0.95 0.75 0.38 117 1 309 26.67 14 56
10000 4 2 0.25 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 10.00 100 100
10000 4 2 0.25 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 13.33 56 75
10000 4 2 0.25 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 20.00 25 50
10000 4 2 1 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 10.00 100 100
10000 4 2 1 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 13.33 56 75
10000 4 2 1 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 20.00 25 50
10000 4 2 1.5 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 10.00 100 100
10000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 13.33 56 75
10000 4 2 1.5 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 20.00 25 50
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m v p k c w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
10000 4 3 0.125 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 13.33 56 38
10000 4 3 0.125 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 17.78 32 28
10000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 26.67 14 19
10000 4 3 0.5 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 13.33 56 38
10000 4 3 0.5 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 17.78 32 28
10000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 26.67 14 19
10000 4 3 0.75 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 13.33 56 38
10000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 17.78 32 28
10000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 26.67 14 19
10000 8 2 0.75 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 6.00 722 500
10000 8 2 0.75 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.00 472 500
10000 8 2 0.75 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6.67 225 450
10000 8 2 3 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 6.00 722 500
10000 8 2 3 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.00 472 500
10000 8 2 3 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6.67 225 450
10000 8 2 4.5 0 2 2 1.00 1000 0 500 6.00 722 500
10000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.9 1.85 0.67 522 33 444 6.00 472 500
10000 8 2 4.5 1 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6.67 225 450
10000 8 4 0.5 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1375 500
10000 8 4 0.5 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 875 500
10000 8 4 0.5 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 5.00 400 400
10000 8 4 2 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1375 500
10000 8 4 2 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 875 500
10000 8 4 2 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 5.00 400 400
10000 8 4 3 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1375 500
10000 8 4 3 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 875 500
10000 8 4 3 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 5.00 400 400
10000 8 6 0.25 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 3.33 900 300
10000 8 6 0.25 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 4.44 506 225
10000 8 6 0.25 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.67 225 150
10000 8 6 1 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 3.33 900 300
10000 8 6 1 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 4.44 506 225
10000 8 6 1 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.67 225 150
10000 8 6 1.5 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 3.33 900 300
10000 8 6 1.5 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 4.44 506 225
10000 8 6 1.5 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.67 225 150
10000 12 3 1.125 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 9.00 1377 500
10000 12 3 1.125 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 9.00 1002 500
10000 12 3 1.125 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 9.00 627 500
10000 12 3 4.5 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 9.00 1377 500
10000 12 3 4.5 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 9.00 1002 500
10000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 9.00 627 500
10000 12 3 6.75 0 3 3 1.00 1500 0 500 9.00 1377 500
10000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 800 33 444 9.00 1002 500
10000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.95 2.9 0.50 362 13 375 9.00 627 500
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m v p k c w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
10000 12 6 0.75 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 6.00 2722 500
10000 12 6 0.75 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 6.00 1972 500
10000 12 6 0.75 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.00 1222 500
10000 12 6 3 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 6.00 2722 500
10000 12 6 3 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 6.00 1972 500
10000 12 6 3 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.00 1222 500
10000 12 6 4.5 0 6 6 1.00 3000 0 500 6.00 2722 500
10000 12 6 4.5 1.5 5.9 5.85 0.67 1633 33 444 6.00 1972 500
10000 12 6 4.5 3 5.95 5.9 0.50 737 13 375 6.00 1222 500
10000 12 9 0.375 0 9 9 1.00 4500 0 500 3.00 3389 500
10000 12 9 0.375 2.25 8.85 8.8 0.75 2475 56 469 3.00 2264 500
10000 12 9 0.375 4.5 8.95 8.9 0.50 1113 12 375 3.00 1139 500
10000 12 9 1.5 0 9 9 1.00 4500 0 500 3.00 3389 500
10000 12 9 1.5 2.25 8.85 8.8 0.75 2475 56 469 3.00 2264 500
10000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.95 8.9 0.50 1113 12 375 3.00 1139 500
10000 12 9 2.25 0 9 9 1.00 4500 0 500 3.00 3389 500
10000 12 9 2.25 2.25 8.85 8.8 0.75 2475 56 469 3.00 2264 500
10000 12 9 2.25 4.5 8.95 8.9 0.50 1113 12 375 3.00 1139 500
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Table 5.3: Dual Channel Strategy in the m/c Plane, v=8, p=4, k=1
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m c w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
0 0 0 0 1.00 1.00 2000 0 500 0 0 ER
0 0.25 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 1875 0 500 0 0 ER
0 0.5 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 1750 0 500 0 0 ER
0 0.75 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 1625 0 500 0 0 ER
0 1 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 1.25 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 1375 0 500 0 0 ER
0 1.5 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 1250 0 500 0 0 ER
0 1.75 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 1125 0 500 0 0 ER
0 2 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 1000 0 500 0 0 ER
0 2.25 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 875 0 500 0 0 ER
0 2.5 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 750 0 500 0 0 ER
0 2.75 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 625 0 500 0 0 ER
0 3 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 3.25 3.55 2.15 1.65 0.49 375 0 500 0 0 ER
0 3.5 3.55 2.15 1.65 0.49 250 0 500 0 0 ER
0 3.75 3.75 2.95 1.68 0.48 125 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 SP
2500 0.25 4 4 40.00 1.00 1752 0 12 488 0 SP
2500 0.5 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 1594 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 0.75 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 1469 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 1 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 1344 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 1.25 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 1219 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 1.5 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 1094 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 1.75 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 969 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 2 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 844 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 2.25 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 719 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 2.5 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 594 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 2.75 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 469 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 3 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 344 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 3.25 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 219 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 3.5 3.95 3.3 5.60 0.09 106 1 354 26 120 SP
2500 3.75 3.9 1.05 10.66 0.07 30 0 188 41 272 CP
5000 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 SP
5000 0.25 3.95 3.95 66.67 1.00 1726 25 7 493 0 SP
5000 0.5 4 4 39.72 0.93 1528 0 13 485 2 SP
5000 0.75 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 1313 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 1 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 1187 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 1.25 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 1063 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 1.5 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 937 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 1.75 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 813 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 2 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 688 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 2.25 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 562 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 2.5 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 438 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 2.75 3.95 3.65 5.41 0.17 324 1 343 67 89 SP
5000 3 3.95 3.65 6.51 0.16 225 2 288 78 135 SP
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m c w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
5000 3.25 3.95 3.6 8.14 0.14 138 2 236 75 189 SP
5000 3.5 3.95 3.5 11.37 0.11 67 2 173 68 259 SP
5000 3.75 3.9 1.05 21.32 0.07 19 0 94 53 353 CP
7500 0 3.95 3.95 600.00 1.00 1975 25 1 499 0 SP
7500 0.25 4 4 120.07 1.00 1751 0 4 496 0 SP
7500 0.5 4 4 59.45 0.93 1527 0 9 489 2 SP
7500 0.75 3.9 3.85 16.85 0.69 1282 31 44 419 37 SP
7500 1 3.9 3.85 16.45 0.69 1112 31 45 418 37 SP
7500 1.25 3.95 3.9 10.16 0.54 960 11 101 334 65 SP
7500 1.5 3.95 3.9 10.50 0.53 820 11 98 335 67 SP
7500 1.75 3.95 3.85 7.39 0.37 691 6 190 220 90 SP
7500 2 3.95 3.85 7.96 0.37 576 6 177 224 99 SP
7500 2.25 3.95 3.8 7.36 0.28 467 4 221 162 118 SP
7500 2.5 3.95 3.8 8.25 0.28 366 4 198 167 134 SP
7500 2.75 3.95 3.75 8.72 0.22 272 3 202 133 165 SP
7500 3 3.95 3.75 10.42 0.22 187 4 170 141 189 SP
7500 3.25 3.95 3.65 12.37 0.15 113 3 153 103 244 SP
7500 3.5 3.95 3.55 17.14 0.12 54 2 114 86 300 SP
7500 3.75 3.9 1.05 31.98 0.07 15 0 63 57 380 CP
10000 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 SP
10000 0.25 4 4 160.00 1.00 1750 0 3 497 0 SP
10000 0.5 4 4 79.18 0.93 1527 0 6 491 2 SP
10000 0.75 3.9 3.85 22.01 0.68 1274 31 34 425 41 SP
10000 1 3.9 3.85 21.53 0.68 1104 31 35 424 41 SP
10000 1.25 3.95 3.9 13.20 0.53 939 11 79 343 78 SP
10000 1.5 3.95 3.9 13.68 0.53 803 11 77 344 79 SP
10000 1.75 3.95 3.9 14.22 0.53 667 11 74 345 81 SP
10000 2 3.95 3.85 10.39 0.36 545 7 138 236 126 SP
10000 2.25 3.95 3.85 11.35 0.36 440 7 127 240 133 SP
10000 2.5 3.95 3.8 10.85 0.27 338 5 152 179 168 SP
10000 2.75 3.95 3.8 12.44 0.27 249 5 133 184 183 SP
10000 3 3.95 3.75 13.81 0.21 169 4 129 150 221 SP
10000 3.25 3.95 3.7 16.83 0.17 101 3 110 130 260 SP
10000 3.5 3.95 3.55 22.84 0.11 47 2 85 91 324 SP
10000 3.75 3.9 1.05 42.64 0.07 13 0 47 59 394 CP
12500 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 SP
12500 0.25 4 4 200.00 1.00 1750 0 2 498 0 SP
12500 0.5 4 4 98.90 0.93 1527 0 5 492 2 SP
12500 0.75 3.9 3.85 27.16 0.68 1269 32 28 428 44 SP
12500 1 3.9 3.85 26.61 0.68 1100 32 28 428 43 SP
12500 1.25 3.9 3.85 26.08 0.68 930 32 29 428 43 SP
12500 1.5 3.95 3.9 16.86 0.52 791 11 63 350 87 SP
12500 1.75 3.95 3.9 17.56 0.52 657 11 60 351 89 SP
12500 2 3.9 3.75 14.66 0.42 526 17 88 291 122 SP
12500 2.25 3.95 3.85 14.04 0.35 424 7 104 247 150 SP
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m c w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
12500 2.5 3.95 3.85 15.53 0.35 324 7 94 250 157 SP
12500 2.75 3.95 3.8 15.47 0.26 236 5 108 191 201 SP
12500 3 3.95 3.75 17.20 0.21 159 4 104 156 240 SP
12500 3.25 3.95 3.7 21.00 0.17 94 4 88 134 277 SP
12500 3.5 3.95 3.55 28.54 0.11 44 2 68 94 338 SP
12500 3.75 3.9 1.05 53.30 0.07 12 0 38 61 402 CP
15000 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 SP
15000 0.25 4 4 240.00 1.00 1750 0 2 498 0 SP
15000 0.5 4 4 118.62 0.93 1526 0 4 493 2 SP
15000 0.75 3.85 3.8 43.55 0.76 1266 55 15 458 27 SP
15000 1 3.9 3.85 31.68 0.68 1096 32 24 431 45 SP
15000 1.25 3.9 3.85 31.08 0.68 927 32 24 430 45 SP
15000 1.5 3.95 3.9 20.04 0.52 783 12 53 354 93 SP
15000 1.75 3.95 3.9 20.89 0.52 651 12 51 355 94 SP
15000 2 3.95 3.9 21.84 0.52 518 12 49 355 96 SP
15000 2.25 3.95 3.85 16.74 0.35 412 7 87 252 161 SP
15000 2.5 3.95 3.85 18.54 0.35 315 7 79 254 167 SP
15000 2.75 3.95 3.8 18.50 0.26 227 5 90 195 214 SP
15000 3 3.95 3.75 20.60 0.21 152 4 87 160 253 SP
15000 3.25 3.95 3.7 25.18 0.17 89 4 74 137 289 SP
15000 3.5 3.95 3.55 34.23 0.11 41 2 57 95 348 SP
15000 3.75 3.9 1.05 63.97 0.07 11 0 31 61 407 CP
17500 0 3.95 3.95 1400.00 1.00 1975 25 0 500 0 SP
17500 0.25 4 4 280.00 1.00 1750 0 2 498 0 SP
17500 0.5 4 4 138.35 0.93 1526 0 4 494 2 SP
17500 0.75 3.85 3.8 50.59 0.76 1265 55 13 460 27 SP
17500 1 3.9 3.85 36.76 0.68 1094 32 21 433 47 SP
17500 1.25 3.9 3.85 36.08 0.68 925 32 21 432 46 SP
17500 1.5 3.95 3.9 23.22 0.52 777 12 46 357 97 SP
17500 1.75 3.95 3.9 24.23 0.51 646 12 44 357 98 SP
17500 2 3.95 3.9 25.35 0.51 514 12 42 358 99 SP
17500 2.25 3.95 3.85 19.44 0.35 404 7 76 255 169 SP
17500 2.5 3.95 3.85 21.56 0.35 309 7 68 257 174 SP
17500 2.75 3.95 3.8 21.53 0.26 221 5 78 199 224 SP
17500 3 3.95 3.75 24.00 0.21 147 4 75 163 263 SP
17500 3.25 3.95 3.7 29.36 0.17 86 4 63 139 297 SP
17500 3.5 3.95 3.55 39.93 0.11 39 3 49 97 354 SP
17500 3.75 3.9 1.05 74.63 0.07 11 0 27 62 411 CP
20000 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 SP
20000 0.25 4 4 320.00 1.00 1750 0 2 498 0 SP
20000 0.5 4 4 158.07 0.93 1526 0 3 494 2 SP
20000 0.75 3.85 3.8 57.64 0.76 1264 55 11 461 28 SP
20000 1 3.9 3.85 41.83 0.68 1092 32 18 434 48 SP
20000 1.25 3.9 3.85 41.08 0.68 924 32 19 434 48 SP
20000 1.5 3.95 3.9 26.40 0.51 773 12 41 359 100 SP
82
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m c w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
20000 1.75 3.95 3.9 27.57 0.51 642 12 39 359 101 SP
20000 2 3.95 3.9 28.86 0.51 511 12 37 360 102 SP
20000 2.25 3.95 3.85 22.14 0.35 398 8 66 258 176 SP
20000 2.5 3.95 3.85 24.57 0.34 304 8 60 260 180 SP
20000 2.75 3.95 3.8 24.56 0.26 216 6 68 201 231 SP
20000 3 3.95 3.75 27.40 0.21 143 4 65 165 270 SP
20000 3.25 3.95 3.7 33.54 0.17 83 4 56 141 303 SP
20000 3.5 3.95 3.55 45.63 0.11 38 3 43 98 359 SP
20000 3.75 3.9 1.05 85.29 0.07 10 0 23 62 414 CP
22500 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 SP
22500 0.25 4 4 360.00 1.00 1750 0 1 499 0 SP
22500 0.5 4 4 177.79 0.93 1526 0 3 495 2 SP
22500 0.75 3.85 3.8 64.68 0.75 1263 55 10 462 28 SP
22500 1 3.9 3.85 46.90 0.67 1090 32 16 435 49 SP
22500 1.25 3.9 3.85 46.08 0.67 922 32 17 435 48 SP
22500 1.5 3.95 3.9 29.58 0.51 769 12 36 361 103 SP
22500 1.75 3.95 3.9 30.90 0.51 639 12 35 361 104 SP
22500 2 3.95 3.9 32.37 0.51 509 12 33 362 105 SP
22500 2.25 3.95 3.85 24.84 0.34 393 8 59 260 181 SP
22500 2.5 3.95 3.85 27.58 0.34 300 8 54 262 185 SP
22500 2.75 3.95 3.8 27.60 0.26 212 6 61 203 236 SP
22500 3 3.95 3.8 32.67 0.26 140 6 52 205 243 SP
22500 3.25 3.95 3.7 37.71 0.17 81 4 49 142 308 SP
22500 3.5 3.95 3.55 51.33 0.11 37 3 38 99 363 SP
22500 3.75 3.9 1.05 95.95 0.07 10 0 21 63 416 CP
25000 0 4 4 ∞ 1.00 2000 0 0 500 0 SP
25000 0.25 4 4 400.00 1.00 1750 0 1 499 0 SP
25000 0.5 4 4 197.51 0.93 1526 0 3 495 2 SP
25000 0.75 3.85 3.8 71.73 0.75 1262 55 9 462 28 SP
25000 1 3.9 3.85 51.97 0.67 1089 33 15 436 49 SP
25000 1.25 3.9 3.85 51.08 0.67 921 33 15 436 49 SP
25000 1.5 3.95 3.9 32.75 0.51 766 12 33 362 105 SP
25000 1.75 3.95 3.9 34.24 0.51 636 12 32 362 106 SP
25000 2 3.95 3.9 35.88 0.51 507 12 30 363 107 SP
25000 2.25 3.95 3.85 27.54 0.34 389 8 54 262 185 SP
25000 2.5 3.95 3.85 30.60 0.34 297 8 48 263 188 SP
25000 2.75 3.95 3.8 30.63 0.26 209 6 55 204 241 SP
25000 3 3.95 3.8 36.28 0.26 138 6 46 207 247 SP
25000 3.25 3.95 3.7 41.89 0.17 80 4 44 143 312 SP
25000 3.5 3.95 3.55 57.03 0.11 36 3 34 99 367 SP
25000 3.75 3.9 1.05 106.61 0.07 10 0 19 63 418 CP
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Table 5.4: RB/DO Strategies in the m/c Plane, v=8, p=4, k=1
RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m c w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
0 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 2000 500
0 0.25 4 4 1.00 1750 0 500 4.00 1875 500
0 0.5 4 4 0.93 1526 0 497 4.00 1750 500
0 0.75 3.85 3.8 0.75 1256 56 469 4.00 1625 500
0 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1500 500
0 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 911 33 444 4.00 1375 500
0 1.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 744 33 444 4.00 1250 500
0 1.75 3.95 3.9 0.50 613 13 375 4.00 1125 500
0 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 4.00 1000 500
0 2.25 3.95 3.9 0.50 362 13 375 4.00 875 500
0 2.5 3.95 3.85 0.33 269 8 278 4.00 750 500
0 2.75 3.95 3.85 0.33 186 8 278 4.00 625 500
0 3 3.95 3.8 0.25 119 6 219 4.00 500 500
0 3.25 3.95 3.7 0.17 65 4 153 4.00 375 500
0 3.5 3.95 3.6 0.13 28 3 117 4.00 250 500
0 3.75 4 4 0.07 8 0 65 4.00 125 500
2500 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1844 500
2500 0.25 4 4 1.00 1750 0 500 4.00 1719 500
2500 0.5 4 4 0.93 1526 0 497 4.00 1594 500
2500 0.75 3.85 3.8 0.75 1256 56 469 4.00 1469 500
2500 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1344 500
2500 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 911 33 444 4.00 1219 500
2500 1.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 744 33 444 4.00 1094 500
2500 1.75 3.95 3.9 0.50 613 13 375 4.00 969 500
2500 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 4.00 844 500
2500 2.25 3.95 3.9 0.50 362 13 375 4.00 719 500
2500 2.5 3.95 3.85 0.33 269 8 278 4.00 594 500
2500 2.75 3.95 3.85 0.33 186 8 278 4.00 469 500
2500 3 3.95 3.8 0.25 119 6 219 4.00 344 500
2500 3.25 3.95 3.7 0.17 65 4 153 4.00 219 500
2500 3.5 3.95 3.6 0.13 28 3 117 5.00 100 400
2500 3.75 4 4 0.07 8 0 65 10.00 25 200
5000 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1688 500
5000 0.25 4 4 1.00 1750 0 500 4.00 1563 500
5000 0.5 4 4 0.93 1526 0 497 4.00 1438 500
5000 0.75 3.85 3.8 0.75 1256 56 469 4.00 1313 500
5000 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1188 500
5000 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 911 33 444 4.00 1063 500
5000 1.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 744 33 444 4.00 938 500
5000 1.75 3.95 3.9 0.50 613 13 375 4.00 813 500
5000 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 4.00 688 500
5000 2.25 3.95 3.9 0.50 362 13 375 4.00 563 500
5000 2.5 3.95 3.85 0.33 269 8 278 4.00 438 500
5000 2.75 3.95 3.85 0.33 186 8 278 4.00 313 500
5000 3 3.95 3.8 0.25 119 6 219 5.00 200 400
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m c w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
5000 3.25 3.95 3.7 0.17 65 4 153 6.67 113 300
5000 3.5 3.95 3.6 0.13 28 3 117 10.00 50 200
5000 3.75 4 4 0.07 8 0 65 20.00 13 100
7500 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1531 500
7500 0.25 4 4 1.00 1750 0 500 4.00 1406 500
7500 0.5 4 4 0.93 1526 0 497 4.00 1281 500
7500 0.75 3.85 3.8 0.75 1256 56 469 4.00 1156 500
7500 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1031 500
7500 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 911 33 444 4.00 906 500
7500 1.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 744 33 444 4.00 781 500
7500 1.75 3.95 3.9 0.50 613 13 375 4.00 656 500
7500 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 4.00 531 500
7500 2.25 3.95 3.9 0.50 362 13 375 4.29 408 467
7500 2.5 3.95 3.85 0.33 269 8 278 5.00 300 400
7500 2.75 3.95 3.85 0.33 186 8 278 6.00 208 333
7500 3 3.95 3.8 0.25 119 6 219 7.50 133 267
7500 3.25 3.95 3.7 0.17 65 4 153 10.00 75 200
7500 3.5 3.95 3.6 0.13 28 3 117 15.00 33 133
7500 3.75 4 4 0.07 8 0 65 30.00 8 67
10000 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1375 500
10000 0.25 4 4 1.00 1750 0 500 4.00 1250 500
10000 0.5 4 4 0.93 1526 0 497 4.00 1125 500
10000 0.75 3.85 3.8 0.75 1256 56 469 4.00 1000 500
10000 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 875 500
10000 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 911 33 444 4.00 750 500
10000 1.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 744 33 444 4.00 625 500
10000 1.75 3.95 3.9 0.50 613 13 375 4.44 506 450
10000 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 5.00 400 400
10000 2.25 3.95 3.9 0.50 362 13 375 5.71 306 350
10000 2.5 3.95 3.85 0.33 269 8 278 6.67 225 300
10000 2.75 3.95 3.85 0.33 186 8 278 8.00 156 250
10000 3 3.95 3.8 0.25 119 6 219 10.00 100 200
10000 3.25 3.95 3.7 0.17 65 4 153 13.33 56 150
10000 3.5 3.95 3.6 0.13 28 3 117 20.00 25 100
10000 3.75 4 4 0.07 8 0 65 40.00 6 50
12500 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1219 500
12500 0.25 4 4 1.00 1750 0 500 4.00 1094 500
12500 0.5 4 4 0.93 1526 0 497 4.00 969 500
12500 0.75 3.85 3.8 0.75 1256 56 469 4.00 844 500
12500 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.17 720 480
12500 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 911 33 444 4.55 605 440
12500 1.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 744 33 444 5.00 500 400
12500 1.75 3.95 3.9 0.50 613 13 375 5.56 405 360
12500 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 6.25 320 320
12500 2.25 3.95 3.9 0.50 362 13 375 7.14 245 280
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m c w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
12500 2.5 3.95 3.85 0.33 269 8 278 8.33 180 240
12500 2.75 3.95 3.85 0.33 186 8 278 10.00 125 200
12500 3 3.95 3.8 0.25 119 6 219 12.50 80 160
12500 3.25 3.95 3.7 0.17 65 4 153 16.67 45 120
12500 3.5 3.95 3.6 0.13 28 3 117 25.00 20 80
12500 3.75 4 4 0.07 8 0 65 50.00 5 40
15000 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.00 1063 500
15000 0.25 4 4 1.00 1750 0 500 4.00 938 500
15000 0.5 4 4 0.93 1526 0 497 4.29 817 467
15000 0.75 3.85 3.8 0.75 1256 56 469 4.62 704 433
15000 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 5.00 600 400
15000 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 911 33 444 5.45 504 367
15000 1.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 744 33 444 6.00 417 333
15000 1.75 3.95 3.9 0.50 613 13 375 6.67 338 300
15000 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 7.50 267 267
15000 2.25 3.95 3.9 0.50 362 13 375 8.57 204 233
15000 2.5 3.95 3.85 0.33 269 8 278 10.00 150 200
15000 2.75 3.95 3.85 0.33 186 8 278 12.00 104 167
15000 3 3.95 3.8 0.25 119 6 219 15.00 67 133
15000 3.25 3.95 3.7 0.17 65 4 153 20.00 38 100
15000 3.5 3.95 3.6 0.13 28 3 117 30.00 17 67
15000 3.75 4 4 0.07 8 0 65 60.00 4 33
17500 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 4.38 914 457
17500 0.25 4 4 1.00 1750 0 500 4.67 804 429
17500 0.5 4 4 0.93 1526 0 497 5.00 700 400
17500 0.75 3.85 3.8 0.75 1256 56 469 5.38 604 371
17500 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 5.83 514 343
17500 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 911 33 444 6.36 432 314
17500 1.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 744 33 444 7.00 357 286
17500 1.75 3.95 3.9 0.50 613 13 375 7.78 289 257
17500 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 8.75 229 229
17500 2.25 3.95 3.9 0.50 362 13 375 10.00 175 200
17500 2.5 3.95 3.85 0.33 269 8 278 11.67 129 171
17500 2.75 3.95 3.85 0.33 186 8 278 14.00 89 143
17500 3 3.95 3.8 0.25 119 6 219 17.50 57 114
17500 3.25 3.95 3.7 0.17 65 4 153 23.33 32 86
17500 3.5 3.95 3.6 0.13 28 3 117 35.00 14 57
17500 3.75 4 4 0.07 8 0 65 70.00 4 29
20000 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 5.00 800 400
20000 0.25 4 4 1.00 1750 0 500 5.33 703 375
20000 0.5 4 4 0.93 1526 0 497 5.71 613 350
20000 0.75 3.85 3.8 0.75 1256 56 469 6.15 528 325
20000 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 6.67 450 300
20000 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 911 33 444 7.27 378 275
20000 1.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 744 33 444 8.00 313 250
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20000 1.75 3.95 3.9 0.50 613 13 375 8.89 253 225
20000 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 10.00 200 200
20000 2.25 3.95 3.9 0.50 362 13 375 11.43 153 175
20000 2.5 3.95 3.85 0.33 269 8 278 13.33 113 150
20000 2.75 3.95 3.85 0.33 186 8 278 16.00 78 125
20000 3 3.95 3.8 0.25 119 6 219 20.00 50 100
20000 3.25 3.95 3.7 0.17 65 4 153 26.67 28 75
20000 3.5 3.95 3.6 0.13 28 3 117 40.00 13 50
20000 3.75 4 4 0.07 8 0 65 80.00 3 25
22500 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 5.63 711 356
22500 0.25 4 4 1.00 1750 0 500 6.00 625 333
22500 0.5 4 4 0.93 1526 0 497 6.43 544 311
22500 0.75 3.85 3.8 0.75 1256 56 469 6.92 469 289
22500 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 7.50 400 267
22500 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 911 33 444 8.18 336 244
22500 1.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 744 33 444 9.00 278 222
22500 1.75 3.95 3.9 0.50 613 13 375 10.00 225 200
22500 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 11.25 178 178
22500 2.25 3.95 3.9 0.50 362 13 375 12.86 136 156
22500 2.5 3.95 3.85 0.33 269 8 278 15.00 100 133
22500 2.75 3.95 3.85 0.33 186 8 278 18.00 69 111
22500 3 3.95 3.8 0.25 119 6 219 22.50 44 89
22500 3.25 3.95 3.7 0.17 65 4 153 30.00 25 67
22500 3.5 3.95 3.6 0.13 28 3 117 45.00 11 44
22500 3.75 4 4 0.07 8 0 65 90.00 3 22
25000 0 4 4 1.00 2000 0 500 6.25 640 320
25000 0.25 4 4 1.00 1750 0 500 6.67 563 300
25000 0.5 4 4 0.93 1526 0 497 7.14 490 280
25000 0.75 3.85 3.8 0.75 1256 56 469 7.69 423 260
25000 1 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 8.33 360 240
25000 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 911 33 444 9.09 303 220
25000 1.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 744 33 444 10.00 250 200
25000 1.75 3.95 3.9 0.50 613 13 375 11.11 203 180
25000 2 3.95 3.9 0.50 487 13 375 12.50 160 160
25000 2.25 3.95 3.9 0.50 362 13 375 14.29 123 140
25000 2.5 3.95 3.85 0.33 269 8 278 16.67 90 120
25000 2.75 3.95 3.85 0.33 186 8 278 20.00 63 100
25000 3 3.95 3.8 0.25 119 6 219 25.00 40 80
25000 3.25 3.95 3.7 0.17 65 4 153 33.33 23 60
25000 3.5 3.95 3.6 0.13 28 3 117 50.00 10 40
25000 3.75 4 4 0.07 8 0 65 100.00 3 20
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Table 5.5: Dual Channel Strategy in the p/k Plane, m=7500, v=8, c=1
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
p k w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
2.00 0.75 2 0 6.00 0.03 292 0 500 0 0 ER
2.00 1.25 1.95 1.8 8.97 0.29 293 4 261 155 83 SP
2.00 1.75 1.95 1.8 8.91 0.29 296 3 276 143 81 SP
2.00 2.25 1.95 1.8 8.85 0.30 299 3 290 130 79 SP
2.00 2.75 1.95 1.8 8.80 0.30 302 3 305 118 77 SP
2.00 3.25 1.95 1.85 9.94 0.39 306 4 261 166 73 SP
2.00 3.75 1.95 1.85 9.75 0.40 310 4 280 150 70 SP
2.00 4.25 2 2 9.09 0.34 316 0 330 96 74 CP
2.00 4.75 2 2 9.80 0.43 323 0 306 131 63 CP
2.00 5.25 2 2 9.92 0.54 324 0 302 157 41 CP
2.25 0.75 2.25 0 5.75 0.03 398 0 500 0 0 ER
2.25 1.25 2.2 0 5.75 0.06 398 0 500 0 0 ER
2.25 1.75 2.15 0 5.75 0.09 398 0 500 0 0 ER
2.25 2.25 2.2 2.1 9.08 0.39 398 5 245 187 69 SP
2.25 2.75 2.2 2.1 8.95 0.39 403 4 264 170 66 SP
2.25 3.25 2.2 2.1 8.83 0.40 408 4 284 153 63 SP
2.25 3.75 2.2 2.1 8.72 0.41 413 3 304 136 60 SP
2.25 4.25 2.2 2.1 8.61 0.42 419 3 324 119 56 SP
2.25 4.75 2.25 2.25 9.13 0.47 429 0 315 133 52 CP
2.25 5.25 2.25 2.25 9.27 0.61 431 0 310 161 28 CP
2.50 0.75 2.5 0 5.50 0.03 502 0 500 0 0 ER
2.50 1.25 2.45 0 5.50 0.06 502 0 500 0 0 ER
2.50 1.75 2.4 0 5.50 0.09 502 0 500 0 0 ER
2.50 2.25 2.35 0 5.50 0.14 502 0 500 0 0 ER
2.50 2.75 2.45 2.35 8.14 0.40 505 4 281 161 59 SP
2.50 3.25 2.45 2.35 8.07 0.41 511 4 301 143 56 SP
2.50 3.75 2.45 2.35 8.00 0.42 517 3 321 125 53 SP
2.50 4.25 2 0.05 7.85 0.41 524 0 350 97 53 CP
2.50 4.75 2.25 1.55 8.88 0.53 538 0 310 147 43 CP
2.50 5.25 2.25 1.8 8.62 0.71 535 0 319 166 15 CP
2.75 0.75 2.75 0 5.25 0.03 603 0 500 0 0 ER
2.75 1.25 2.7 0 5.25 0.06 603 0 500 0 0 ER
2.75 1.75 2.65 0 5.25 0.10 603 0 500 0 0 ER
2.75 2.25 2.55 0 5.25 0.15 603 0 500 0 0 ER
2.75 2.75 2.7 2.65 10.21 0.56 607 8 183 269 48 SP
2.75 3.25 2.7 2.65 9.77 0.56 616 7 211 245 44 SP
2.75 3.75 2.7 2.65 9.36 0.57 624 7 240 220 40 SP
2.75 4.25 2.7 2.65 8.97 0.58 634 6 271 193 36 SP
2.75 4.75 2.6 2.25 8.90 0.60 649 0 295 172 33 CP
2.75 5.25 2.7 2.65 5.71 1.00 605 0 459 41 0 CP
3.00 0.75 2.95 0 5.00 0.03 700 0 500 0 0 ER
3.00 1.25 2.9 0 5.00 0.07 700 0 500 0 0 ER
3.00 1.75 2.85 0 5.00 0.11 700 0 500 0 0 ER
3.00 2.25 2.95 2.9 10.15 0.55 707 9 162 287 51 SP
3.00 2.75 2.95 2.9 9.73 0.56 715 8 188 264 48 SP
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
p k w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
3.00 3.25 2.95 2.9 9.35 0.56 724 7 216 240 44 SP
3.00 3.75 2.95 2.9 8.99 0.57 734 6 246 214 41 SP
3.00 4.25 2.95 2.9 8.65 0.58 745 5 278 186 36 SP
3.00 4.75 2 0.15 8.93 0.70 758 0 280 200 20 CP
3.00 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.25 0.75 3.2 0 4.75 0.04 793 0 500 0 0 RE
3.25 1.25 3.2 3.15 10.58 0.54 796 10 116 326 58 SP
3.25 1.75 3.2 3.15 10.14 0.55 805 10 140 305 55 SP
3.25 2.25 3.2 3.15 9.73 0.55 813 9 165 283 52 SP
3.25 2.75 3.2 3.15 9.36 0.56 822 8 192 260 48 SP
3.25 3.25 3.2 3.15 9.01 0.56 832 7 220 235 45 SP
3.25 3.75 3.2 3.15 8.69 0.57 843 6 250 208 41 SP
3.25 4.25 2.7 1.35 8.58 0.58 859 0 277 183 40 CP
3.25 4.75 3.2 3.15 6.32 1.00 813 0 376 124 0 CP
3.25 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.50 0.75 3.45 3.4 10.62 0.54 892 11 95 344 62 SP
3.50 1.25 3.45 3.4 10.18 0.54 900 10 117 324 59 SP
3.50 1.75 3.45 3.4 9.77 0.55 909 9 141 303 56 SP
3.50 2.25 3.45 3.4 9.40 0.55 918 9 167 280 53 SP
3.50 2.75 3.45 3.4 9.06 0.56 928 8 194 256 50 SP
3.50 3.25 3.45 3.4 8.75 0.56 939 7 223 231 46 SP
3.50 3.75 3.45 3.4 8.46 0.57 950 6 253 204 43 SP
3.50 4.25 2.35 0.15 9.27 0.69 978 0 243 232 25 CP
3.50 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.50 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.75 0.75 3.65 3.6 17.95 0.69 994 31 36 426 37 SP
3.75 1.25 3.7 3.65 9.88 0.54 1003 10 117 323 60 SP
3.75 1.75 3.7 3.65 9.50 0.54 1012 9 142 301 57 SP
3.75 2.25 3.7 3.65 9.15 0.55 1022 9 168 278 54 SP
3.75 2.75 3.65 3.6 11.20 0.71 1034 24 137 336 27 SP
3.75 3.25 3.65 3.6 10.20 0.71 1047 22 172 304 24 SP
3.75 3.75 3.65 3.6 9.34 0.72 1061 19 212 267 21 SP
3.75 4.25 3.7 3.65 7.06 1.00 1026 0 301 199 0 CP
3.75 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.75 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 0.75 3.9 3.85 17.64 0.69 1108 31 36 426 38 SP
4.00 1.25 3.9 3.85 15.41 0.69 1116 30 55 409 36 SP
4.00 1.75 3.9 3.85 13.66 0.69 1126 29 79 388 33 SP
4.00 2.25 3.9 3.85 12.25 0.70 1137 27 106 364 30 SP
4.00 2.75 3.9 3.85 11.09 0.70 1149 24 137 335 28 SP
4.00 3.25 3.9 3.85 10.12 0.71 1162 22 172 303 25 SP
4.00 3.75 2.65 0 9.43 0.67 1187 5 212 256 32 CP
4.00 4.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Table 5.6: RB/DO Strategies in the p/k Plane, m=7500, v=8, c=1
RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
p k w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
2.00 0.75 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6 292 500
2.00 1.25 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6 292 500
2.00 1.75 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6 292 500
2.00 2.25 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6 292 500
2.00 2.75 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6 292 500
2.00 3.25 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6 292 500
2.00 3.75 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6 292 500
2.00 4.25 1.95 1.9 0.50 238 12 375 6 292 500
2.00 4.75 1.85 1.3 0.43 245 0 337 6 292 500
2.00 5.25 1.85 1.45 0.54 248 0 396 6 292 500
2.25 0.75 2.2 2.15 0.50 331 12 375 5.75 398 500
2.25 1.25 2.2 2.15 0.50 331 12 375 5.75 398 500
2.25 1.75 2.2 2.15 0.50 331 12 375 5.75 398 500
2.25 2.25 2.2 2.15 0.50 331 12 375 5.75 398 500
2.25 2.75 2.2 2.15 0.50 331 12 375 5.75 398 500
2.25 3.25 2.2 2.15 0.50 331 12 375 5.75 398 500
2.25 3.75 2.2 2.15 0.50 331 12 375 5.75 398 500
2.25 4.25 2.2 2.15 0.50 331 12 375 5.75 398 500
2.25 4.75 1.8 0.35 0.47 338 1 360 5.75 398 500
2.25 5.25 2.05 1.6 0.61 343 0 425 5.75 398 500
2.50 0.75 2.45 2.4 0.50 425 13 375 5.5 502 500
2.50 1.25 2.45 2.4 0.50 425 13 375 5.5 502 500
2.50 1.75 2.45 2.4 0.50 425 13 375 5.5 502 500
2.50 2.25 2.45 2.4 0.50 425 13 375 5.5 502 500
2.50 2.75 2.45 2.4 0.50 425 13 375 5.5 502 500
2.50 3.25 2.45 2.4 0.50 425 13 375 5.5 502 500
2.50 3.75 2.45 2.4 0.50 425 13 375 5.5 502 500
2.50 4.25 2.45 2.4 0.50 425 13 375 5.5 502 500
2.50 4.75 2.5 2.5 0.53 443 0 387 5.5 502 500
2.50 5.25 2.5 2.5 0.71 434 0 459 5.5 502 500
2.75 0.75 2.65 2.6 0.67 522 33 444 5.25 603 500
2.75 1.25 2.65 2.6 0.67 522 33 444 5.25 603 500
2.75 1.75 2.65 2.6 0.67 522 33 444 5.25 603 500
2.75 2.25 2.65 2.6 0.67 522 33 444 5.25 603 500
2.75 2.75 2.65 2.6 0.67 522 33 444 5.25 603 500
2.75 3.25 2.65 2.6 0.67 522 33 444 5.25 603 500
2.75 3.75 2.65 2.6 0.67 522 33 444 5.25 603 500
2.75 4.25 2.65 2.6 0.67 522 33 444 5.25 603 500
2.75 4.75 2.75 2.75 0.60 555 0 419 5.25 603 500
2.75 5.25 2.65 2.6 0.67 522 33 444 5.25 603 500
3.00 0.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 633 33 444 5 700 500
3.00 1.25 2.9 2.85 0.67 633 33 444 5 700 500
3.00 1.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 633 33 444 5 700 500
3.00 2.25 2.9 2.85 0.67 633 33 444 5 700 500
3.00 2.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 633 33 444 5 700 500
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p k w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
3.00 3.25 2.9 2.85 0.67 633 33 444 5 700 500
3.00 3.75 2.9 2.85 0.67 633 33 444 5 700 500
3.00 4.25 2.9 2.85 0.67 633 33 444 5 700 500
3.00 4.75 3 3 0.70 665 0 455 5 700 500
3.00 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.25 0.75 3.15 3.1 0.67 744 33 444 4.75 793 500
3.25 1.25 3.15 3.1 0.67 744 33 444 4.75 793 500
3.25 1.75 3.15 3.1 0.67 744 33 444 4.75 793 500
3.25 2.25 3.15 3.1 0.67 744 33 444 4.75 793 500
3.25 2.75 3.15 3.1 0.67 744 33 444 4.75 793 500
3.25 3.25 3.15 3.1 0.67 744 33 444 4.75 793 500
3.25 3.75 3.15 3.1 0.67 744 33 444 4.75 793 500
3.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 0.58 758 0 411 4.75 793 500
3.25 4.75 3.15 3.1 0.67 744 33 444 4.75 793 500
3.25 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.50 0.75 3.4 3.35 0.67 856 33 444 4.5 880 500
3.50 1.25 3.4 3.35 0.67 856 33 444 4.5 880 500
3.50 1.75 3.4 3.35 0.67 856 33 444 4.5 880 500
3.50 2.25 3.4 3.35 0.67 856 33 444 4.5 880 500
3.50 2.75 3.4 3.35 0.67 856 33 444 4.5 880 500
3.50 3.25 3.4 3.35 0.67 856 33 444 4.5 880 500
3.50 3.75 3.4 3.35 0.67 856 33 444 4.5 880 500
3.50 4.25 3.5 3.5 0.69 891 0 451 4.5 880 500
3.50 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.50 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.75 0.75 3.65 3.6 0.67 967 33 444 4.25 960 500
3.75 1.25 3.65 3.6 0.67 967 33 444 4.25 960 500
3.75 1.75 3.65 3.6 0.67 967 33 444 4.25 960 500
3.75 2.25 3.65 3.6 0.67 967 33 444 4.25 960 500
3.75 2.75 3.65 3.6 0.67 967 33 444 4.25 960 500
3.75 3.25 3.65 3.6 0.67 967 33 444 4.25 960 500
3.75 3.75 3.65 3.6 0.67 967 33 444 4.25 960 500
3.75 4.25 3.65 3.6 0.67 967 33 444 4.25 960 500
3.75 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.75 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 0.75 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4 1031 500
4.00 1.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4 1031 500
4.00 1.75 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4 1031 500
4.00 2.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4 1031 500
4.00 2.75 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4 1031 500
4.00 3.25 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4 1031 500
4.00 3.75 4 4 0.67 1112 0 445 4 1031 500
4.00 4.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Table 5.7: Dual Channel Strategy in the m/v Plane, p=4, k=1, c=1
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
0 5 1 0 1.00 1.00 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 5.5 3.35 1.35 1.24 0.49 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 6 3.1 0.35 1.32 0.49 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 6.5 3.45 1.75 1.40 0.49 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 7 3.35 1.35 1.48 0.49 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 7.5 3.25 0.95 1.56 0.49 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 8 3.1 0.35 1.63 0.49 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 5 3.95 3.9 10.00 1.00 1025 0 50 450 0 CP
2500 5.5 3.9 3.85 9.68 0.68 1109 30 58 399 43 SP
2500 6 3.9 3.85 8.47 0.69 1119 29 71 393 37 SP
2500 6.5 3.9 3.85 7.63 0.70 1129 28 82 387 31 SP
2500 7 3.8 0 3.00 0.10 1222 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 7.5 3.85 0 3.50 0.08 1296 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 8 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 1344 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 5 3.95 3.9 20.00 1.00 1013 0 25 475 0 CP
5000 5.5 3.9 3.85 19.12 0.67 1094 31 30 421 49 SP
5000 6 3.9 3.85 16.52 0.68 1100 31 37 418 46 SP
5000 6.5 3.9 3.85 14.66 0.68 1106 31 44 415 42 SP
5000 7 3.9 3.85 13.26 0.69 1112 30 51 411 38 SP
5000 7.5 3.9 3.85 12.20 0.69 1119 30 58 409 34 SP
5000 8 3.9 0 4.00 0.07 1187 0 500 0 0 ER
7500 5 3.95 3.9 30.00 1.00 1008 0 17 483 0 CP
7500 5.5 3.9 3.85 28.56 0.67 1089 32 20 429 51 SP
7500 6 3.9 3.85 24.57 0.67 1093 32 25 427 49 SP
7500 6.5 3.9 3.85 21.68 0.68 1097 32 30 424 46 SP
7500 7 3.9 3.85 19.49 0.68 1102 31 35 422 43 SP
7500 7.5 3.9 3.85 17.80 0.68 1107 31 40 420 40 SP
7500 8 3.9 3.85 16.45 0.69 1112 31 45 418 37 SP
10000 5 3.95 3.9 40.00 1.00 1006 0 12 488 0 CP
10000 5.5 3.9 3.85 37.99 0.67 1086 32 15 433 52 SP
10000 6 3.9 3.85 32.62 0.67 1089 32 19 431 50 SP
10000 6.5 3.9 3.85 28.70 0.67 1092 32 23 429 48 SP
10000 7 3.9 3.85 25.72 0.68 1096 32 27 427 46 SP
10000 7.5 3.9 3.85 23.39 0.68 1100 32 31 426 43 SP
10000 8 3.9 3.85 21.53 0.68 1104 31 35 424 41 SP
12500 5 3.95 3.9 50.00 1.00 1005 0 10 490 0 CP
12500 5.5 3.9 3.85 47.43 0.67 1084 33 12 435 53 SP
12500 6 3.9 3.85 40.67 0.67 1087 32 15 434 51 SP
12500 6.5 3.9 3.85 35.71 0.67 1090 32 18 432 50 SP
12500 7 3.9 3.85 31.94 0.68 1093 32 21 431 48 SP
12500 7.5 3.9 3.85 28.98 0.68 1096 32 25 429 46 SP
12500 8 3.9 3.85 26.61 0.68 1100 32 28 428 43 SP
15000 5 3.95 3.9 60.00 1.00 1004 0 8 492 0 CP
15000 5.5 3.9 3.85 56.87 0.67 1083 33 10 437 53 SP
15000 6 3.9 3.85 48.72 0.67 1085 33 13 435 52 SP
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits — Sales Eql.
m v w b t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
15000 6.5 3.9 3.85 42.73 0.67 1088 32 15 434 51 SP
15000 7 3.9 3.85 38.16 0.67 1090 32 18 433 49 SP
15000 7.5 3.9 3.85 34.57 0.68 1093 32 21 432 47 SP
15000 8 3.9 3.85 31.68 0.68 1096 32 24 431 45 SP
17500 5 3.95 3.9 70.00 1.00 1004 0 7 493 0 CP
17500 5.5 3.9 3.85 66.31 0.67 1082 33 9 438 54 SP
17500 6 3.9 3.85 56.77 0.67 1084 33 11 437 53 SP
17500 6.5 3.9 3.85 49.75 0.67 1086 33 13 436 51 SP
17500 7 3.9 3.85 44.38 0.67 1089 32 16 435 50 SP
17500 7.5 3.9 3.85 40.15 0.67 1091 32 18 434 48 SP
17500 8 3.9 3.85 36.76 0.68 1094 32 21 433 47 SP
20000 5 3.95 3.9 80.00 1.00 1003 0 6 494 0 CP
20000 5.5 3.9 3.85 75.75 0.67 1082 33 8 439 54 SP
20000 6 3.9 3.85 64.82 0.67 1083 33 9 438 53 SP
20000 6.5 3.9 3.85 56.77 0.67 1085 33 11 437 52 SP
20000 7 3.9 3.85 50.60 0.67 1087 33 14 436 51 SP
20000 7.5 3.9 3.85 45.74 0.67 1090 32 16 435 49 SP
20000 8 3.9 3.85 41.83 0.68 1092 32 18 434 48 SP
22500 5 3.95 3.9 90.00 1.00 1003 0 6 494 0 CP
22500 5.5 3.9 3.85 85.19 0.67 1081 33 7 439 54 SP
22500 6 3.9 3.85 72.87 0.67 1083 33 8 438 53 SP
22500 6.5 3.9 3.85 63.79 0.67 1084 33 10 438 52 SP
22500 7 3.9 3.85 56.82 0.67 1086 33 12 437 51 SP
22500 7.5 3.9 3.85 51.33 0.67 1088 33 14 436 50 SP
22500 8 3.9 3.85 46.90 0.67 1090 32 16 435 49 SP
25000 5 3.95 3.9 100.00 1.00 1003 0 5 495 0 CP
25000 5.5 3.9 3.85 94.63 0.67 1081 33 6 440 54 SP
25000 6 3.9 3.85 80.93 0.67 1082 33 8 439 53 SP
25000 6.5 3.9 3.85 70.80 0.67 1084 33 9 438 53 SP
25000 7 3.9 3.85 63.04 0.67 1085 33 11 437 52 SP
25000 7.5 3.9 3.85 56.91 0.67 1087 33 13 437 50 SP
25000 8 3.9 3.85 51.97 0.67 1089 33 15 436 49 SP
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Table 5.8: RB/DO Strategies in the m/v Plane, p=4, k=1, c=1
RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m v w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
0 5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 1.00 1500 500
0 5.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 1.50 1500 500
0 6 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 2.00 1500 500
0 6.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 2.50 1500 500
0 7 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 3.00 1500 500
0 7.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 3.50 1500 500
0 8 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1500 500
2500 5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 3.33 225 150
2500 5.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 2.22 506 338
2500 6 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 2.00 875 500
2500 6.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 2.50 1100 500
2500 7 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 3.00 1222 500
2500 7.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 3.50 1296 500
2500 8 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1344 500
5000 5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 6.67 113 75
5000 5.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.44 253 169
5000 6 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 3.33 450 300
5000 6.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 2.67 703 469
5000 7 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 3.00 944 500
5000 7.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 3.50 1092 500
5000 8 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1188 500
7500 5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 10.00 75 50
7500 5.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 6.67 169 113
7500 6 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 5.00 300 200
7500 6.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 469 313
7500 7 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 3.33 675 450
7500 7.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 3.50 888 500
7500 8 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 1031 500
10000 5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 13.33 56 38
10000 5.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 8.89 127 84
10000 6 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 6.67 225 150
10000 6.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 5.33 352 234
10000 7 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.44 506 338
10000 7.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 3.81 689 459
10000 8 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.00 875 500
12500 5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 16.67 45 30
12500 5.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 11.11 101 68
12500 6 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 8.33 180 120
12500 6.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 6.67 281 188
12500 7 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 5.56 405 270
12500 7.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.76 551 368
12500 8 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 4.17 720 480
15000 5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 20.00 38 25
15000 5.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 13.33 84 56
15000 6 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 10.00 150 100
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RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m v w b α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
15000 6.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 8.00 234 156
15000 7 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 6.67 338 225
15000 7.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 5.71 459 306
15000 8 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 5.00 600 400
17500 5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 23.33 32 21
17500 5.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 15.56 72 48
17500 6 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 11.67 129 86
17500 6.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 9.33 201 134
17500 7 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 7.78 289 193
17500 7.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 6.67 394 263
17500 8 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 5.83 514 343
20000 5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 26.67 28 19
20000 5.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 17.78 63 42
20000 6 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 13.33 113 75
20000 6.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 10.67 176 117
20000 7 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 8.89 253 169
20000 7.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 7.62 345 230
20000 8 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 6.67 450 300
22500 5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 30.00 25 17
22500 5.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 20.00 56 38
22500 6 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 15.00 100 67
22500 6.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 12.00 156 104
22500 7 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 10.00 225 150
22500 7.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 8.57 306 204
22500 8 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 7.50 400 267
25000 5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 33.33 23 15
25000 5.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 22.22 51 34
25000 6 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 16.67 90 60
25000 6.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 13.33 141 94
25000 7 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 11.11 203 135
25000 7.5 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 9.52 276 184
25000 8 3.9 3.85 0.67 1078 33 444 8.33 360 240
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Appendix D: Results of the Wholesale Price
Contract
Table 5.9: The Numerical Experiments to Span the Parameter Space DW
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v p k c w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
1000 4 1 0.375 0 1 3.00 0.03 389 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 4 1 0.375 0.25 1 3.00 0.03 264 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 4 1 0.375 0.5 1 3.00 0.03 139 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 4 1 1.5 0 0.95 3.00 0.19 389 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 4 1 1.5 0.25 0.95 3.00 0.19 264 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.9 3.80 0.19 144 0 394 36 70 CP
1000 4 1 2.25 0 0.8 3.44 0.38 391 0 437 39 24 CP
1000 4 1 2.25 0.25 0.8 4.05 0.38 271 1 371 80 49 CP
1000 4 1 2.25 0.5 0.8 4.93 0.38 156 1 304 121 75 CP
1000 4 2 0.25 0 2 2.00 0.03 750 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 4 2 0.25 0.5 2 2.00 0.03 500 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 4 2 0.25 1 1.75 2.63 0.15 256 7 349 65 86 SP
1000 4 2 1 0 1.85 2.00 0.19 750 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 4 2 1 0.5 1.8 2.00 0.19 500 0 497 2 1 SP
1000 4 2 1 1 1.8 2.85 0.19 272 1 351 51 99 CP
1000 4 2 1.5 0 1.6 2.58 0.38 763 2 388 69 43 CP
1000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.6 3.04 0.38 529 2 329 106 65 CP
1000 4 2 1.5 1 1.6 3.70 0.38 303 3 271 142 88 CP
1000 4 3 0.125 0 1.75 3.59 0.44 845 236 75 311 114 SP
1000 4 3 0.125 0.75 2.05 3.45 0.33 519 132 98 244 157 SP
1000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.35 3.93 0.23 258 60 105 172 223 SP
1000 4 3 0.5 0 1.7 3.20 0.46 883 221 121 280 99 SP
1000 4 3 0.5 0.75 2 3.17 0.36 546 125 137 222 142 SP
1000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.7 3.80 0.19 293 3 131 125 244 CP
1000 4 3 0.75 0 2.4 3.44 0.38 1003 7 146 219 135 CP
1000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.4 4.05 0.38 692 8 124 233 144 CP
1000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.4 4.93 0.38 385 8 101 247 152 CP
1000 8 2 0.75 0 2 6.00 0.03 972 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 2 0.75 0.5 2 6.00 0.03 722 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 2 0.75 1 2 6.00 0.03 472 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 2 3 0 1.85 6.00 0.19 972 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 2 3 0.5 1.85 6.00 0.19 722 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 2 3 1 1.85 6.00 0.19 472 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 2 4.5 0 1.65 6.00 0.38 972 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.65 6.00 0.38 722 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 2 4.5 1 1.65 6.00 0.38 472 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 4 0.5 0 3.95 4.00 0.03 1938 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 4 0.5 1 3.95 4.00 0.03 1437 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 4 0.5 2 3.95 4.00 0.03 937 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 4 2 0 3.65 4.00 0.19 1938 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 4 2 1 3.65 4.00 0.19 1437 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 4 2 2 3.65 4.00 0.19 937 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 4 3 0 3.25 4.00 0.38 1938 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 4 3 1 3.25 4.00 0.38 1438 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 4 3 2 3.25 4.00 0.38 938 0 500 0 0 ER
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v p k c w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
1000 8 6 0.25 0 5.95 2.00 0.03 2750 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 6 0.25 1.5 5.95 2.00 0.03 2000 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 6 0.25 3 5.95 2.00 0.03 1250 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 6 1 0 5.45 2.00 0.19 2750 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 6 1 1.5 5.45 2.00 0.19 2000 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 6 1 3 5.45 2.00 0.19 1250 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 6 1.5 0 4.9 2.00 0.38 2750 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 6 1.5 1.5 4.9 2.00 0.38 2000 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 8 6 1.5 3 4.9 2.00 0.38 1250 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 3 1.125 0 3 9.00 0.03 1488 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 3 1.125 0.75 3 9.00 0.03 1113 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 3 1.125 1.5 3 9.00 0.03 738 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 3 4.5 0 2.75 9.00 0.19 1488 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 3 4.5 0.75 2.75 9.00 0.19 1113 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.75 9.00 0.19 738 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 3 6.75 0 2.45 9.00 0.38 1488 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.45 9.00 0.38 1113 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.45 9.00 0.38 738 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 6 0.75 0 5.95 6.00 0.03 2972 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 6 0.75 1.5 5.95 6.00 0.03 2222 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 6 0.75 3 5.95 6.00 0.03 1472 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 6 3 0 5.45 6.00 0.19 2972 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 6 3 1.5 5.45 6.00 0.19 2222 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 6 3 3 5.45 6.00 0.19 1472 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 6 4.5 0 4.9 6.00 0.38 2972 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 6 4.5 1.5 4.9 6.00 0.38 2222 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 6 4.5 3 4.9 6.00 0.38 1472 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 9 0.375 0 8.9 3.00 0.03 4389 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 9 0.375 2.25 8.9 3.00 0.03 3264 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 9 0.375 4.5 8.9 3.00 0.03 2139 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 9 1.5 0 8.2 3.00 0.19 4389 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 9 1.5 2.25 8.2 3.00 0.19 3264 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.2 3.00 0.19 2139 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 9 2.25 0 7.3 3.00 0.38 4389 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 9 2.25 2.25 7.3 3.00 0.38 3264 0 500 0 0 ER
1000 12 9 2.25 4.5 7.3 3.00 0.38 2139 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 4 1 0.375 0 0.55 19.03 0.46 268 96 40 339 121 SP
5000 4 1 0.375 0.25 0.65 18.14 0.36 160 57 53 276 170 SP
5000 4 1 0.375 0.5 0.75 20.47 0.26 76 29 58 207 236 SP
5000 4 1 1.5 0 0.55 15.82 0.47 277 88 73 312 115 SP
5000 4 1 1.5 0.25 0.65 15.76 0.36 166 52 82 254 164 SP
5000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.9 19.01 0.19 89 1 79 143 279 CP
5000 4 1 2.25 0 0.8 17.18 0.38 323 3 87 255 157 CP
5000 4 1 2.25 0.25 0.8 20.24 0.38 223 3 74 263 162 CP
5000 4 1 2.25 0.5 0.8 24.64 0.38 123 3 61 272 167 CP
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v p k c w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
5000 4 2 0.25 0 1.1 14.20 0.46 532 194 36 340 125 SP
5000 4 2 0.25 0.5 1.3 13.55 0.36 315 115 48 278 175 SP
5000 4 2 0.25 1 1.55 14.75 0.23 150 47 56 189 256 SP
5000 4 2 1 0 1.05 12.22 0.49 548 201 61 330 109 SP
5000 4 2 1 0.5 1.3 11.78 0.36 326 106 73 258 169 SP
5000 4 2 1 1 1.8 14.26 0.19 174 2 70 146 284 CP
5000 4 2 1.5 0 1.6 12.88 0.38 642 6 78 261 161 CP
5000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.6 15.18 0.38 442 6 66 269 166 CP
5000 4 2 1.5 1 1.6 18.48 0.38 244 6 54 276 170 CP
5000 4 3 0.125 0 1.55 20.22 0.49 768 345 12 363 125 SP
5000 4 3 0.125 0.75 1.9 18.39 0.37 441 197 17 295 187 SP
5000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.25 20.25 0.25 201 91 20 215 266 SP
5000 4 3 0.5 0 1.55 16.03 0.49 777 336 23 354 123 SP
5000 4 3 0.5 0.75 1.9 15.68 0.37 447 192 27 288 185 SP
5000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.7 19.01 0.19 238 4 26 160 313 CP
5000 4 3 0.75 0 2.4 17.18 0.38 935 10 29 291 180 CP
5000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.4 20.24 0.38 643 10 25 294 181 CP
5000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.4 24.64 0.38 352 10 20 297 183 CP
5000 8 2 0.75 0 2 6.00 0.03 861 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 2 0.75 0.5 2 6.00 0.03 611 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 2 0.75 1 2 6.00 0.03 361 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 2 3 0 1.85 6.00 0.19 861 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 2 3 0.5 1.85 6.00 0.19 611 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 2 3 1 1.85 6.00 0.19 361 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 2 4.5 0 1.65 6.00 0.38 861 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.65 6.00 0.38 611 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 2 4.5 1 1.6 6.16 0.38 361 0 487 8 5 CP
5000 8 4 0.5 0 3.95 4.00 0.03 1688 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 4 0.5 1 3.95 4.00 0.03 1187 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 4 0.5 2 3.95 4.00 0.03 687 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 4 2 0 3.65 4.00 0.19 1688 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 4 2 1 3.65 4.00 0.19 1187 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 4 2 2 3.65 4.00 0.19 687 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 4 3 0 3.25 4.00 0.38 1688 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 4 3 1 3.25 4.00 0.38 1188 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 4 3 2 3.2 4.62 0.38 693 2 433 42 26 CP
5000 8 6 0.25 0 4 3.79 0.37 1827 262 167 240 94 SP
5000 8 6 0.25 1.5 4.5 3.86 0.28 1167 138 196 178 126 SP
5000 8 6 0.25 3 4.85 4.79 0.21 602 82 177 140 183 SP
5000 8 6 1 0 3.75 3.87 0.42 1922 262 209 211 80 SP
5000 8 6 1 1.5 4.25 3.93 0.33 1235 148 227 163 110 SP
5000 8 6 1 3 5.4 4.75 0.19 669 4 210 98 192 CP
5000 8 6 1.5 0 4.85 4.37 0.38 2117 1 229 168 103 CP
5000 8 6 1.5 1.5 4.85 5.16 0.38 1469 1 194 189 117 CP
5000 8 6 1.5 3 4.85 6.31 0.38 833 1 159 211 130 CP
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v p k c w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
5000 12 3 1.125 0 3 9.00 0.03 1438 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 3 1.125 0.75 3 9.00 0.03 1063 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 3 1.125 1.5 3 9.00 0.03 688 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 3 4.5 0 2.75 9.00 0.19 1438 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 3 4.5 0.75 2.75 9.00 0.19 1063 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.75 9.00 0.19 688 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 3 6.75 0 2.45 9.00 0.38 1438 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.45 9.00 0.38 1063 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.45 9.00 0.38 688 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 6 0.75 0 5.95 6.00 0.03 2861 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 6 0.75 1.5 5.95 6.00 0.03 2111 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 6 0.75 3 5.95 6.00 0.03 1361 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 6 3 0 5.45 6.00 0.19 2861 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 6 3 1.5 5.45 6.00 0.19 2111 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 6 3 3 5.45 6.00 0.19 1361 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 6 4.5 0 4.9 6.00 0.38 2861 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 6 4.5 1.5 4.9 6.00 0.38 2111 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 6 4.5 3 4.9 6.00 0.38 1361 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 9 0.375 0 8.9 3.00 0.03 3944 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 9 0.375 2.25 8.9 3.00 0.03 2819 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 9 0.375 4.5 8.9 3.00 0.03 1694 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 9 1.5 0 8.2 3.00 0.19 3944 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 9 1.5 2.25 8.2 3.00 0.19 2819 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.2 3.00 0.19 1694 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 9 2.25 0 7.3 3.00 0.38 3944 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 9 2.25 2.25 7.3 3.00 0.38 2819 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 12 9 2.25 4.5 7.3 3.00 0.38 1694 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 4 1 0.375 0 0.5 42.67 0.51 259 123 16 371 113 SP
10000 4 1 0.375 0.25 0.65 35.70 0.36 150 59 27 282 190 SP
10000 4 1 0.375 0.5 0.75 40.61 0.25 69 30 29 213 258 SP
10000 4 1 1.5 0 0.5 33.02 0.51 263 118 33 357 110 SP
10000 4 1 1.5 0.25 0.65 31.00 0.36 153 57 42 271 187 SP
10000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.9 38.02 0.19 82 1 39 156 305 CP
10000 4 1 2.25 0 0.8 34.35 0.38 314 3 44 282 174 CP
10000 4 1 2.25 0.25 0.8 40.48 0.38 216 3 37 286 177 CP
10000 4 1 2.25 0.5 0.8 49.28 0.38 119 3 30 290 179 CP
10000 4 2 0.25 0 1.05 29.79 0.48 516 221 16 358 126 SP
10000 4 2 0.25 0.5 1.3 26.73 0.35 298 119 24 283 193 SP
10000 4 2 0.25 1 1.5 30.43 0.25 137 60 26 213 261 SP
10000 4 2 1 0 1.05 23.91 0.48 524 213 32 346 123 SP
10000 4 2 1 0.5 1.25 23.80 0.38 303 132 36 289 175 SP
10000 4 2 1 1 1.8 28.52 0.19 162 2 35 157 308 CP
10000 4 2 1.5 0 1.6 25.76 0.38 627 6 39 285 176 CP
10000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.6 30.36 0.38 431 6 33 289 178 CP
10000 4 2 1.5 1 1.6 36.96 0.38 237 6 27 293 180 CP
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m v p k c w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
10000 4 3 0.125 0 1.5 42.04 0.50 759 373 5 374 121 SP
10000 4 3 0.125 0.75 1.9 36.58 0.37 431 200 9 297 194 SP
10000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.25 40.41 0.25 194 93 10 217 273 SP
10000 4 3 0.5 0 1.5 32.50 0.50 764 367 11 369 120 SP
10000 4 3 0.5 0.75 1.9 31.20 0.37 434 197 14 293 193 SP
10000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.7 38.02 0.19 231 4 13 165 322 CP
10000 4 3 0.75 0 2.4 34.35 0.38 926 10 15 300 185 CP
10000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.4 40.48 0.38 637 10 12 302 186 CP
10000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.4 49.28 0.38 348 10 10 303 187 CP
10000 8 2 0.75 0 2 6.00 0.03 722 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 8 2 0.75 0.5 2 6.00 0.03 472 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 8 2 0.75 1 1.7 9.10 0.17 241 13 293 90 117 SP
10000 8 2 3 0 1.85 6.00 0.19 722 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 8 2 3 0.5 1.6 7.40 0.27 476 10 383 66 51 SP
10000 8 2 3 1 1.8 9.51 0.19 260 1 316 62 122 CP
10000 8 2 4.5 0 1.6 8.59 0.38 747 2 349 93 57 CP
10000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.6 10.12 0.38 518 3 296 126 78 CP
10000 8 2 4.5 1 1.6 12.32 0.38 295 3 244 159 98 CP
10000 8 4 0.5 0 3.95 4.00 0.03 1375 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 8 4 0.5 1 3.95 4.00 0.03 875 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 8 4 0.5 2 3.35 6.92 0.18 455 33 254 105 141 SP
10000 8 4 2 0 2.85 5.31 0.36 1378 65 326 123 51 SP
10000 8 4 2 1 3.05 5.71 0.29 908 43 323 102 75 SP
10000 8 4 2 2 3.6 7.13 0.19 495 2 281 74 145 CP
10000 8 4 3 0 3.2 6.44 0.38 1465 5 311 117 72 CP
10000 8 4 3 1 3.2 7.59 0.38 1015 6 263 146 90 CP
10000 8 4 3 2 3.2 9.24 0.38 576 8 216 175 108 CP
10000 8 6 0.25 0 3.4 9.24 0.45 1650 524 56 325 118 SP
10000 8 6 0.25 1.5 4.05 8.69 0.34 998 286 77 255 168 SP
10000 8 6 0.25 3 4.65 9.90 0.23 487 135 82 183 234 SP
10000 8 6 1 0 3.3 8.05 0.47 1714 505 95 301 105 SP
10000 8 6 1 1.5 3.95 7.90 0.36 1043 281 109 238 153 SP
10000 8 6 1 3 5.4 9.51 0.19 559 6 105 134 261 CP
10000 8 6 1.5 0 4.85 8.73 0.38 1986 1 115 238 147 CP
10000 8 6 1.5 1.5 4.85 10.32 0.38 1375 1 97 249 154 CP
10000 8 6 1.5 3 4.85 12.62 0.38 770 1 79 260 160 CP
10000 12 3 1.125 0 3 9.00 0.03 1377 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 3 1.125 0.75 3 9.00 0.03 1002 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 3 1.125 1.5 3 9.00 0.03 627 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 3 4.5 0 2.75 9.00 0.19 1377 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 3 4.5 0.75 2.75 9.00 0.19 1002 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.75 9.00 0.19 627 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 3 6.75 0 2.45 9.00 0.38 1377 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.45 9.00 0.38 1002 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.45 9.00 0.38 627 0 500 0 0 ER
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10000 12 6 0.75 0 5.95 6.00 0.03 2722 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 6 0.75 1.5 5.95 6.00 0.03 1972 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 6 0.75 3 5.95 6.00 0.03 1222 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 6 3 0 5.45 6.00 0.19 2722 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 6 3 1.5 5.45 6.00 0.19 1972 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 6 3 3 5.45 6.00 0.19 1222 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 6 4.5 0 4.9 6.00 0.38 2722 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 6 4.5 1.5 4.9 6.00 0.38 1972 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 6 4.5 3 4.9 6.00 0.38 1222 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 9 0.375 0 8.9 3.00 0.03 3389 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 9 0.375 2.25 8.9 3.00 0.03 2264 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 9 0.375 4.5 7.95 3.83 0.14 1162 26 362 58 80 SP
10000 12 9 1.5 0 8.2 3.00 0.19 3389 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 9 1.5 2.25 8.2 3.00 0.19 2264 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.15 4.25 0.19 1235 1 353 50 97 CP
10000 12 9 2.25 0 7.25 3.86 0.38 3444 2 389 69 42 CP
10000 12 9 2.25 2.25 7.25 4.56 0.38 2394 4 329 106 65 CP
10000 12 9 2.25 4.5 7.25 5.56 0.38 1375 5 270 142 88 CP
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Table 5.10: The Numerical Experiments to Span the Parameter Space RW/DO
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m v p k c w α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
1000 4 1 0.375 0 0.5 0.50 250 125 375 3.00 389 500
1000 4 1 0.375 0.25 0.6 0.40 140 80 320 3.00 264 500
1000 4 1 0.375 0.5 0.75 0.25 63 31 219 3.00 139 500
1000 4 1 1.5 0 0.5 0.50 250 125 375 3.00 389 500
1000 4 1 1.5 0.25 0.6 0.40 140 80 320 3.00 264 500
1000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.9 0.19 75 1 169 3.00 139 500
1000 4 1 2.25 0 0.8 0.38 306 3 309 3.00 389 500
1000 4 1 2.25 0.25 0.8 0.38 210 3 309 3.00 264 500
1000 4 1 2.25 0.5 0.8 0.38 115 3 309 3.00 139 500
1000 4 2 0.25 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 2.00 750 500
1000 4 2 0.25 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 2.00 500 500
1000 4 2 0.25 1 1.5 0.25 125 62 219 2.00 250 500
1000 4 2 1 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 2.00 750 500
1000 4 2 1 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 2.00 500 500
1000 4 2 1 1 1.8 0.19 149 2 169 2.00 250 500
1000 4 2 1.5 0 1.6 0.38 612 7 309 2.00 750 500
1000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.6 0.38 421 7 309 2.00 500 500
1000 4 2 1.5 1 1.6 0.38 229 7 309 2.00 250 500
1000 4 3 0.125 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 1.33 563 375
1000 4 3 0.125 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 1.78 316 281
1000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.25 0.25 187 94 219 2.67 141 188
1000 4 3 0.5 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 1.33 563 375
1000 4 3 0.5 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 1.78 316 281
1000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.7 0.19 224 4 169 2.67 141 188
1000 4 3 0.75 0 2.4 0.38 918 10 309 1.33 563 375
1000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.4 0.38 631 10 309 1.78 316 281
1000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.4 0.38 344 10 309 2.67 141 188
1000 8 2 0.75 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 6.00 972 500
1000 8 2 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 6.00 722 500
1000 8 2 0.75 1 1.5 0.25 125 62 219 6.00 472 500
1000 8 2 3 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 6.00 972 500
1000 8 2 3 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 6.00 722 500
1000 8 2 3 1 1.8 0.19 149 2 169 6.00 472 500
1000 8 2 4.5 0 1.6 0.38 612 7 309 6.00 972 500
1000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.6 0.38 421 7 309 6.00 722 500
1000 8 2 4.5 1 1.6 0.38 229 7 309 6.00 472 500
1000 8 4 0.5 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1938 500
1000 8 4 0.5 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1438 500
1000 8 4 0.5 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 4.00 938 500
1000 8 4 2 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1938 500
1000 8 4 2 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1438 500
1000 8 4 2 2 3.6 0.19 299 5 169 4.00 938 500
1000 8 4 3 0 3.2 0.38 1224 13 309 4.00 1938 500
1000 8 4 3 1 3.2 0.38 841 13 309 4.00 1438 500
1000 8 4 3 2 3.2 0.38 459 13 309 4.00 938 500
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m v p k c w α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
1000 8 6 0.25 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 2.00 2750 500
1000 8 6 0.25 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 2.00 2000 500
1000 8 6 0.25 3 4.5 0.25 375 188 219 2.00 1250 500
1000 8 6 1 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 2.00 2750 500
1000 8 6 1 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 2.00 2000 500
1000 8 6 1 3 5.4 0.19 448 7 169 2.00 1250 500
1000 8 6 1.5 0 4.85 0.38 1855 1 309 2.00 2750 500
1000 8 6 1.5 1.5 4.85 0.38 1281 1 309 2.00 2000 500
1000 8 6 1.5 3 4.85 0.38 707 1 309 2.00 1250 500
1000 12 3 1.125 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 9.00 1488 500
1000 12 3 1.125 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 9.00 1113 500
1000 12 3 1.125 1.5 2.25 0.25 187 94 219 9.00 738 500
1000 12 3 4.5 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 9.00 1488 500
1000 12 3 4.5 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 9.00 1113 500
1000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.7 0.19 224 4 169 9.00 738 500
1000 12 3 6.75 0 2.4 0.38 918 10 309 9.00 1488 500
1000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.4 0.38 631 10 309 9.00 1113 500
1000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.4 0.38 344 10 309 9.00 738 500
1000 12 6 0.75 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 6.00 2972 500
1000 12 6 0.75 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 6.00 2222 500
1000 12 6 0.75 3 4.5 0.25 375 188 219 6.00 1472 500
1000 12 6 3 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 6.00 2972 500
1000 12 6 3 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 6.00 2222 500
1000 12 6 3 3 5.4 0.19 448 7 169 6.00 1472 500
1000 12 6 4.5 0 4.85 0.38 1855 1 309 6.00 2972 500
1000 12 6 4.5 1.5 4.85 0.38 1281 1 309 6.00 2222 500
1000 12 6 4.5 3 4.85 0.38 707 1 309 6.00 1472 500
1000 12 9 0.375 0 4.5 0.50 2250 1125 375 3.00 4389 500
1000 12 9 0.375 2.25 5.6 0.38 1266 642 306 3.00 3264 500
1000 12 9 0.375 4.5 6.75 0.25 563 281 219 3.00 2139 500
1000 12 9 1.5 0 4.5 0.50 2250 1125 375 3.00 4389 500
1000 12 9 1.5 2.25 5.6 0.38 1266 642 306 3.00 3264 500
1000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.15 0.19 681 2 169 3.00 2139 500
1000 12 9 2.25 0 7.25 0.38 2772 11 309 3.00 4389 500
1000 12 9 2.25 2.25 7.25 0.38 1912 11 309 3.00 3264 500
1000 12 9 2.25 4.5 7.25 0.38 1052 11 309 3.00 2139 500
5000 4 1 0.375 0 0.5 0.50 250 125 375 6.67 113 225
5000 4 1 0.375 0.25 0.6 0.40 140 80 320 8.89 63 169
5000 4 1 0.375 0.5 0.75 0.25 63 31 219 13.33 28 113
5000 4 1 1.5 0 0.5 0.50 250 125 375 6.67 113 225
5000 4 1 1.5 0.25 0.6 0.40 140 80 320 8.89 63 169
5000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.9 0.19 75 1 169 13.33 28 113
5000 4 1 2.25 0 0.8 0.38 306 3 309 6.67 113 225
5000 4 1 2.25 0.25 0.8 0.38 210 3 309 8.89 63 169
5000 4 1 2.25 0.5 0.8 0.38 115 3 309 13.33 28 113
103
RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
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5000 4 2 0.25 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 5.00 200 200
5000 4 2 0.25 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 6.67 113 150
5000 4 2 0.25 1 1.5 0.25 125 62 219 10.00 50 100
5000 4 2 1 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 5.00 200 200
5000 4 2 1 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 6.67 113 150
5000 4 2 1 1 1.8 0.19 149 2 169 10.00 50 100
5000 4 2 1.5 0 1.6 0.38 612 7 309 5.00 200 200
5000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.6 0.38 421 7 309 6.67 113 150
5000 4 2 1.5 1 1.6 0.38 229 7 309 10.00 50 100
5000 4 3 0.125 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 6.67 113 75
5000 4 3 0.125 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 8.89 63 56
5000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.25 0.25 187 94 219 13.33 28 38
5000 4 3 0.5 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 6.67 113 75
5000 4 3 0.5 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 8.89 63 56
5000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.7 0.19 224 4 169 13.33 28 38
5000 4 3 0.75 0 2.4 0.38 918 10 309 6.67 113 75
5000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.4 0.38 631 10 309 8.89 63 56
5000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.4 0.38 344 10 309 13.33 28 38
5000 8 2 0.75 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 6.00 861 500
5000 8 2 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 6.00 611 500
5000 8 2 0.75 1 1.5 0.25 125 62 219 6.00 361 500
5000 8 2 3 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 6.00 861 500
5000 8 2 3 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 6.00 611 500
5000 8 2 3 1 1.8 0.19 149 2 169 6.00 361 500
5000 8 2 4.5 0 1.6 0.38 612 7 309 6.00 861 500
5000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.6 0.38 421 7 309 6.00 611 500
5000 8 2 4.5 1 1.6 0.38 229 7 309 6.00 361 500
5000 8 4 0.5 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1688 500
5000 8 4 0.5 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1188 500
5000 8 4 0.5 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 4.00 688 500
5000 8 4 2 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1688 500
5000 8 4 2 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1188 500
5000 8 4 2 2 3.6 0.19 299 5 169 4.00 688 500
5000 8 4 3 0 3.2 0.38 1224 13 309 4.00 1688 500
5000 8 4 3 1 3.2 0.38 841 13 309 4.00 1188 500
5000 8 4 3 2 3.2 0.38 459 13 309 4.00 688 500
5000 8 6 0.25 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 2.00 1750 500
5000 8 6 0.25 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 2.22 1013 450
5000 8 6 0.25 3 4.5 0.25 375 188 219 3.33 450 300
5000 8 6 1 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 2.00 1750 500
5000 8 6 1 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 2.22 1013 450
5000 8 6 1 3 5.4 0.19 448 7 169 3.33 450 300
5000 8 6 1.5 0 4.85 0.38 1855 1 309 2.00 1750 500
5000 8 6 1.5 1.5 4.85 0.38 1281 1 309 2.22 1013 450
5000 8 6 1.5 3 4.85 0.38 707 1 309 3.33 450 300
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5000 12 3 1.125 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 9.00 1438 500
5000 12 3 1.125 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 9.00 1063 500
5000 12 3 1.125 1.5 2.25 0.25 187 94 219 9.00 688 500
5000 12 3 4.5 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 9.00 1438 500
5000 12 3 4.5 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 9.00 1063 500
5000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.7 0.19 224 4 169 9.00 688 500
5000 12 3 6.75 0 2.4 0.38 918 10 309 9.00 1438 500
5000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.4 0.38 631 10 309 9.00 1063 500
5000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.4 0.38 344 10 309 9.00 688 500
5000 12 6 0.75 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 6.00 2861 500
5000 12 6 0.75 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 6.00 2111 500
5000 12 6 0.75 3 4.5 0.25 375 188 219 6.00 1361 500
5000 12 6 3 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 6.00 2861 500
5000 12 6 3 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 6.00 2111 500
5000 12 6 3 3 5.4 0.19 448 7 169 6.00 1361 500
5000 12 6 4.5 0 4.85 0.38 1855 1 309 6.00 2861 500
5000 12 6 4.5 1.5 4.85 0.38 1281 1 309 6.00 2111 500
5000 12 6 4.5 3 4.85 0.38 707 1 309 6.00 1361 500
5000 12 9 0.375 0 4.5 0.50 2250 1125 375 3.00 3944 500
5000 12 9 0.375 2.25 5.6 0.38 1266 642 306 3.00 2819 500
5000 12 9 0.375 4.5 6.75 0.25 563 281 219 3.00 1694 500
5000 12 9 1.5 0 4.5 0.50 2250 1125 375 3.00 3944 500
5000 12 9 1.5 2.25 5.6 0.38 1266 642 306 3.00 2819 500
5000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.15 0.19 681 2 169 3.00 1694 500
5000 12 9 2.25 0 7.25 0.38 2772 11 309 3.00 3944 500
5000 12 9 2.25 2.25 7.25 0.38 1912 11 309 3.00 2819 500
5000 12 9 2.25 4.5 7.25 0.38 1052 11 309 3.00 1694 500
10000 4 1 0.375 0 0.5 0.50 250 125 375 13.33 56 113
10000 4 1 0.375 0.25 0.6 0.40 140 80 320 17.78 32 84
10000 4 1 0.375 0.5 0.75 0.25 63 31 219 26.67 14 56
10000 4 1 1.5 0 0.5 0.50 250 125 375 13.33 56 113
10000 4 1 1.5 0.25 0.6 0.40 140 80 320 17.78 32 84
10000 4 1 1.5 0.5 0.9 0.19 75 1 169 26.67 14 56
10000 4 1 2.25 0 0.8 0.38 306 3 309 13.33 56 113
10000 4 1 2.25 0.25 0.8 0.38 210 3 309 17.78 32 84
10000 4 1 2.25 0.5 0.8 0.38 115 3 309 26.67 14 56
10000 4 2 0.25 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 10.00 100 100
10000 4 2 0.25 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 13.33 56 75
10000 4 2 0.25 1 1.5 0.25 125 62 219 20.00 25 50
10000 4 2 1 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 10.00 100 100
10000 4 2 1 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 13.33 56 75
10000 4 2 1 1 1.8 0.19 149 2 169 20.00 25 50
10000 4 2 1.5 0 1.6 0.38 612 7 309 10.00 100 100
10000 4 2 1.5 0.5 1.6 0.38 421 7 309 13.33 56 75
10000 4 2 1.5 1 1.6 0.38 229 7 309 20.00 25 50
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10000 4 3 0.125 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 13.33 56 38
10000 4 3 0.125 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 17.78 32 28
10000 4 3 0.125 1.5 2.25 0.25 187 94 219 26.67 14 19
10000 4 3 0.5 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 13.33 56 38
10000 4 3 0.5 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 17.78 32 28
10000 4 3 0.5 1.5 2.7 0.19 224 4 169 26.67 14 19
10000 4 3 0.75 0 2.4 0.38 918 10 309 13.33 56 38
10000 4 3 0.75 0.75 2.4 0.38 631 10 309 17.78 32 28
10000 4 3 0.75 1.5 2.4 0.38 344 10 309 26.67 14 19
10000 8 2 0.75 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 6.00 722 500
10000 8 2 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 6.00 472 500
10000 8 2 0.75 1 1.5 0.25 125 62 219 6.67 225 450
10000 8 2 3 0 1 0.50 500 250 375 6.00 722 500
10000 8 2 3 0.5 1.25 0.37 281 141 305 6.00 472 500
10000 8 2 3 1 1.8 0.19 149 2 169 6.67 225 450
10000 8 2 4.5 0 1.6 0.38 612 7 309 6.00 722 500
10000 8 2 4.5 0.5 1.6 0.38 421 7 309 6.00 472 500
10000 8 2 4.5 1 1.6 0.38 229 7 309 6.67 225 450
10000 8 4 0.5 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1375 500
10000 8 4 0.5 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 875 500
10000 8 4 0.5 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 5.00 400 400
10000 8 4 2 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1375 500
10000 8 4 2 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 875 500
10000 8 4 2 2 3.6 0.19 299 5 169 5.00 400 400
10000 8 4 3 0 3.2 0.38 1224 13 309 4.00 1375 500
10000 8 4 3 1 3.2 0.38 841 13 309 4.00 875 500
10000 8 4 3 2 3.2 0.38 459 13 309 5.00 400 400
10000 8 6 0.25 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 3.33 900 300
10000 8 6 0.25 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 4.44 506 225
10000 8 6 0.25 3 4.5 0.25 375 188 219 6.67 225 150
10000 8 6 1 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 3.33 900 300
10000 8 6 1 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 4.44 506 225
10000 8 6 1 3 5.4 0.19 448 7 169 6.67 225 150
10000 8 6 1.5 0 4.85 0.38 1855 1 309 3.33 900 300
10000 8 6 1.5 1.5 4.85 0.38 1281 1 309 4.44 506 225
10000 8 6 1.5 3 4.85 0.38 707 1 309 6.67 225 150
10000 12 3 1.125 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 9.00 1377 500
10000 12 3 1.125 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 9.00 1002 500
10000 12 3 1.125 1.5 2.25 0.25 187 94 219 9.00 627 500
10000 12 3 4.5 0 1.5 0.50 750 375 375 9.00 1377 500
10000 12 3 4.5 0.75 1.85 0.38 422 220 310 9.00 1002 500
10000 12 3 4.5 1.5 2.7 0.19 224 4 169 9.00 627 500
10000 12 3 6.75 0 2.4 0.38 918 10 309 9.00 1377 500
10000 12 3 6.75 0.75 2.4 0.38 631 10 309 9.00 1002 500
10000 12 3 6.75 1.5 2.4 0.38 344 10 309 9.00 627 500
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10000 12 6 0.75 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 6.00 2722 500
10000 12 6 0.75 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 6.00 1972 500
10000 12 6 0.75 3 4.5 0.25 375 188 219 6.00 1222 500
10000 12 6 3 0 3 0.50 1500 750 375 6.00 2722 500
10000 12 6 3 1.5 3.75 0.38 844 422 305 6.00 1972 500
10000 12 6 3 3 5.4 0.19 448 7 169 6.00 1222 500
10000 12 6 4.5 0 4.85 0.38 1855 1 309 6.00 2722 500
10000 12 6 4.5 1.5 4.85 0.38 1281 1 309 6.00 1972 500
10000 12 6 4.5 3 4.85 0.38 707 1 309 6.00 1222 500
10000 12 9 0.375 0 4.5 0.50 2250 1125 375 3.00 3389 500
10000 12 9 0.375 2.25 5.6 0.38 1266 642 306 3.00 2264 500
10000 12 9 0.375 4.5 6.75 0.25 563 281 219 3.00 1139 500
10000 12 9 1.5 0 4.5 0.50 2250 1125 375 3.00 3389 500
10000 12 9 1.5 2.25 5.6 0.38 1266 642 306 3.00 2264 500
10000 12 9 1.5 4.5 8.15 0.19 681 2 169 3.00 1139 500
10000 12 9 2.25 0 7.25 0.38 2772 11 309 3.00 3389 500
10000 12 9 2.25 2.25 7.25 0.38 1912 11 309 3.00 2264 500
10000 12 9 2.25 4.5 7.25 0.38 1052 11 309 3.00 1139 500
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Table 5.11: Dual Channel Strategy in the m/c Plane, v=8, p=4, k=1
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m c w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
0 0 0 1.00 1.00 2000 0 500 0 0 ER
0 0.25 3.05 1.69 0.48 1875 0 500 0 0 ER
0 0.5 3.05 1.69 0.48 1750 0 500 0 0 ER
0 0.75 3.05 1.69 0.48 1625 0 500 0 0 ER
0 1 3.05 1.69 0.48 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 1.25 3.05 1.69 0.48 1375 0 500 0 0 ER
0 1.5 3.05 1.69 0.48 1250 0 500 0 0 ER
0 1.75 3.05 1.69 0.48 1125 0 500 0 0 ER
0 2 3.05 1.69 0.48 1000 0 500 0 0 ER
0 2.25 3.05 1.69 0.48 875 0 500 0 0 ER
0 2.5 3.05 1.69 0.48 750 0 500 0 0 ER
0 2.75 3.05 1.69 0.48 625 0 500 0 0 ER
0 3 3.05 1.69 0.48 500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 3.25 3.4 2.36 0.30 375 0 500 0 0 ER
0 3.5 3.5 2.61 0.25 250 0 500 0 0 ER
0 3.75 3.75 3.46 0.13 125 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 0 3.9 4.00 0.07 1844 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 0.25 3.9 4.00 0.07 1719 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 0.5 3.9 4.00 0.07 1594 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 0.75 3.9 4.00 0.07 1469 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 1 3.9 4.00 0.07 1344 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 1.25 3.9 4.00 0.07 1219 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 1.5 3.9 4.00 0.07 1094 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 1.75 3.9 4.00 0.07 969 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 2 3.9 4.00 0.07 844 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 2.25 3.9 4.00 0.07 719 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 2.5 3.9 4.00 0.07 594 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 2.75 3.9 4.00 0.07 469 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 3 3.9 4.00 0.07 344 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 3.25 3.9 4.00 0.07 219 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 3.5 3.85 5.52 0.07 106 0 362 18 120 CP
2500 3.75 3.85 10.57 0.07 29 1 189 41 270 CP
5000 0 3.9 4.00 0.07 1688 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 0.25 3.9 4.00 0.07 1563 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 0.5 3.9 4.00 0.07 1438 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 0.75 3.9 4.00 0.07 1313 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 1 3.9 4.00 0.07 1187 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 1.25 3.9 4.00 0.07 1063 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 1.5 3.9 4.00 0.07 937 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 1.75 3.9 4.00 0.07 813 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 2 3.9 4.00 0.07 688 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 2.25 3.9 4.00 0.07 562 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 2.5 3.9 4.00 0.07 438 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 2.75 3.7 4.72 0.10 318 2 418 20 62 SP
5000 3 3.65 5.81 0.10 215 6 338 36 125 SP
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m c w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
5000 3.25 3.85 7.48 0.07 130 0 268 30 202 CP
5000 3.5 3.85 11.05 0.07 65 1 181 42 277 CP
5000 3.75 3.85 21.15 0.07 18 1 95 53 352 CP
7500 0 3.9 4.00 0.07 1531 0 500 0 0 ER
7500 0.25 3.9 4.00 0.07 1406 0 500 0 0 ER
7500 0.5 3.9 4.00 0.07 1281 0 500 0 0 ER
7500 0.75 3.9 4.00 0.07 1156 0 500 0 0 ER
7500 1 3.9 4.00 0.07 1031 0 500 0 0 ER
7500 1.25 3.9 4.00 0.07 906 0 500 0 0 ER
7500 1.5 3.9 4.00 0.07 781 0 500 0 0 ER
7500 1.75 3.9 4.00 0.07 656 0 500 0 0 ER
7500 2 3.55 4.86 0.14 538 7 393 42 65 SP
7500 2.25 3.5 5.54 0.15 432 12 343 57 100 SP
7500 2.5 3.5 6.30 0.14 334 14 303 64 133 SP
7500 2.75 3.5 7.35 0.14 244 17 260 71 168 SP
7500 3 3.55 8.79 0.12 164 15 221 69 210 SP
7500 3.25 3.85 11.21 0.07 100 1 178 42 280 CP
7500 3.5 3.85 16.57 0.07 51 1 121 50 330 CP
7500 3.75 3.85 31.72 0.07 14 1 63 57 380 CP
10000 0 3.9 4.00 0.07 1375 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 0.25 3.9 4.00 0.07 1250 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 0.5 3.9 4.00 0.07 1125 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 0.75 3.9 4.00 0.07 1000 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 1 3.25 5.22 0.23 880 32 335 96 70 SP
10000 1.25 3.25 5.57 0.22 769 34 315 100 85 SP
10000 1.5 3.25 6.00 0.22 663 36 294 105 101 SP
10000 1.75 3.25 6.51 0.22 560 39 272 109 118 SP
10000 2 3.3 7.00 0.20 463 35 258 104 137 SP
10000 2.25 3.35 7.65 0.18 371 31 241 100 160 SP
10000 2.5 3.4 8.55 0.16 285 28 219 96 186 SP
10000 2.75 3.45 9.83 0.15 207 25 193 92 215 SP
10000 3 3.55 11.66 0.12 139 18 167 78 255 SP
10000 3.25 3.85 14.95 0.07 85 1 134 48 318 CP
10000 3.5 3.85 22.09 0.07 44 1 91 54 356 CP
10000 3.75 3.85 42.29 0.07 12 1 47 59 393 CP
12500 0 2.7 6.90 0.37 1256 146 205 211 84 SP
12500 0.25 2.8 6.81 0.34 1139 120 218 193 90 SP
12500 0.5 2.85 6.94 0.33 1026 110 219 185 96 SP
12500 0.75 2.9 7.12 0.31 915 101 218 178 104 SP
12500 1 3 7.18 0.28 808 81 226 160 114 SP
12500 1.25 3.05 7.47 0.27 705 74 222 153 125 SP
12500 1.5 3.1 7.85 0.25 605 67 216 147 137 SP
12500 1.75 3.15 8.33 0.24 510 60 208 140 152 SP
12500 2 3.2 8.95 0.22 419 55 197 135 169 SP
12500 2.25 3.3 9.62 0.19 335 42 189 119 192 SP
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m c w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
12500 2.5 3.35 10.76 0.17 256 37 172 114 214 SP
12500 2.75 3.45 12.22 0.15 186 28 156 99 246 SP
12500 3 3.55 14.54 0.12 124 19 134 84 282 SP
12500 3.25 3.85 18.69 0.07 76 1 107 51 342 CP
12500 3.5 3.85 27.62 0.07 40 1 72 56 372 CP
12500 3.75 3.85 52.86 0.07 11 1 38 60 402 CP
15000 0 2.5 9.05 0.41 1208 220 145 257 97 SP
15000 0.25 2.6 8.90 0.38 1091 188 155 241 105 SP
15000 0.5 2.7 8.82 0.36 978 159 164 223 113 SP
15000 0.75 2.8 8.81 0.33 870 133 171 206 123 SP
15000 1 2.85 9.09 0.32 765 123 170 199 131 SP
15000 1.25 2.95 9.24 0.29 664 101 174 182 144 SP
15000 1.5 3 9.69 0.27 568 92 170 175 155 SP
15000 1.75 3.1 10.08 0.24 477 74 170 158 172 SP
15000 2 3.2 10.65 0.22 391 59 166 142 192 SP
15000 2.25 3.25 11.66 0.20 311 53 155 135 210 SP
15000 2.5 3.35 12.85 0.17 237 40 145 119 236 SP
15000 2.75 3.45 14.63 0.14 171 29 130 103 266 SP
15000 3 3.55 17.42 0.12 113 20 112 87 301 SP
15000 3.25 3.85 22.43 0.07 70 1 89 54 357 CP
15000 3.5 3.85 33.14 0.07 37 1 60 58 382 CP
15000 3.75 3.85 63.44 0.07 10 1 32 61 407 CP
17500 0 2.4 10.98 0.43 1176 265 116 281 103 SP
17500 0.25 2.5 10.79 0.40 1058 230 123 265 112 SP
17500 0.5 2.6 10.68 0.38 946 197 130 248 121 SP
17500 0.75 2.7 10.66 0.35 838 168 137 232 132 SP
17500 1 2.8 10.73 0.32 735 141 142 215 143 SP
17500 1.25 2.9 10.90 0.30 636 118 146 198 157 SP
17500 1.5 3 11.21 0.27 542 96 148 181 172 SP
17500 1.75 3.05 11.90 0.25 454 88 142 173 185 SP
17500 2 3.15 12.57 0.23 371 70 139 157 204 SP
17500 2.25 3.25 13.54 0.20 294 55 133 140 227 SP
17500 2.5 3.3 15.14 0.18 223 49 121 133 245 SP
17500 2.75 3.4 17.21 0.16 160 37 110 117 273 SP
17500 3 3.5 20.46 0.13 106 26 94 100 305 SP
17500 3.25 3.85 26.17 0.07 66 1 76 55 368 CP
17500 3.5 3.85 38.66 0.07 35 1 52 59 390 CP
17500 3.75 3.85 74.01 0.07 10 1 27 62 411 CP
20000 0 2.35 12.75 0.44 1152 291 98 294 108 SP
20000 0.25 2.45 12.52 0.41 1035 254 105 278 117 SP
20000 0.5 2.55 12.39 0.39 922 220 111 262 127 SP
20000 0.75 2.65 12.36 0.36 815 188 116 245 138 SP
20000 1 2.75 12.43 0.33 713 160 121 229 151 SP
20000 1.25 2.85 12.64 0.31 615 134 124 212 164 SP
20000 1.5 2.95 12.99 0.28 523 111 125 195 180 SP
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m c w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
20000 1.75 3.05 13.53 0.25 436 91 125 178 197 SP
20000 2 3.1 14.55 0.24 355 82 119 170 211 SP
20000 2.25 3.2 15.66 0.21 281 65 114 154 232 SP
20000 2.5 3.3 17.26 0.18 213 50 107 137 257 SP
20000 2.75 3.4 19.65 0.16 153 38 96 120 284 SP
20000 3 3.5 23.37 0.13 101 27 83 102 315 SP
20000 3.25 3.85 29.91 0.07 63 1 67 57 376 CP
20000 3.5 3.85 44.19 0.07 34 1 45 59 395 CP
20000 3.75 3.85 84.58 0.07 10 1 24 62 414 CP
22500 0 2.3 14.61 0.45 1135 317 84 305 111 SP
22500 0.25 2.4 14.34 0.42 1017 278 90 290 120 SP
22500 0.5 2.5 14.18 0.40 904 242 95 274 131 SP
22500 0.75 2.6 14.13 0.37 797 209 100 258 142 SP
22500 1 2.7 14.21 0.34 696 179 104 241 155 SP
22500 1.25 2.8 14.44 0.32 599 151 107 225 169 SP
22500 1.5 2.9 14.83 0.29 508 126 108 208 184 SP
22500 1.75 3 15.43 0.26 423 104 108 191 201 SP
22500 2 3.1 16.31 0.24 344 84 106 174 220 SP
22500 2.25 3.2 17.57 0.21 271 67 102 156 242 SP
22500 2.5 3.3 19.39 0.18 205 52 95 139 266 SP
22500 2.75 3.4 22.08 0.15 147 38 86 122 293 SP
22500 3 3.5 26.27 0.13 97 27 74 104 322 SP
22500 3.25 3.85 33.64 0.07 60 1 59 58 383 CP
22500 3.5 3.85 49.71 0.07 33 1 40 60 400 CP
22500 3.75 3.85 95.15 0.07 9 1 21 63 416 CP
25000 0 2.25 16.57 0.46 1121 342 73 316 112 SP
25000 0.25 2.4 15.82 0.42 1003 282 82 293 126 SP
25000 0.5 2.5 15.65 0.39 890 245 86 277 137 SP
25000 0.75 2.6 15.61 0.37 783 212 91 261 149 SP
25000 1 2.7 15.71 0.34 682 182 94 244 162 SP
25000 1.25 2.8 15.97 0.32 587 154 97 228 176 SP
25000 1.5 2.9 16.41 0.29 497 129 98 211 191 SP
25000 1.75 3 17.09 0.26 412 106 98 193 209 SP
25000 2 3.1 18.08 0.23 334 86 96 176 228 SP
25000 2.25 3.2 19.49 0.21 263 68 92 159 250 SP
25000 2.5 3.3 21.51 0.18 199 53 86 141 273 SP
25000 2.75 3.4 24.51 0.15 142 39 77 123 299 SP
25000 3 3.5 29.17 0.13 93 28 66 105 328 SP
25000 3.25 3.85 37.38 0.07 59 1 54 58 388 CP
25000 3.5 3.85 55.24 0.07 32 1 36 61 403 CP
25000 3.75 3.85 105.73 0.07 9 1 19 63 418 CP
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Table 5.12: RW/DO Strategy in the m/c Plane
RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m c w α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
0 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 2000 500
0 0.25 2.1 0.47 879 451 362 4.00 1875 500
0 0.5 2.25 0.44 766 383 342 4.00 1750 500
0 0.75 2.35 0.41 660 340 327 4.00 1625 500
0 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1500 500
0 1.25 2.6 0.35 472 245 289 4.00 1375 500
0 1.5 2.75 0.31 391 195 264 4.00 1250 500
0 1.75 2.85 0.29 316 165 246 4.00 1125 500
0 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 4.00 1000 500
0 2.25 3.1 0.23 191 101 200 4.00 875 500
0 2.5 3.25 0.19 141 70 170 4.00 750 500
0 2.75 3.35 0.16 97 53 149 4.00 625 500
0 3 3.5 0.13 63 31 117 4.00 500 500
0 3.25 3.85 0.07 41 1 65 4.00 375 500
0 3.5 3.85 0.07 24 1 65 4.00 250 500
0 3.75 3.85 0.07 7 1 65 4.00 125 500
2500 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1844 500
2500 0.25 2.1 0.47 879 451 362 4.00 1719 500
2500 0.5 2.25 0.44 766 383 342 4.00 1594 500
2500 0.75 2.35 0.41 660 340 327 4.00 1469 500
2500 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1344 500
2500 1.25 2.6 0.35 472 245 289 4.00 1219 500
2500 1.5 2.75 0.31 391 195 264 4.00 1094 500
2500 1.75 2.85 0.29 316 165 246 4.00 969 500
2500 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 4.00 844 500
2500 2.25 3.1 0.23 191 101 200 4.00 719 500
2500 2.5 3.25 0.19 141 70 170 4.00 594 500
2500 2.75 3.35 0.16 97 53 149 4.00 469 500
2500 3 3.5 0.13 63 31 117 4.00 344 500
2500 3.25 3.85 0.07 41 1 65 4.00 219 500
2500 3.5 3.85 0.07 24 1 65 5.00 100 400
2500 3.75 3.85 0.07 7 1 65 10.00 25 200
5000 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1688 500
5000 0.25 2.1 0.47 879 451 362 4.00 1563 500
5000 0.5 2.25 0.44 766 383 342 4.00 1438 500
5000 0.75 2.35 0.41 660 340 327 4.00 1313 500
5000 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1188 500
5000 1.25 2.6 0.35 472 245 289 4.00 1063 500
5000 1.5 2.75 0.31 391 195 264 4.00 938 500
5000 1.75 2.85 0.29 316 165 246 4.00 813 500
5000 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 4.00 688 500
5000 2.25 3.1 0.23 191 101 200 4.00 563 500
5000 2.5 3.25 0.19 141 70 170 4.00 438 500
5000 2.75 3.35 0.16 97 53 149 4.00 313 500
5000 3 3.5 0.13 63 31 117 5.00 200 400
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RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m c w α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
5000 3.25 3.85 0.07 41 1 65 6.67 113 300
5000 3.5 3.85 0.07 24 1 65 10.00 50 200
5000 3.75 3.85 0.07 7 1 65 20.00 13 100
7500 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1531 500
7500 0.25 2.1 0.47 879 451 362 4.00 1406 500
7500 0.5 2.25 0.44 766 383 342 4.00 1281 500
7500 0.75 2.35 0.41 660 340 327 4.00 1156 500
7500 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1031 500
7500 1.25 2.6 0.35 472 245 289 4.00 906 500
7500 1.5 2.75 0.31 391 195 264 4.00 781 500
7500 1.75 2.85 0.29 316 165 246 4.00 656 500
7500 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 4.00 531 500
7500 2.25 3.1 0.23 191 101 200 4.29 408 467
7500 2.5 3.25 0.19 141 70 170 5.00 300 400
7500 2.75 3.35 0.16 97 53 149 6.00 208 333
7500 3 3.5 0.13 63 31 117 7.50 133 267
7500 3.25 3.85 0.07 41 1 65 10.00 75 200
7500 3.5 3.85 0.07 24 1 65 15.00 33 133
7500 3.75 3.85 0.07 7 1 65 30.00 8 67
10000 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1375 500
10000 0.25 2.1 0.47 879 451 362 4.00 1250 500
10000 0.5 2.25 0.44 766 383 342 4.00 1125 500
10000 0.75 2.35 0.41 660 340 327 4.00 1000 500
10000 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 875 500
10000 1.25 2.6 0.35 472 245 289 4.00 750 500
10000 1.5 2.75 0.31 391 195 264 4.00 625 500
10000 1.75 2.85 0.29 316 165 246 4.44 506 450
10000 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 5.00 400 400
10000 2.25 3.1 0.23 191 101 200 5.71 306 350
10000 2.5 3.25 0.19 141 70 170 6.67 225 300
10000 2.75 3.35 0.16 97 53 149 8.00 156 250
10000 3 3.5 0.13 63 31 117 10.00 100 200
10000 3.25 3.85 0.07 41 1 65 13.33 56 150
10000 3.5 3.85 0.07 24 1 65 20.00 25 100
10000 3.75 3.85 0.07 7 1 65 40.00 6 50
12500 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1219 500
12500 0.25 2.1 0.47 879 451 362 4.00 1094 500
12500 0.5 2.25 0.44 766 383 342 4.00 969 500
12500 0.75 2.35 0.41 660 340 327 4.00 844 500
12500 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.17 720 480
12500 1.25 2.6 0.35 472 245 289 4.55 605 440
12500 1.5 2.75 0.31 391 195 264 5.00 500 400
12500 1.75 2.85 0.29 316 165 246 5.56 405 360
12500 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 6.25 320 320
12500 2.25 3.1 0.23 191 101 200 7.14 245 280
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RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m c w α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
12500 2.5 3.25 0.19 141 70 170 8.33 180 240
12500 2.75 3.35 0.16 97 53 149 10.00 125 200
12500 3 3.5 0.13 63 31 117 12.50 80 160
12500 3.25 3.85 0.07 41 1 65 16.67 45 120
12500 3.5 3.85 0.07 24 1 65 25.00 20 80
12500 3.75 3.85 0.07 7 1 65 50.00 5 40
15000 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.00 1063 500
15000 0.25 2.1 0.47 879 451 362 4.00 938 500
15000 0.5 2.25 0.44 766 383 342 4.29 817 467
15000 0.75 2.35 0.41 660 340 327 4.62 704 433
15000 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 5.00 600 400
15000 1.25 2.6 0.35 472 245 289 5.45 504 367
15000 1.5 2.75 0.31 391 195 264 6.00 417 333
15000 1.75 2.85 0.29 316 165 246 6.67 338 300
15000 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 7.50 267 267
15000 2.25 3.1 0.23 191 101 200 8.57 204 233
15000 2.5 3.25 0.19 141 70 170 10.00 150 200
15000 2.75 3.35 0.16 97 53 149 12.00 104 167
15000 3 3.5 0.13 63 31 117 15.00 67 133
15000 3.25 3.85 0.07 41 1 65 20.00 38 100
15000 3.5 3.85 0.07 24 1 65 30.00 17 67
15000 3.75 3.85 0.07 7 1 65 60.00 4 33
17500 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 4.38 914 457
17500 0.25 2.1 0.47 879 451 362 4.67 804 429
17500 0.5 2.25 0.44 766 383 342 5.00 700 400
17500 0.75 2.35 0.41 660 340 327 5.38 604 371
17500 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 5.83 514 343
17500 1.25 2.6 0.35 472 245 289 6.36 432 314
17500 1.5 2.75 0.31 391 195 264 7.00 357 286
17500 1.75 2.85 0.29 316 165 246 7.78 289 257
17500 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 8.75 229 229
17500 2.25 3.1 0.23 191 101 200 10.00 175 200
17500 2.5 3.25 0.19 141 70 170 11.67 129 171
17500 2.75 3.35 0.16 97 53 149 14.00 89 143
17500 3 3.5 0.13 63 31 117 17.50 57 114
17500 3.25 3.85 0.07 41 1 65 23.33 32 86
17500 3.5 3.85 0.07 24 1 65 35.00 14 57
17500 3.75 3.85 0.07 7 1 65 70.00 4 29
20000 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 5.00 800 400
20000 0.25 2.1 0.47 879 451 362 5.33 703 375
20000 0.5 2.25 0.44 766 383 342 5.71 613 350
20000 0.75 2.35 0.41 660 340 327 6.15 528 325
20000 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 6.67 450 300
20000 1.25 2.6 0.35 472 245 289 7.27 378 275
20000 1.5 2.75 0.31 391 195 264 8.00 313 250
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RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m c w α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
20000 1.75 2.85 0.29 316 165 246 8.89 253 225
20000 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 10.00 200 200
20000 2.25 3.1 0.23 191 101 200 11.43 153 175
20000 2.5 3.25 0.19 141 70 170 13.33 113 150
20000 2.75 3.35 0.16 97 53 149 16.00 78 125
20000 3 3.5 0.13 63 31 117 20.00 50 100
20000 3.25 3.85 0.07 41 1 65 26.67 28 75
20000 3.5 3.85 0.07 24 1 65 40.00 13 50
20000 3.75 3.85 0.07 7 1 65 80.00 3 25
22500 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 5.63 711 356
22500 0.25 2.1 0.47 879 451 362 6.00 625 333
22500 0.5 2.25 0.44 766 383 342 6.43 544 311
22500 0.75 2.35 0.41 660 340 327 6.92 469 289
22500 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 7.50 400 267
22500 1.25 2.6 0.35 472 245 289 8.18 336 244
22500 1.5 2.75 0.31 391 195 264 9.00 278 222
22500 1.75 2.85 0.29 316 165 246 10.00 225 200
22500 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 11.25 178 178
22500 2.25 3.1 0.23 191 101 200 12.86 136 156
22500 2.5 3.25 0.19 141 70 170 15.00 100 133
22500 2.75 3.35 0.16 97 53 149 18.00 69 111
22500 3 3.5 0.13 63 31 117 22.50 44 89
22500 3.25 3.85 0.07 41 1 65 30.00 25 67
22500 3.5 3.85 0.07 24 1 65 45.00 11 44
22500 3.75 3.85 0.07 7 1 65 90.00 3 22
25000 0 2 0.50 1000 500 375 6.25 640 320
25000 0.25 2.1 0.47 879 451 362 6.67 563 300
25000 0.5 2.25 0.44 766 383 342 7.14 490 280
25000 0.75 2.35 0.41 660 340 327 7.69 423 260
25000 1 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 8.33 360 240
25000 1.25 2.6 0.35 472 245 289 9.09 303 220
25000 1.5 2.75 0.31 391 195 264 10.00 250 200
25000 1.75 2.85 0.29 316 165 246 11.11 203 180
25000 2 3 0.25 250 125 219 12.50 160 160
25000 2.25 3.1 0.23 191 101 200 14.29 123 140
25000 2.5 3.25 0.19 141 70 170 16.67 90 120
25000 2.75 3.35 0.16 97 53 149 20.00 63 100
25000 3 3.5 0.13 63 31 117 25.00 40 80
25000 3.25 3.85 0.07 41 1 65 33.33 23 60
25000 3.5 3.85 0.07 24 1 65 50.00 10 40
25000 3.75 3.85 0.07 7 1 65 100.00 3 20
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Table 5.13: Dual Channel Strategy in the p/k Plane, m=7500, v=8, k=1
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
p k w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
2.00 0.75 2 6.00 0.03 292 0 500 0 0 ER
2.00 1.25 1.95 6.00 0.05 292 0 500 0 0 ER
2.00 1.75 1.95 6.00 0.08 292 0 500 0 0 ER
2.00 2.25 1.8 6.57 0.15 292 1 449 19 32 SP
2.00 2.75 1.8 6.76 0.16 294 1 444 17 39 CP
2.00 3.25 1.75 7.34 0.21 299 1 409 35 57 CP
2.00 3.75 1.7 8.06 0.27 305 2 372 60 68 CP
2.00 4.25 1.65 8.99 0.34 315 1 334 94 72 CP
2.00 4.75 1.55 9.46 0.43 320 3 317 123 60 CP
2.00 5.25 1.45 9.79 0.54 323 1 306 153 40 CP
2.25 0.75 2.25 5.75 0.03 398 0 500 0 0 ER
2.25 1.25 2.2 5.75 0.06 398 0 500 0 0 ER
2.25 1.75 2.15 5.75 0.09 398 0 500 0 0 ER
2.25 2.25 2.15 5.75 0.13 398 0 500 0 0 ER
2.25 2.75 2.05 5.90 0.17 398 0 487 4 9 CP
2.25 3.25 1.95 6.39 0.23 400 1 450 20 30 CP
2.25 3.75 1.9 7.21 0.29 407 1 399 51 51 CP
2.25 4.25 1.8 7.95 0.37 416 3 361 84 55 CP
2.25 4.75 1.7 8.85 0.47 426 3 325 126 49 CP
2.25 5.25 1.55 9.06 0.61 428 2 317 155 27 CP
2.50 0.75 2.5 5.50 0.03 502 0 500 0 0 ER
2.50 1.25 2.45 5.50 0.06 502 0 500 0 0 ER
2.50 1.75 2.4 5.50 0.09 502 0 500 0 0 ER
2.50 2.25 2.35 5.50 0.14 502 0 500 0 0 ER
2.50 2.75 2.3 5.50 0.19 502 0 500 0 0 ER
2.50 3.25 2.15 5.84 0.25 503 1 471 12 16 CP
2.50 3.75 2.1 6.81 0.32 511 0 404 51 45 CP
2.50 4.25 1.95 7.50 0.41 520 5 367 87 47 CP
2.50 4.75 1.8 8.28 0.53 530 8 332 130 38 CP
2.50 5.25 1.6 8.48 0.71 533 2 324 161 14 CP
2.75 0.75 2.75 5.25 0.03 603 0 500 0 0 ER
2.75 1.25 2.7 5.25 0.06 603 0 500 0 0 ER
2.75 1.75 2.65 5.25 0.10 603 0 500 0 0 ER
2.75 2.25 2.55 5.25 0.15 603 0 500 0 0 ER
2.75 2.75 2.5 5.25 0.20 603 0 500 0 0 ER
2.75 3.25 2.35 5.55 0.27 604 0 473 12 14 CP
2.75 3.75 2.25 6.48 0.35 613 2 405 54 40 CP
2.75 4.25 2.1 7.52 0.45 628 4 349 105 46 CP
2.75 4.75 1.9 8.45 0.60 642 7 311 159 31 CP
2.75 5.25 1.35 5.44 1.00 603 1 482 18 0 CP
3.00 0.75 2.95 5.00 0.03 700 0 500 0 0 ER
3.00 1.25 2.9 5.00 0.07 700 0 500 0 0 ER
3.00 1.75 2.85 5.00 0.11 700 0 500 0 0 ER
3.00 2.25 2.8 5.00 0.16 700 0 500 0 0 ER
3.00 2.75 2.7 5.00 0.22 700 0 500 0 0 ER
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
p k w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
3.00 3.25 2.55 5.46 0.29 702 0 458 21 21 CP
3.00 3.75 2.4 6.46 0.38 715 2 387 70 43 CP
3.00 4.25 2.2 7.61 0.50 735 7 328 130 42 CP
3.00 4.75 1.9 8.13 0.70 744 13 308 175 17 CP
3.00 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.25 0.75 3.2 4.75 0.04 793 0 500 0 0 ER
3.25 1.25 3.15 4.75 0.07 793 0 500 0 0 ER
3.25 1.75 3.1 4.75 0.12 793 0 500 0 0 ER
3.25 2.25 3 4.75 0.17 793 0 500 0 0 ER
3.25 2.75 2.9 4.75 0.24 793 0 500 0 0 ER
3.25 3.25 2.7 5.43 0.32 798 1 437 34 29 CP
3.25 3.75 2.55 6.79 0.43 823 1 350 101 50 CP
3.25 4.25 2.3 8.45 0.58 856 3 281 180 39 CP
3.25 4.75 1.6 6.02 1.00 807 5 395 105 0 CP
3.25 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.50 0.75 3.45 4.50 0.04 880 0 500 0 0 ER
3.50 1.25 3.4 4.50 0.08 880 0 500 0 0 ER
3.50 1.75 3.3 4.50 0.13 880 0 500 0 0 ER
3.50 2.25 3.2 4.50 0.19 880 0 500 0 0 ER
3.50 2.75 2.95 4.68 0.28 879 1 477 13 10 SP
3.50 3.25 2.85 5.61 0.35 894 2 401 58 41 CP
3.50 3.75 2.65 7.32 0.48 934 1 308 141 52 CP
3.50 4.25 2.25 8.49 0.69 961 16 265 212 23 CP
3.50 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.50 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.75 0.75 3.7 4.25 0.04 960 0 500 0 0 ER
3.75 1.25 3.6 4.25 0.08 960 0 500 0 0 ER
3.75 1.75 3.5 4.25 0.14 960 0 500 0 0 ER
3.75 2.25 3.4 4.25 0.20 960 0 500 0 0 ER
3.75 2.75 3.2 4.77 0.29 965 0 446 27 27 CP
3.75 3.25 3 6.10 0.40 998 0 349 97 55 CP
3.75 3.75 2.7 8.21 0.56 1056 2 259 194 48 CP
3.75 4.25 1.85 6.72 1.00 1016 9 316 184 0 CP
3.75 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.75 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 0.75 3.95 4.00 0.05 1031 0 500 0 0 ER
4.00 1.25 3.85 4.00 0.09 1031 0 500 0 0 ER
4.00 1.75 3.7 4.00 0.15 1031 0 500 0 0 ER
4.00 2.25 3.5 4.08 0.23 1031 0 489 6 6 SP
4.00 2.75 3.35 5.05 0.32 1052 0 396 56 48 CP
4.00 3.25 3.05 6.59 0.45 1104 7 304 138 59 CP
4.00 3.75 2.65 9.43 0.67 1187 5 212 256 32 CP
4.00 4.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Table 5.14: RW/DO Strategy in the p/k Plane
RETAILER ONLY DIRECT ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
p k w α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
2.00 0.75 1.5 0.25 125 62 219 6 292 500
2.00 1.25 1.5 0.25 125 62 219 6 292 500
2.00 1.75 1.5 0.25 125 62 219 6 292 500
2.00 2.25 1.5 0.25 125 62 219 6 292 500
2.00 2.75 1.8 0.16 130 6 150 6 292 500
2.00 3.25 1.75 0.21 159 8 190 6 292 500
2.00 3.75 1.7 0.27 190 8 234 6 292 500
2.00 4.25 1.65 0.34 222 3 283 6 292 500
2.00 4.75 1.55 0.43 236 9 337 6 292 500
2.00 5.25 1.45 0.54 245 3 396 6 292 500
2.25 0.75 1.6 0.29 173 94 247 5.75 398 500
2.25 1.25 1.6 0.29 173 94 247 5.75 398 500
2.25 1.75 1.6 0.29 173 94 247 5.75 398 500
2.25 2.25 1.6 0.29 173 94 247 5.75 398 500
2.25 2.75 2.05 0.17 183 1 159 5.75 398 500
2.25 3.25 1.95 0.23 217 10 202 5.75 398 500
2.25 3.75 1.9 0.29 263 6 250 5.75 398 500
2.25 4.25 1.8 0.37 297 12 302 5.75 398 500
2.25 4.75 1.7 0.47 330 9 360 5.75 398 500
2.25 5.25 1.55 0.61 337 6 425 5.75 398 500
2.50 0.75 1.75 0.30 225 112 255 5.5 502 500
2.50 1.25 1.75 0.30 225 112 255 5.5 502 500
2.50 1.75 1.75 0.30 225 112 255 5.5 502 500
2.50 2.25 1.75 0.30 225 112 255 5.5 502 500
2.50 2.75 2.25 0.19 233 3 169 5.5 502 500
2.50 3.25 2.15 0.25 283 10 216 5.5 502 500
2.50 3.75 2.1 0.32 349 1 267 5.5 502 500
2.50 4.25 1.95 0.41 386 17 324 5.5 502 500
2.50 4.75 1.8 0.53 420 23 387 5.5 502 500
2.50 5.25 1.6 0.71 428 5 459 5.5 502 500
2.75 0.75 1.85 0.33 278 147 274 5.25 603 500
2.75 1.25 1.85 0.33 278 147 274 5.25 603 500
2.75 1.75 1.85 0.33 278 147 274 5.25 603 500
2.75 2.25 1.85 0.33 278 147 274 5.25 603 500
2.75 2.75 2.45 0.20 292 5 181 5.25 603 500
2.75 3.25 2.35 0.27 360 9 231 5.25 603 500
2.75 3.75 2.25 0.35 434 8 287 5.25 603 500
2.75 4.25 2.1 0.45 495 14 349 5.25 603 500
2.75 4.75 1.9 0.60 537 18 419 5.25 603 500
2.75 5.25 1.35 1.00 350 25 500 5.25 603 500
3.00 0.75 2 0.33 333 167 278 5 700 500
3.00 1.25 2 0.33 333 167 278 5 700 500
3.00 1.75 2 0.33 333 167 278 5 700 500
3.00 2.25 2 0.33 333 167 278 5 700 500
3.00 2.75 2.65 0.22 360 5 194 5 700 500
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RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
p k w α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
3.00 3.25 2.55 0.29 451 4 249 5 700 500
3.00 3.75 2.4 0.38 535 10 309 5 700 500
3.00 4.25 2.2 0.50 606 21 377 5 700 500
3.00 4.75 1.9 0.70 631 34 455 5 700 500
3.00 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.25 0.75 2.1 0.35 389 203 291 4.75 793 500
3.25 1.25 2.1 0.35 389 203 291 4.75 793 500
3.25 1.75 2.1 0.35 389 203 291 4.75 793 500
3.25 2.25 2.1 0.35 389 203 291 4.75 793 500
3.25 2.75 2.85 0.24 439 3 209 4.75 793 500
3.25 3.25 2.7 0.32 543 10 269 4.75 793 500
3.25 3.75 2.55 0.43 660 3 335 4.75 793 500
3.25 4.25 2.3 0.58 751 6 411 4.75 793 500
3.25 4.75 1.6 1.00 600 25 500 4.75 793 500
3.25 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.50 0.75 2.25 0.36 446 223 293 4.5 880 500
3.50 1.25 2.25 0.36 446 223 293 4.5 880 500
3.50 1.75 2.25 0.36 446 223 293 4.5 880 500
3.50 2.25 2.25 0.36 446 223 293 4.5 880 500
3.50 2.75 3 0.26 521 11 227 4.5 880 500
3.50 3.25 2.85 0.35 656 10 292 4.5 880 500
3.50 3.75 2.65 0.48 794 4 366 4.5 880 500
3.50 4.25 2.25 0.69 857 34 451 4.5 880 500
3.50 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.50 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.75 0.75 2.35 0.37 504 261 304 4.25 960 500
3.75 1.25 2.35 0.37 504 261 304 4.25 960 500
3.75 1.75 2.35 0.37 504 261 304 4.25 960 500
3.75 2.25 2.35 0.37 504 261 304 4.25 960 500
3.75 2.75 3.2 0.29 635 3 247 4.25 960 500
3.75 3.25 3 0.40 796 1 319 4.25 960 500
3.75 3.75 2.7 0.56 945 4 401 4.25 960 500
3.75 4.25 1.85 1.00 850 25 500 4.25 960 500
3.75 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.75 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 0.75 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4 1031 500
4.00 1.25 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4 1031 500
4.00 1.75 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4 1031 500
4.00 2.25 3.5 0.23 566 11 201 4 1031 500
4.00 2.75 3.35 0.32 758 2 271 4 1031 500
4.00 3.25 3.05 0.45 931 19 351 4 1031 500
4.00 3.75 2.65 0.67 1102 9 445 4 1031 500
4.00 4.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 4.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.00 5.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Table 5.15: Dual Channel Strategy in the m/v Plane, p=4, k=1, c=1
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
0 5 1 1.00 1.00 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 5.5 3.05 1.26 0.48 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 6 3.05 1.34 0.48 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 6.5 3.05 1.43 0.48 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 7 3.05 1.51 0.48 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 7.5 3.05 1.60 0.48 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
0 8 3.05 1.69 0.48 1500 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 5 2 10.00 1.00 1025 0 50 450 0 CP
2500 5.5 3.35 4.25 0.30 854 8 176 167 156 CP
2500 6 3.05 2.86 0.29 908 43 323 102 75 SP
2500 6.5 3.75 2.50 0.13 1100 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 7 3.8 3.00 0.10 1222 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 7.5 3.85 3.50 0.08 1296 0 500 0 0 ER
2500 8 3.9 4.00 0.07 1344 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 5 2 20.00 1.00 1012 0 25 475 0 CP
5000 5.5 3.35 8.50 0.30 785 10 88 213 199 CP
5000 6 2.7 5.91 0.35 738 154 148 213 140 SP
5000 6.5 2.9 4.69 0.31 820 91 228 162 111 SP
5000 7 3.8 3.00 0.10 944 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 7.5 3.85 3.50 0.08 1092 0 500 0 0 ER
5000 8 3.9 4.00 0.07 1187 0 500 0 0 ER
7500 5 2 30.00 1.00 1008 0 17 483 0 CP
7500 5.5 3.35 12.75 0.30 762 11 59 228 213 CP
7500 6 2.6 8.92 0.37 681 203 96 248 156 SP
7500 6.5 2.75 7.19 0.34 734 147 144 212 143 SP
7500 7 2.9 5.90 0.31 802 99 209 173 118 SP
7500 7.5 3.3 4.38 0.22 891 24 359 80 62 SP
7500 8 3.9 4.00 0.07 1031 0 500 0 0 ER
10000 5 2 40.00 1.00 1006 0 13 487 0 CP
10000 5.5 3.35 17.00 0.30 750 11 44 235 220 CP
10000 6 2.6 11.78 0.36 652 213 73 258 169 SP
10000 6.5 2.65 9.77 0.36 692 188 104 242 154 SP
10000 7 2.75 8.17 0.34 741 149 145 216 139 SP
10000 7.5 2.95 6.66 0.30 801 91 214 168 118 SP
10000 8 3.25 5.22 0.23 880 32 335 96 70 SP
12500 5 2 50.00 1.00 1005 0 10 490 0 CP
12500 5.5 3.35 21.25 0.30 743 12 35 240 225 CP
12500 6 2.55 14.82 0.37 634 236 58 272 170 SP
12500 6.5 2.65 12.09 0.35 666 195 84 249 167 SP
12500 7 2.7 10.27 0.34 705 172 114 234 152 SP
12500 7.5 2.8 8.73 0.33 752 136 156 208 136 SP
12500 8 3 7.18 0.28 808 81 226 160 114 SP
15000 5 2 60.00 1.00 1004 0 8 492 0 CP
15000 5.5 3.35 25.50 0.30 739 12 29 243 228 CP
15000 6 2.55 17.72 0.37 622 240 48 276 176 SP
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Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Eql.
m v w t α Πm Πr Direct Retailer Lost Type
15000 6.5 2.6 14.66 0.36 649 217 69 263 169 SP
15000 7 2.65 12.45 0.35 681 194 93 249 158 SP
15000 7.5 2.75 10.57 0.33 719 157 127 225 148 SP
15000 8 2.85 9.09 0.32 765 123 170 199 131 SP
17500 5 2 70.00 1.00 1004 0 7 493 0 CP
17500 5.5 3.35 29.75 0.30 736 12 25 245 230 CP
17500 6 2.55 20.61 0.37 614 243 42 279 180 SP
17500 6.5 2.6 17.03 0.36 637 221 59 266 175 SP
17500 7 2.65 14.44 0.35 664 198 81 253 166 SP
17500 7.5 2.7 12.49 0.34 697 177 106 239 155 SP
17500 8 2.8 10.73 0.32 735 141 142 215 143 SP
20000 5 2 80.00 1.00 1003 0 6 494 0 CP
20000 5.5 3.35 34.00 0.30 733 12 22 247 231 CP
20000 6 2.55 23.51 0.37 607 246 36 281 182 SP
20000 6.5 2.6 19.40 0.36 627 224 52 269 179 SP
20000 7 2.6 16.73 0.36 651 218 69 265 167 SP
20000 7.5 2.7 14.18 0.34 680 181 94 243 163 SP
20000 8 2.75 12.43 0.33 713 160 121 229 151 SP
22500 5 2 90.00 1.00 1003 0 6 494 0 CP
22500 5.5 3.35 38.25 0.30 731 12 20 248 232 CP
22500 6 2.55 26.41 0.37 602 248 33 283 185 SP
22500 6.5 2.55 22.12 0.37 620 243 45 279 176 SP
22500 7 2.6 18.76 0.36 642 221 61 267 171 SP
22500 7.5 2.65 16.20 0.35 667 200 81 255 165 SP
22500 8 2.7 14.21 0.34 696 179 104 241 155 SP
25000 5 2 100.00 1.00 1002 0 5 495 0 CP
25000 5.5 3.35 42.50 0.30 730 12 18 249 233 CP
25000 6 2.55 29.30 0.37 598 249 29 284 187 SP
25000 6.5 2.55 24.53 0.37 614 245 41 281 178 SP
25000 7 2.6 20.78 0.36 634 223 55 269 175 SP
25000 7.5 2.65 17.93 0.35 656 202 73 257 170 SP
25000 8 2.7 15.71 0.34 682 182 94 244 162 SP
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Table 5.16: RW/DO Strategy in the m/v Plane
RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m v w α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
0 5 2 1.00 1000 0 500 1.00 1500 500
0 5.5 3.35 0.30 716 12 258 1.50 1500 500
0 6 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 2.00 1500 500
0 6.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 2.50 1500 500
0 7 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 3.00 1500 500
0 7.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 3.50 1500 500
0 8 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1500 500
2500 5 2 1.00 1000 0 500 3.33 225 150
2500 5.5 3.35 0.30 716 12 258 2.22 506 338
2500 6 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 2.00 875 500
2500 6.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 2.50 1100 500
2500 7 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 3.00 1222 500
2500 7.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 3.50 1296 500
2500 8 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1344 500
5000 5 2 1.00 1000 0 500 6.67 113 75
5000 5.5 3.35 0.30 716 12 258 4.44 253 169
5000 6 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 3.33 450 300
5000 6.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 2.67 703 469
5000 7 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 3.00 944 500
5000 7.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 3.50 1092 500
5000 8 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1188 500
7500 5 2 1.00 1000 0 500 10.00 75 50
7500 5.5 3.35 0.30 716 12 258 6.67 169 113
7500 6 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 5.00 300 200
7500 6.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 469 313
7500 7 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 3.33 675 450
7500 7.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 3.50 888 500
7500 8 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 1031 500
10000 5 2 1.00 1000 0 500 13.33 56 38
10000 5.5 3.35 0.30 716 12 258 8.89 127 84
10000 6 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 6.67 225 150
10000 6.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 5.33 352 234
10000 7 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.44 506 338
10000 7.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 3.81 689 459
10000 8 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.00 875 500
12500 5 2 1.00 1000 0 500 16.67 45 30
12500 5.5 3.35 0.30 716 12 258 11.11 101 68
12500 6 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 8.33 180 120
12500 6.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 6.67 281 188
12500 7 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 5.56 405 270
12500 7.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.76 551 368
12500 8 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 4.17 720 480
15000 5 2 1.00 1000 0 500 20.00 38 25
15000 5.5 3.35 0.30 716 12 258 13.33 84 56
15000 6 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 10.00 150 100
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RETAILER-ONLY DIRECT-ONLY
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales Decision Var. Profit Sales
m v w α Πm Πr Retailer t Πm Direct
15000 6.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 8.00 234 156
15000 7 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 6.67 338 225
15000 7.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 5.71 459 306
15000 8 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 5.00 600 400
17500 5 2 1.00 1000 0 500 23.33 32 21
17500 5.5 3.35 0.30 716 12 258 15.56 72 48
17500 6 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 11.67 129 86
17500 6.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 9.33 201 134
17500 7 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 7.78 289 193
17500 7.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 6.67 394 263
17500 8 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 5.83 514 343
20000 5 2 1.00 1000 0 500 26.67 28 19
20000 5.5 3.35 0.30 716 12 258 17.78 63 42
20000 6 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 13.33 113 75
20000 6.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 10.67 176 117
20000 7 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 8.89 253 169
20000 7.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 7.62 345 230
20000 8 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 6.67 450 300
22500 5 2 1.00 1000 0 500 30.00 25 17
22500 5.5 3.35 0.30 716 12 258 20.00 56 38
22500 6 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 15.00 100 67
22500 6.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 12.00 156 104
22500 7 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 10.00 225 150
22500 7.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 8.57 306 204
22500 8 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 7.50 400 267
25000 5 2 1.00 1000 0 500 33.33 23 15
25000 5.5 3.35 0.30 716 12 258 22.22 51 34
25000 6 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 16.67 90 60
25000 6.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 13.33 141 94
25000 7 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 11.11 203 135
25000 7.5 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 9.52 276 184
25000 8 2.5 0.38 563 281 305 8.33 360 240
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